J-S04044-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
TENTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : PHILIP SNYDER : : Appellant : No. 1321 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered April 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 190703016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2024
Philip Snyder (“Snyder”) appeals from the order granting the emergency
motion for injunctive relief for a preliminary injunction filed by Tenth
Presbyterian Church (“the Church”). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
This matter has been before this Court in three prior appeals. In one of
those appeals, this Court summarized the factual and procedural history of
this dispute as follows:
The Church owns several properties in Philadelphia. The Church’s primary facility is located at 1701 Delancey Street (“the Property”). Snyder moved to Philadelphia in 2008, after which he joined the Church, where he remained a member until the Church excommunicated [him] in August 2016. Snyder thereafter began picketing at the Property regarding his excommunication and the conduct of certain current and prior Church officials. Snyder brought a defamation action against individual members of the Church, but ultimately, a jury tendered a verdict against Snyder. J-S04044-24
After the verdict in the defamation action, Snyder protested outside of the Property every Sunday, before and after Church services. [In] 2019, the Church filed a complaint for an injunction and an emergency motion for injunctive relief for a preliminary injunction. The Church sought to restrict Snyder from coming within 1,000 feet of all properties owned by the Church. Following oral argument, Snyder temporarily agreed to the Church’s requested relief.
The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on the Church’s motion for a preliminary injunction [i]n . . . 2020. The trial court described the evidence presented at that hearing as follows:
Snyder testified that he began picketing outside of the Property after the . . . 2019. . . jury verdict more frequently, with a sign that contained the phrase “naked beatings,” “lying,” and “rape,” because he was displeased with the results of the case. Snyder further testified that he had protested while wearing a body camera and filmed congregants outside of the Property. Snyder testified that a trial court order and subsequent opinion in the defamation case misrepresented the truth. Douglas Baker (Baker), the Church’s former administrator, testified that Snyder frequently wore a visibly “concealed” firearm to church services when he was a member, and that he continued the practice while picketing with the sign and body camera. Baker testified that Snyder would verbally harass and yell at congregants outside the Property and then post body camera videos on a blog. Dr. William Goligher (Dr. Goligher), senior minister for the Church, testified that Snyder called him the “son of Satan” and a liar. Dr. Goligher testified that Snyder had verbally disparaged Snyder’s own family for not committing to his protest and not being faithful, including referring to Snyder’s wife as Job’s wife . . . Dr. Goligher also testified that Snyder seemed preoccupied with safety and firearms, such that he would stand beside Dr. Goligher and point out individuals whom he thought were carrying firearms. Snyder’s fixation on security and policing, even minor behaviors of the Church congregants, went on for years and included concerns about stolen phones,
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money, and immigrants. Snyder himself provided testimony that he has been the only individual telling the truth, that he has mailed 100 pages of material to 200 members of the Church, that he will never stop any of his behaviors until the Church’s leadership has resigned in full, and that the Church was trying to poison him and hire a hitman to assassinate him. Susan Elzey (Ms. Elzey), a congregant, testified that outside of Church services [in] 2019, Snyder told her he was an instrument of God, similar to a prophet, and that only Snyder knows the true nature of Dr. Goligher’s soul. Snyder went on to tell Ms. Elzey that Dr. Goligher was a son of Satan, and that any congregants who support Dr. Goligher are doing Satan’s work. Snyder also told Ms. Elzey that he was unhappy with his wife, described her as Job’s wife because she did not support him, and that his oath to remove Dr. Goligher from the Church was more important to him than his family.
By order dated February 10, 2020, the trial court granted the Church’s motion and enjoined Snyder from appearing within five thousand (5,000) feet of the Church’s properties located at (1) 1701 Delancey Street; (2) 1700 Spruce Street; (3) 315 S. 17th Street; (4) 1710 Spruce Street; and (5) 1716 Spruce Street.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/20, at 1-5 . . ..
Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 266 A.3d 640 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(unpublished memorandum at **1-5) (emphasis, brackets, unnecessary
capitalization, and some quotation marks omitted).
