Terelle Malik Luckett v. State of Iowa

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 24-1731

Filed September 2, 2026

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Terelle Malik Luckett, Applicant–Appellant,

v.

State of Iowa,

Respondent–Appellee.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Richard Hollis, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

In this postconviction-relief (PCR) action, following Alford and guilty pleas to several criminal counts,1 Terelle Luckett raises several issues, including judicial disqualification of the PCR judge, ineffective assistance of his trial counsel under several theories, and finally, actual innocence. The State points to Luckett’s favorable plea agreement and the testimony of Luckett’s trial counsel to argue he could not show that his counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced. As for the request to have the PCR judge recuse himself, the State asserts Luckett did not preserve error nor was recusal necessary. And on the actual-innocence challenge, the State contends Luckett did not meet his heavy burden of proof because he did not provide any evidence of his innocence.

For our reasons set out below, we affirm the denial of the PCR application.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Luckett entered pleas in two cases and was sentenced to a total indeterminate sentence of seventeen years, but the sentencing court reconsidered Luckett’s sentence, suspended it, and imposed two years of probation. Unfortunately, Luckett did not take advantage of that favorable sentence as he violated his probation terms. In June 2019, the district court revoked his probation and imposed the seventeen-year sentence.

1 The PCR action challenges convictions in two separate cases in which he entered a combination of Alford and guilty pleas to the following charges: (1) first-degree theft; (2) two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon; (3) carrying concealed weapons; and (4) third-degree burglary.

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Luckett timely applied for PCR in April 2021. His PCR application was amended to add a long list of challenges, but at the September 2024 PCR hearing, the focus was on whether Luckett’s plea attorney provided effective assistance of counsel and whether Luckett was actually innocent. At the PCR hearing, the court considered the transcript of the plea proceeding, as well as other court filings, testimony from Luckett’s plea counsel, and testimony from Luckett. There was also a substance-use assessment report introduced as an exhibit that noted Luckett was oriented to person, place, and time, although he indicated problems with depression, anxiety, and trauma. The same judge who presided over the PCR hearing also took Luckett’s plea and sentenced him. From the record provided, no one challenged the judge’s assignment to the PCR case or asked him to recuse himself.

After considering the evidence, the PCR court denied Luckett’s PCR application finding he failed to prove that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance or that prejudice resulted. Based on the plea hearing transcript, the PCR court confirmed that Luckett understood the plea “proceedings, the rights he gave up entering the pleas, the consequences of his pleas, [and] that he [did not] suffer[] from anything that would cloud his judgment or make his actions in entering the pleas involuntary or against his will.” The court also rejected other claims made in the application but not addressed at the hearing. Additionally, the PCR court determined Luckett did not present clear and convincing evidence of his actual innocence. Luckett appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

Motions for recusal are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). While we generally review PCR proceedings for errors at law, “[t]o the extent [Luckett’s] claim of actual

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innocence raises constitutional questions, our review is de novo.” Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2019). Likewise, we review claims of ineffective assistance de novo. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Iowa 2010).

III. Analysis.

In the following order, we address Luckett’s claims that (1) the PCR judge failed to recuse himself from the proceeding, (2) plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) Luckett was actually innocent.

A. Judicial Disqualification. Luckett argues that because the PCR judge presided over the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings, the judge should have recused himself sua sponte from addressing the PCR application. More specifically, Luckett reasoned:

to grant Luckett relief on the merits of the related cluster of claims pertaining to whether Luckett’s due process rights were violated because he did not enter his pleas knowingly, and intelligently, and voluntarily set forth in Paragraph 4 subsections (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), and (o) of the Amended Petition, the Court had to determine that his prior findings to the contrary made on the record and in the order accepting Luckett’s pleas were erroneous.

