UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CESAR TERAN-SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 23-cv-3189 (DLF)
STREAM REALTY PARTNERS, L.P.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cesar Teran-Sanchez brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., alleging race- and sex-based discrimination and retaliation by his
former employer, Stream Realty Partners, L.P. Compl., Dkt. 1. Before the Court is the
defendant’s motion to dismiss Teran-Sanchez’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 8. For the reasons that follow, the
Court will grant the motion and dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Cesar Teran-Sanchez is a homosexual Latino male formerly employed by Stream Realty,
a commercial real estate services company, as a building technician. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2. Teran-
Sanchez commenced his employment with Stream Realty in 2018 in their Dallas, Texas office. Id.
¶ 6. In 2022, Teran-Sanchez was transferred to Stream Realty’s Washington, D.C. office. Id. ¶ 9.
1 Because this order resolves a motion to dismiss, these background facts are drawn from the complaint. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Court accepts the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Arencibia v. 2401 Rest. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 318, 323 (D.D.C. 2010). Teran-Sanchez alleges that, following his transfer to Washington, D.C., he “began to
experience significant discrimination at Stream Realty[.]” Id. ¶ 11. Namely, he “regularly heard
his coworkers use derogatory slurs” and make statements like “gay people should not exist.” Id.
¶ ¶ 12–13. He also heard his supervisors make “racist comments about employees of color[.]” Id.
¶ 14. At some point, Teran-Sanchez brought his concerns of discriminatory treatment to Stream
Realty’s Human Resources Department (“HR”). Id. ¶ 17. Teran-Sanchez claims that his
“experience[] worsened after he made his HR complaint, to include threats and intimidation from
his supervisor,” and that his employment was eventually terminated by constructive discharge. Id.
¶ ¶ 19–21.
Teran-Sanchez claims that he suffered race- and sex-based discrimination and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. ¶¶ 22–41. He seeks compensatory and punitive
damages, among other relief. Id. ¶¶ 42–44. In response, Stream Realty filed the instant motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 8.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). This standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement, but it does require
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
2 level[.]”). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but alleging facts that are
“merely consistent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to
[an] assumption of truth,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and the Court construes the complaint “in favor
of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But the Court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor
an inference unsupported by the facts alleged in the pleadings. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178,
193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). An “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited; likewise, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
[is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679.
III. ANALYSIS
The complaint alleges three claims under Title VII: discrimination on the basis of race,
discrimination on the basis of sex, and retaliation. For the reasons that follow, the complaint fails
to state any of these claims. The Court will thus dismiss the complaint.
To state a claim for Title VII discrimination, a complaint must allege facts that, if true,
would establish that “(1) [the claimant] is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007). To state a claim for
3 retaliation, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity,
(2) she suffered a materially adverse action by her employer, and (3) the two are causally
connected.” Spence v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 109 F.4th 531 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted). An adverse employment action is a disadvantageous, but not
necessarily significant or substantial, change to a term, condition, or privilege of employment.
Mudrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024); see generally Chambers v. District of
Columbia, 35 F.4th 870 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
To meet the adverse action requirement of both his discrimination and retaliation claims,
Teran-Sanchez alleges that he was constructively discharged from his employment with Stream
Realty. Compl. ¶ 21.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CESAR TERAN-SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 23-cv-3189 (DLF)
STREAM REALTY PARTNERS, L.P.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cesar Teran-Sanchez brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., alleging race- and sex-based discrimination and retaliation by his
former employer, Stream Realty Partners, L.P. Compl., Dkt. 1. Before the Court is the
defendant’s motion to dismiss Teran-Sanchez’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 8. For the reasons that follow, the
Court will grant the motion and dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Cesar Teran-Sanchez is a homosexual Latino male formerly employed by Stream Realty,
a commercial real estate services company, as a building technician. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2. Teran-
Sanchez commenced his employment with Stream Realty in 2018 in their Dallas, Texas office. Id.
¶ 6. In 2022, Teran-Sanchez was transferred to Stream Realty’s Washington, D.C. office. Id. ¶ 9.
1 Because this order resolves a motion to dismiss, these background facts are drawn from the complaint. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Court accepts the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Arencibia v. 2401 Rest. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 318, 323 (D.D.C. 2010). Teran-Sanchez alleges that, following his transfer to Washington, D.C., he “began to
experience significant discrimination at Stream Realty[.]” Id. ¶ 11. Namely, he “regularly heard
his coworkers use derogatory slurs” and make statements like “gay people should not exist.” Id.
