Teper v. East Penn Trucking Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Teper v. East Penn Trucking Co.

204 A.D.2d 712, 614 N.Y.S.2d 254

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 31, 1994

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 204 A.D.2d 712 (Teper v. East Penn Trucking Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Teper v. East Penn Trucking Co., 204 A.D.2d 712, 614 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal, (1) as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Krausman, J.), dated February 6, 1992, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and (2) from an order of the same court dated December 8, 1992, which (a) denied their motion for reargument, (b) denied their motion for leave to serve an amended answer, and (c) denied their motion which was denominated as one for renewal, but was, in fact, a motion for reargument.

[713]*713Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order dated December 8, 1992, as denied the defendants’ motions for reargument is dismissed since no appeal lies from the denial of reargument; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated December 8, 1992, is otherwise affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated February 6, 1992, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, no triable issue of fact exists with regard to the defendants’ liability (see, Cummins v Rose, 185 AD2d 839). The Supreme Court correctly determined that the defendant Daniel C. Myers’ conduct was the sole cause of the accident that caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, and it properly denied the defendants leave to assert a counterclaim for contribution.

The appeal from the denial of reargument must be dismissed since no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see, Savory v Romex Realty Corp., 194 AD2d 601).

We have examined the defendants’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Rosenblatt, Pizzuto and Florio, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal, (1) as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Krausman, J.), dated February 6, 1992, as granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and (2) from an order of the same court dated December 8, 1992, which (a) denied their motion for reargument, (b) denied their motion for leave to serve an amended answer, and (c) denied their motion which was denominated as one for renewal, but was, in fact, a motion for reargument.