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct rule 51:2.11(A)(1) states that “a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) The judge has . . . personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.” (Emphasis added). Given the mandatory nature of the rule, if disqualification is required, the court should disclose any possible basis for disqualification to the parties and obtain their consent to proceed, putting the onus on the court. See In re Howes, 880 N.W.2d 184, 194 (Iowa 2016) (“The rule’s mandatory nature is clear from its

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language, which provides a judge ʻshall disqualify himself or herself’ from deciding a matter whenever his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). But “[t]he burden of showing grounds for recusal is on the party seeking recusal.” Haskins, 573 N.W.2d at 44.

To address this challenge, the State first argues that Luckett did not preserve error as he never raised the issue at the time of the PCR hearing. Our appellate cases have applied error preservation to questions related to recusal where the question of disqualification is not addressed by the court at the time of the hearing. See State v. Goodson, 958 N.W.2d 791, 806 (Iowa 2021); Riley v. State, No. 24-0274, 2025 WL 1324260, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 7, 2025) (noting late challenge to court’s failure to recuse itself from the PCR proceeding because same judge handled the waiver of jury trial was not preserved for appeal). In Riley, we listed a series of cases supporting the rule that “[t]he issue of recusal is not preserved for our review if a litigant fails to bring that issue to the district court’s attention.” 2025 WL 1324260, at *2 (quoting State v. Pecora, No. 23-1292, 2024 WL 4965864, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024)); see also id. (citing cases that consider the recusal claim waived when the issue was not raised before the district court). Here, Luckett did not preserve error.

Even if we were to consider the recusal question, a motion for recusal would have been meritless. Here the PCR court simply repeated the transcribed exchange between the plea court and Luckett and made no findings with respect to any other earlier observations outside that proceeding. Thus, the knowledge of any alleged disputed evidentiary facts came from a judicial source, not extrajudicial. See State v Pirie, 18 N.W.3d 238, 244 (Iowa 2025) (requiring that the party seeking recusal “must show that the judge’s alleged bias and prejudice must stem from an

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extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participation in the case” (cleaned up)); Miller v. State, No. 13-1240, 2015 WL 1815903, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (noting that while the same judge presided over both the second trial and the PCR proceeding, the “[m]ere speculation as to judicial bias is not sufficient to prove the grounds necessary for recusal, nor is a judge’s perception or attitude arising from the judge’s participation a disqualifying factor. Rather, personal bias or actual prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source must be shown” (internal citations omitted)); see also State v. Hunter, No. 01-1919, 2002 WL 31757491, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (“Only personal bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source and resulting in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participation in the case ranks as a disqualifying factor; judicial predilection does not.”).

We also reject Luckett’s constitutional challenges related to his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Luckett cites federal cases that are not on point to this specific issue. See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (finding that where the judge had prior involvement in the case as a prosecutor “an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case”).

We find that if Luckett had preserved his claim, his basis for recusal—

that the judge presided over the plea proceeding—is meritless because he presented no evidence of bias, prejudice, or impermissible personal knowledge gained outside the responsibilities as a court officer. We find there was no abuse of discretion by having the PCR court preside over Luckett’s PCR claims. See Brownlee v. State, No. 19-1364, 2021 WL 595177, at *4–5,

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(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021) (concluding trial judge not required to recuse in subsequent PCR case because “the judge was neither a witness nor provided evidence”); Long v. State, No. 19-0726, 2020 WL 2061934, at *4–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020) (concluding that judge who had presided over other matters involving same individual was not required to recuse himself in PCR case because the applicant “offered no evidence that the judge had knowledge of [the applicant’s] cases other than from the course of [the judge’s] judicial responsibilities”).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. In our review of Luckett’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments, we synthesize them into three basic areas: (1) voluntariness of his plea based upon his characterization of his mental-health status and his intellectual abilities, (2) plea counsel’s failure to request a competency evaluation, and (3) failure of plea counsel to investigate and complete discovery that would have exposed weaknesses in the case. In his closing at the PCR hearing, Luckett’s counsel said:

So I think that there would have been a reasonable probability that he would have made a different decision if he would have been in a different state of mind and had the full evidence. It’s hard to say what kind of decision a person in Mr. Luckett’s position would make after you fully litigated and laid bare all the facts.