In an appeal of the February 2020 order granting the Church’s motion,
this Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that a preliminary injunction
was warranted; however, based on the Church’s request for a 1,000 feet
restriction, this Court reversed the imposition of a 5,000-foot restriction
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against Snyder, and remanded for the trial court to fashion a distance
limitation that was sufficient to protect congregants’ access to the Church and
its services, yet continued to uphold Snyder’s constitutional right to convey
his dissatisfaction with the Church and its leadership. See id. (unpublished
memorandum at **24-25). This Court directed the trial court to narrowly
tailor the injunction to “address the physical realities of each Church property
. . ..” Id. (unpublished memorandum at *22 n.3). Upon remand, the trial
court entered an order granting the Church’s motion and enjoining Snyder
from appearing within 1,000 feet of all Church-owned properties; however, it
did not address the physical realities of each Church property.
The matter returned to this Court on an appeal from that order. This
Court noted that the order did not indicate that the trial court had weighed
the physical characteristics of each Church property and tailed the distance
limitation accordingly. As such, this Court affirmed all aspects of the order
except for the 1,000 feet distance limitation, which was vacated. This Court
acknowledged the trial court’s finding that Snyder engaged in aggressive and
agitated behavior that frightened Church members inside and outside of the
Property, but directed the trial court to explain upon remand why its distance
restriction of 1,000 feet was the least necessary distance to protect Church
property, permit the congregants and Church employees access to the Church
and to hold services without distraction, with the least possible impingement
on Snyder’s constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the Church
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and its leadership on public streets and sidewalks. See Tenth Presbyterian
Church v. Snyder, 285 A.3d 917 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished
memorandum at *12). On remand, the trial court entered an order in granting
the Church’s motion and enjoining Snyder from appearing within 500 feet of
all Church-owned properties.
On appeal of that order, this Court determined that the trial court’s
explanation for imposing its new distance requirement failed to answer our
remand directive:
On remand, the trial court, in setting its new distance requirement at 500 feet, did not cite any record evidence or receive any new evidence. Instead, the trial court cited its own internet research that a “typical” city block is 310 to 323 feet in length, seemingly concluding that keeping Snyder around a block- and-a-half away from the Church was the only way to ensure that his protest does not deter congregants and employees of the Church from accessing its properties.
The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it is not clear what evidence the trial court is relying on for its finding that 500 feet is appropriate under the facts of this case, taking into consideration the physical layout of the Church’s properties and the surrounding neighborhood. Like it failed to do before, there is no evidence that the trial court, in setting its distance requirement, weighed the physical characteristics of the Church’s property and then tailored its distance requirement so that Snyder could still meaningfully protest the Church and its leadership.
Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 296 A.3d 569 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(unpublished memorandum at **16-17) (some emphasis added, some
emphasis in original). This Court additionally determined that the language
in the trial court’s order which enjoined Snyder from “[a]ppearing within [500
feet] of all property owned and/or occupied by [the Church], in the
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immediate vicinity of [the Church] including: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701
Delancey Street, 315 S. 17th Street, 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103,” did not restrict the Church’s property to only
those properties listed. Id. (unpublished memorandum at **18-19)
(emphasis in original). Consequently, this Court determined that the order,
as written, “possibly still captures unidentified locations from which Snyder is
enjoined from appearing within 500 feet.” Id. (unpublished memorandum at
*19). On these bases, this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded
for the trial court to: (1) identify all properties from which Snyder is enjoined
from appearing; (2) identify the specific conduct of Snyder which is causing
the harm and why that particular distance requirement is necessary to
alleviate the harm; and (3) set forth expressly why its 500-foot distance
requirement was the least necessary to protect the ability of congregants and
employees to access the Church and hold services without distraction, while
also being the least possible infringement on Snyder’s constitutional right to
protest the Church and its leadership in public. See id. (unpublished
memorandum at **19-20).
Upon remand, the trial court entered an order on April 18, 2023, in
which it indicated that Snyder is enjoined from “[a]ppearing within 350 feet
of the following properties: a. 1700 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103; b.