¶ ¶ 12–13. He also heard his supervisors make “racist comments about employees of color[.]” Id.
¶ 14. At some point, Teran-Sanchez brought his concerns of discriminatory treatment to Stream
Realty’s Human Resources Department (“HR”). Id. ¶ 17. Teran-Sanchez claims that his
“experience[] worsened after he made his HR complaint, to include threats and intimidation from
his supervisor,” and that his employment was eventually terminated by constructive discharge. Id.
¶ ¶ 19–21.
Teran-Sanchez claims that he suffered race- and sex-based discrimination and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. ¶¶ 22–41. He seeks compensatory and punitive
damages, among other relief. Id. ¶¶ 42–44. In response, Stream Realty filed the instant motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 8.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). This standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement, but it does require
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
2 level[.]”). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but alleging facts that are
“merely consistent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to
[an] assumption of truth,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and the Court construes the complaint “in favor
of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But the Court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor
an inference unsupported by the facts alleged in the pleadings. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178,
193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). An “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited; likewise, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
[is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679.
III. ANALYSIS
The complaint alleges three claims under Title VII: discrimination on the basis of race,
discrimination on the basis of sex, and retaliation. For the reasons that follow, the complaint fails
to state any of these claims. The Court will thus dismiss the complaint.
To state a claim for Title VII discrimination, a complaint must allege facts that, if true,
would establish that “(1) [the claimant] is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007). To state a claim for
3 retaliation, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity,
(2) she suffered a materially adverse action by her employer, and (3) the two are causally
connected.” Spence v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 109 F.4th 531 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted). An adverse employment action is a disadvantageous, but not
necessarily significant or substantial, change to a term, condition, or privilege of employment.
Mudrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024); see generally Chambers v. District of
Columbia, 35 F.4th 870 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
To meet the adverse action requirement of both his discrimination and retaliation claims,
Teran-Sanchez alleges that he was constructively discharged from his employment with Stream
Realty. Compl. ¶ 21. The doctrine of constructive discharge permits an employee who resigned
from their employment to “demonstrate she suffered an adverse employment action by showing
the resignation or retirement was, in fact, not voluntary.” Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556, 566 (D.C.
Cir. 2010). The inquiry for constructive discharge is an objective one: the complainant must show
that “working conditions [had] become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s
position would have felt compelled to resign.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141
(2004). In the context of a Title VII action, that requires a finding of discrimination and the
existence of aggravating factors that would force a reasonable employee to leave. See Mungin v.
Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Here, the complaint does not plausibly allege that the plaintiff was constructively
discharged. The plaintiff alleges that he was privy to an unspecified number of racist and
homophobic comments made by his coworkers and his supervisors. Compl. ¶¶ 12–14. However,
“[t]he D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that casual or isolated manifestations of a
discriminatory environment, such as a few ethnic or racial slurs,” are not sufficiently severe or
4 pervasive to establish the existence of a hostile work environment. Goode v. Billington, 932 F.
Supp. 2d 75, 89 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Slate v. Pub. Def. Serv.
for D.C., 31 F. Supp. 3d 277, 295–96 (collecting cases). As repugnant as these allegations are,
they do not render plausible the existence of such intolerable conditions that a reasonable employee
would have felt compelled to resign. See Pa. State Police, 542 U.S. at 141.
The complaint itself otherwise presents only vague and conclusory allegations to support
the notion that the plaintiff was constructively discharged. For instance, the complaint alleges that
the plaintiff’s “experience[] worsened after he made his HR complaint, to include threats and
intimidation from his supervisor,” but it does not specify the nature or frequency of such threats.
Compl. ¶ 19. The complaint also states that “[b]y October 2022, the discrimination and hostile
work environment Mr. Teran-Sanchez was experiencing became so pervasive, severe, and
intolerable, that it [sic] no reasonable employee could continue to work there.” Compl. ¶ 20. Bald,
conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, and in
deciding a motion to dismiss, a court cannot consider facts not alleged in the complaint, cf. Pappas
v. District of Columbia, 513 F. Supp. 3d 64, 80 n.5 (D.D.C. 2021) (rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt
to introduce new facts in later-filed briefs). Because the plaintiff has failed to adequately plead
that he was constructively discharged and thus subject to an adverse employment action, his
discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
5 Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; it is further
ORDERED that the plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty days of this
order.
________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge September 17, 2024