To start, “a defendant proves ineffective assistance of counsel when he establishes: (1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” Trane v. State, 16 N.W.3d 683, 692 (Iowa 2025) (cleaned up). To prove the first prong, the applicant must prove “counsel performed below the standard demanded of a reasonably competent attorney.” Id. (cleaned up). Still, “[w]e presume counsel performed competently unless the claimant proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). On the prejudice

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prong, “typically, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith v. State, 7 N.W.3d 723, 727 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). And when the applicant has pled guilty, the prejudice element requires proof that “the guilty plea would not have been entered but for the breach of duty by counsel.” Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2011).

At the PCR trial, Luckett discussed his poor mental-health status around the time he entered his pleas, which he contends should have been considered by his plea counsel because it impacted his ability to enter a voluntary and informed plea. In January 24, 2018 jail records, Luckett showed signs of suicidal thoughts and auditory hallucinations. He was placed in a safe cell and monitored, and his medications were adjusted. The next day, it was noted that Luckett “had been refusing his mediations and was experiencing an increase in auditory hallucinations telling him to hurt himself. These hallucinations have decreased and he did take his medications.” The safety cell was discontinued. Luckett entered his plea on February 8. Luckett’s contention is that his plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and based on his condition, plea counsel should have requested a competency evaluation.

Luckett also argued that plea counsel ignored his intellectual deficiencies and should have done more to make certain that Luckett understood the details of the plea. He notes that during the plea proceeding, the plea court referenced Luckett’s hesitation:

THE COURT: Would you agree with me that if the witnesses and evidence would come in exactly as the Trial Information and minutes of testimony say they would that there is a substantial likelihood that you would be found guilty of all three of those original charges?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You hesitated. You don’t think you would?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: You think you would?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: All right. Do you believe that by entering these Alford pleas to the charges I’ve just said to you earlier or a few moments ago, the class “C,” the aggravated and the other aggravated and the aggravated serious, that if the Trial Information and minutes of testimony in all those cases, if those witnesses were to come in and testify exactly as they say they would, that you could be found guilty of these other offenses, these lesser offenses? Do you believe that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

“[O]ur task is to examine the information before the trial court to determine if at the relevant time an unresolved question of the defendant’s competency reasonably appeared.” State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1979). Luckett addressed his mental-health diagnosis in detail with the plea court and assured the court that the medications helped his mental-health conditions and did not impact his ability “to have a clear head and make important decisions about [Luckett’s] life.” Then, Luckett specifically confirmed as he sat at the plea proceeding he was clearheaded and knew what was going on. From our vantage point, the record supports those statements as the colloquy with the court was detailed and extensive. And as it concerns Luckett’s intellectual abilities, he testified that he graduated from high school, could read and write, and had no trouble understanding the court.

In his representation of Luckett, plea counsel had notes that showed he met with Luckett nine times at the jail to prepare for the case. In his view,

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plea counsel recollected that “[Luckett] wasn’t spouting off conspiracy theories or saying that people were putting devices in Coke cans and things like that.” From our read of the plea proceeding transcript, Luckett engaged in a dialogue with the plea judge that was lucid and appropriate. As for the conversations he had with Luckett, plea counsel confirmed that Luckett’s motivation was to “get the best possible deal.”

After being questioned about the possibility of pursuing defenses related to drug intoxication or a mental-health-impairment defense, plea counsel offered that he considered those but, in his experience, “those kind of defenses are really, really difficult to prevail.” Plea counsel testified that his practice was to “seriously explore” whether a client is competent to stand trial when mental-health concerns are observed or raised but that he remembered that Luckett “understood the nature of the charges and was able to assist [him] in [Luckett’s] defense.” These allegations, relating to his mental health and intellectual limitations, pertain to the voluntary, intelligent, and knowing nature of the plea agreement. Based upon our review of the record made at the plea proceeding, we find that Luckett has not shown that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Given our reading of Luckett’s exchange with the plea court that carefully outlined the foundation for Luckett’s voluntary plea, we find plea counsel’s decision not to pursue a competency evaluation was reasonable and that Luckett comprehended the proceedings and his choices. Smith, 7 N.W.3d at 726 (“To establish that counsel breached an essential duty, the defendant is required to show that counsel did not meet the standard of performance required of ʻa reasonably competent practitioner.’” (quoting State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa 2012))). On top of that, Luckett’s statements that he was “satisfied” with plea counsel, had no trouble communicating with his counsel, and had sufficient time to talk to his attorney about all of the charges