1701 Delancey Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103; c. 315 S. 17th Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19103; d. 1710 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103; and
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e. 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103.” See Order, 4/18/23, at
unnumbered 1. The order further explained that “all of the properties subject
to this injunction are actively used by Church congregants or employees and
are located in close proximity to the area where . . . Snyder has engaged in
his disruptive and harassing conduct.” Id. at unnumbered 5. The order also
identified, in detail, the particular conduct of Snyder that is causing the harm,
including verbally harassing and aggressively approaching congregants as
they are attempting to attend Church services or enter Church buildings,
causing congregants to fear for their safety to the point where they do not
feel safe to attend Church services, making threats to the life of a Church
minister, displaying escalating anger and increased confrontations with
congregants following the loss of his defamation action against Church
members, displaying a temperament change and an increased hostile social
media presence including a blog, possessing a firearm on at least one occasion
while engaging in his aggressive and harassing conduct, and displaying
behaviors indicative of escalating violence relating to religious institutions. Id.
at unnumbered 2-4.
However, rather than providing an explanation as to why the 500 feet
distance requirement is the least necessary distance to alleviate the harm, the
trial court, once again, simply reduced the distance limitation (this time to 350
feet) and merely noted that the primary Church building is more than 100
years old, the security infrastructure requires updating, and congregants
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inside the Church could hear Snyder protesting twenty feet away from the
entrance. See id. at unnumbered 2-3. Snyder filed a timely notice of appeal
from the order, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1
Snyder raises the following issue for our review: “Did the [trial] court
commit an error of law and/or abuse its discretion by failing to narrowly tailor
its injunction to address the alleged harms claimed by . . . [the] Church . . .?”
Snyder’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
An appellate court’s review a trial court order granting or refusing to
grant a preliminary injunction is for an abuse of discretion. See Summit
Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1000
(Pa. 2003). In conducting such review, this Court employs a “highly
deferential” standard. Warehime v. Warehime, 860 A.2d 41, 46 (Pa. 2004).
This “highly deferential” standard of review contemplates that, when
reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief, an appellate court
will “examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable
grounds for the action of the court below.” Id.
There are six essential prerequisites that a party must establish prior to
obtaining preliminary injunctive relief: Specifically, the party must show: (1)
the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that
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1 In lieu of authoring a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court directed this Court
to its April 18, 2023 order and its three prior Rule 1925(a) opinions prepared in this matter. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/23, at 1.
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cannot be adequately compensated by damages; (2) greater injury would
result from refusing an injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly,
that issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested
parties in the proceedings; (3) a preliminary injunction will properly restore
the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged
wrongful conduct; (4) the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that its
right to relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must
show that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction it seeks is
reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and (6) a preliminary
injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. See Warehime, 860
A.2d at 46-47. The burden of proving these six essential prerequisites falls
on the party who requested preliminary injunctive relief. Id.2
Where, as here, an order affects First Amendment rights, the order
“must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case.”
Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
2 This Court previously affirmed the trial court’s determination that that the
Church satisfied its burden of proving these six essential prerequisites and is entitled to injunctive relief. See Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 266 A.3d 640 (unpublished memorandum at **21, 24) (concluding that “the trial court had ‘apparently reasonable grounds’ for the imposition of a preliminary injunction against Snyder,” and affirming the trial court’s determination that a preliminary injunction is warranted); see also Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 285 A.3d 917 (unpublished memorandum at **5, 12-13) (noting this Court’s prior affirmance of the propriety of the preliminary injunction, and affirming all aspects of the preliminary injunction order except for the distance limitation). Thus, we need not reconsider these prerequisites.
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(1968). Therefore, “[a]n order issued in the area of First Amendment rights
must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed
objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the
public order.” Turner Constr. v. Plumbers Local 690, 130 A.3d 47, 69 (Pa.
Super. 2015).
Snyder contends that, while the trial court reduced the distance
limitation to 350 feet, it has not shown how it considered the physical
characteristics of the Property in determining this distance. Instead, Snyder
asserts, the trial court merely noted that the Church is over 100 years old, its
security requires updating, and congregants inside the Church could hear
Snyder protesting twenty feet away from the entrance. Snyder maintains that
the trial court did not consider—and conducted no analysis—as to whether
there is a distance between twenty feet and 350 feet at which Snyder’s
protests would no longer be heard from inside the Church.
