Teodora Garcia v. Department of the Treasury

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 31, 2022
DocketDA-315H-16-0512-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Teodora Garcia v. Department of the Treasury (Teodora Garcia v. Department of the Treasury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Teodora Garcia v. Department of the Treasury, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TEODORA GARCIA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-315H-16-0512-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DATE: May 31, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Teodora Garcia, Austin, Texas, pro se.

Bridgette M. Gibson, Esquire, and Michael L. Salyards, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The agency terminated the appellant from her competitive -service position as a GS-4 Data Transcriber during her probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 18, 20-22. She timely appealed her termination to the Board. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge issued an order explaining that the appellant has the burden of proving that the action was within the Board’s jurisdiction, providing explicit information on what was required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue, and directing her to file evidence and argument proving jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 2; see Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). ¶3 After receiving the parties’ submissions, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the agency has responded in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. 3

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶4 Generally, the Board lacks jurisdiction over a probationary employee ’s appeal from a termination during the probationary period. Hurston v. Department of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 8 (2010). To establish Board jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, an individual must, among other things, show that she satisfies one of the definitions of “employee” in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d); see Walker v. Department of the Army, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5 (2013). For an individual in the competitive service, like the appellant, this means that she must either: (1) not be serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment; or (2) have completed 1 year of current, continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). Individuals in the competitive service who do not satisfy either definition may nevertheless have a regulatory right to appeal a termination to the Board when: (1) the employee was discriminated against based on her marital status; (2) the agency action was based on partisan political reasons; or (3) the agency action was based (in whole or in part) on preappointment reasons , and the agency did not follow the procedures of 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(a)-(c); see Walker, 119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 5. Absent a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction by an appellant, there is no right to a hearing on the threshold issue of jurisdiction. See Campion v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 326 F.3d 1210, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2003). ¶5 On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge ’s determinations that she was not an “employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) and that she did not nonfrivolously allege or show that the termination was based on partisan political reasons, marital status discrimination, or conditions arising before her appointment. PFR File, Tab 1; see ID at 2-5. Rather, the appellant challenges on review the merits of her termination and alleges that her Individual Performance Report, explaining her scores during her probationary period, was overlooked. PFR File, Tab 1. She submits for the first 4

time on review several documents supporting these arguments. Id. at 6-12. However, none of the appellant’s arguments constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of any of the exceptions to the general rule discussed above, and she has not shown that the evidence she submits on review was unavailable before the record closed despite her due diligence and was material to the jurisdictional issues in this case. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Thus, even if true, nothing the appellant alleges on review would establish Board jurisdiction ove r her probationary termination. ¶6 Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s initial decision dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seekin g such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Related

Bridgett L. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board
758 F.2d 641 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
James Campion v. Merit Systems Protection Board
326 F.3d 1210 (Federal Circuit, 2003)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Teodora Garcia v. Department of the Treasury, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/teodora-garcia-v-department-of-the-treasury-mspb-2022.