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supports the conclusion that plea counsel provided reasonable and competent assistance of counsel.

Finally, Luckett asserts that plea counsel “failed his duty to investigate and assist [Luckett] with [his] defense.” On this challenge, Luckett contends he was unaware of details that would have influenced his decision to enter his plea agreements, such as if he had known that the other individuals who were also involved but were listed as witnesses had not been charged with crimes, thus indicating those persons had a motive to lie. Or that another witness had initially misled police, which called into question that witness’s credibility, and that no one ever found a gun that was allegedly used in the crime. He testified that his plea counsel influenced him to just agree as “this is the only deal that we [could] get.” Although plea counsel had not yet obtained statements of alleged co-defendants or the requested video or audio evidence, plea counsel confirmed that Luckett still wanted to pursue the guilty plea as Luckett “thought the evidence was strong enough against him to find him guilty potentially.” Plea counsel also emphasized the positive plea agreement Luckett received by noting: “[Luckett] avoided the mandatory minimum and he wanted to Alford plea to the crimes against him.2 And also as the [m]otion to [r]econsider indicated, there was an agreement from [the prosecutor] to agree to the reconsideration once he was sentenced.”

In a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

2 At the plea proceeding, plea counsel also noted “the substantial benefit” of the plea agreement as “going from a forcible felony robbery in the first degree with a twenty- five-year sentence, if convicted, with a mandatory seventy percent, to a theft in the first degree.”

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different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The PCR court found that Luckett failed to prove that his trial counsel breached his duty as counsel or that even if he had, prejudice resulted. Here, “[t]o satisfy the prejudice requirement, [Luckett] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he . . . would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). While there may have been options to attack the charges based upon what witnesses’ statements might have shown, as in many criminal trials, the minutes of testimony established that, had a jury believed those allegations, Luckett was facing significant prison time. As the State argues, Luckett was facing a possible prison term of forty years had he gone to trial and lost. And plea counsel confirmed that had Luckett felt he was innocent of the crime, counsel would have put on a strong defense and would have been willing to take the case to trial. Thus, given the benefits of the plea agreement (as Luckett himself acknowledged during the plea hearing), he has failed to show there was a reasonable probability he would have withdrawn his guilty pleas and taken his case to trial. Id.; see also Buckley v. State, No. 18-0278, 2018 WL 5839882, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2018) (finding defendant’s concession he “received a considerable deal” supported reasonable probability he would not have insisted on going to trial).

Based upon our de novo review of the record, we find Luckett failed to prove the prejudice prong or that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

C. Actual Innocence. The PCR court found that Luckett failed to present any evidence that could establish “by clear and convincing evidence that despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable

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fact finder could convict him.” It noted that the only evidence presented was “Luckett’s unsupported testimony.”

“For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty . . . .” Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018). On our review, we give weight to the PCR court’s finding that Luckett’s testimony was not credible. See Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021).

After our review of the record, we find Luckett did not “meet the demanding actual-innocence standard to prove the validity of [his] actual- innocence claims.” Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5 (quoting Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 793).

IV. Conclusion.

The PCR court did not abuse its discretion by presiding over the PCR proceeding even though it handled the plea proceeding. We affirm the PCR court’s conclusion that Luckett could not establish his counsel provided ineffective assistance or that he was prejudiced by any claimed failure. And, as Luckett failed to prove the validity of his actual-innocence claim, we also reject that challenge. We affirm the denial of the PCR application.

AFFIRMED.