Snyder additionally argues that the trial court did not narrowly tailor the
distance requirement to balance the congregants’ ability to access the
Property with his right to free speech. Snyder insists that the order not only
permanently enjoins him from picketing and distributing leaflets within 350
feet of the Church, but also bars him from appearing within 350 feet of the
Property. Snyder claims that because he is functionally barred from physically
existing near the Property, he is therefore banned from engaging in all
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expressive conduct within this geographic boundary regardless of whether
that expression deals with the Church.3
Notably, as indicated above, this Court has repeatedly affirmed the trial
court’s decision to grant preliminary injunctive relief to the Church. Indeed,
on the lengthy record before this Court, there is no question that injunctive
relief is appropriate and warranted, given Snyder’s escalating and troubling
pattern of aggression, intimidation, and threats to congregants and Church
employees as they come and go from services, such that many congregants
fear for their safety and many no longer attend Church services.4
Nevertheless, the trial court has yet to provide this Court with an
explanation as to why its particular distance requirement is the least necessary
to protect the ability of congregants and employees to access the Church and
hold services without distraction, while also being the least possible
3 Snyder additionally argues that the distance limitation prevents him from patronizing certain businesses near the Church, the injunction is overly broad in scope because it applies seven days per week and twenty-four hours per day, and that the second and fifth prerequisites for a preliminary injunction have not been satisfied. However, as this Court has repeatedly upheld the Church’s entitlement to a preliminary injunction against Snyder, we need not address these arguments. See Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 296 A.3d 569 (unpublished memorandum at *19 n.2) (rejecting Snyder’s attempt to raise new issues and noting that, “as we have already affirmed those parts of the trial court’s order, we will not revisit them here where the sole issue is the distance requirement”). Moreover, Snyder concedes that the only issue in this appeal is the distance limitation. See Snyder’s Brief at 24.
4 Dr. Goligher estimated that, due to the escalation in Snyder’s conduct, the
Church has lost 300 members. See N.T., 2/10/20, at 120.
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infringement on Snyder’s constitutional right to protest the Church and its
leadership in public. See Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 296 A.3d
569 (unpublished memorandum at **19-20). This Court previously directed
the trial court to provide an explanation which takes into consideration the
particular facts of this case, including the physical layout of the Church’s
properties and the surrounding neighborhood, as well as the physical
characteristics of Church’s property. Id. (unpublished memorandum at **16-
17). Thus, as no such explanation has yet been provided, we are constrained
to, once again, affirm all aspects of the order except for the distance limitation,
which we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
While we acknowledge the trial court’s anticipated frustration with yet
another remand, this Court must nevertheless ensure that the certified record
includes evidence which demonstrates that the distance limitation imposed by
the trial court is narrowly tailored to the particular characteristics of the
Church properties and the practical considerations attendant to the need to
ensure safe and peaceful access by congregants and employees to those
properties.5 Such characteristics and considerations may include, but are not
limited to, whether the Church has any on-site parking in which congregants
5 We observe that, although the trial court elected to reduce the distance limitation following each prior remand, those reductions might not have been necessary if the trial court had directed this Court to record evidence demonstrating that the distance limitation was narrowly tailored to the particular facts of this case.
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and employees may park for work, meetings, services, events, functions, etc.,
and if so, whether such on-site parking is sufficient to accommodate
employees and congregants. On the other hand, if there is no on-site parking
or such parking is insufficient to accommodate employees and congregants,
the trial court should consider how far a distance from Church properties do
employees and congregants generally need to park in order to attend work,
meetings, services, events, and functions at Church properties. The distance
from which Church employees and congregants must travel to and from their
vehicles (or places of public transportation) when accessing Church properties
is highly relevant to a determination as to whether the trial court’s distance
requirement is the least necessary to protect the ability of congregants and
employees to safely and peacefully access those properties without
harassment and confrontation, while also being the least possible infringement
on Snyder’s constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership in
public.6
Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Memorandum. Superior Court jurisdiction
relinquished.
6 Our review of the certified record discloses no evidence or testimony regarding the distance that congregants and employees must travel from their vehicles or places of public transportation to Church properties so as to calculate the distance during which they are potentially exposed to Snyder’s harassment and confrontation. Hence, upon remand, an evidentiary hearing to determine such distances may be necessary.
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Judge Stabile joins in the memorandum.
Judge Bowes filed a dissenting memorandum.
Date: 5/31/2024
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