FILED SUPERIOR COURT 0.F \.) (" a 11\ I, JUf\lVI 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 3 VINCENT A. TENORIO, Individually and as) the Administrator for the ESTATES OF) 4 ENRIQUE M. LUJAN, and PAZ LUJAN) TENORIO, ) 5 ) PlaintUI: ) 6 ) v. ) 7 ) DECISION AND ORDER ) re: Motion for Summary Judgment 8 ) RALPH L. LUJAN, aka RAPAEL L. LUJAN,) 9 FUn DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,) MARINE DRIVE FRONTAGE) 10 DEVELOPMENT LLC, a Guam LLC; et aI., ) ) 11 ) Defendants. ) 12 ) 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the HOnorable Judge Michael J. Bordallo on July 26, 2011. The 15 16 Plaintiffs are represented by' attorney William L. Gavras. Defendants Fuji Development
17 Corporation and Marine Drive Frontage Development LLC, a Guam LLC are represented by
18 Attorney David W. Dooley. After considering the matters presented, the court now issues the - 19 following decision and order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment 20 BACKGROUND 21 The instant matter arises out of a complaint to quiet title Lot No. 5049-2-Rl Tamuning,
22 formerly Dededo, Guam which was filed on August 15,2008. The complaint concerns title to 23 Lot No. 5049-2-Rl. At issue is a February 14, 1980 deed of gift, filed at the Department of 24 ~
Land Management, Government of Guam. The property and deed of gift were the subject of 25 26 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 litigation in the fully adjudicated case of Taitano v. Lujan, 2005 Guam 26. 1 The property and 2 deed of gift are also the subject of litigation in Alcantra v. Lujan, CV0484-05. 3 The Plaintiff's :first and only cause ofaction alleges he is entitled to unclouded fee simple 4 ownership in the above mentioned property based on three legal theories affecting the deed of 5 gift:(l) it violates the rule against perpetuities and 21 GCA §§2165, 2166; 2) violates 21 GCA 6 7 §29148 and Guam's Land Title Registration Law; 3) is invalid because it attempted transfer of
8 an expectancy (expectant interest) without consideration.
9 On March 18, 2011, Defendants Fuji Development Corporation and Marine Drive
10 Frontage Development LLC, a Guam LLC filed a motion for summary judgment.. The motion 11 requests that the court find as a matter of law that Plaintiff may not argue three legal theories 12 challenging the validity of the deed of gift under which Defendant Lujan and his successors in 13 interest claim or claimed an interest in the Lot. 14 DISCUSSION 15 Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, deposition, interrogatories and 16 admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any show the there is no genuine issue as to any 17 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater oflaw. Guam ~ Civ. 18 19 P.56(c). Jzuka Corp. V. KawashoIntemational (Guam), Inc., 1997 ~ 10, f7.
20 [A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 21 portions of''the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the 22 absence of a genuine issue of material fact 23 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 24 25 1Please see section I of the Supreme Court decision for a more extensive review of the 26 background facts of the instant case.
Page 2 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 In rendering its decision on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw 2 inferences and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bank of 3 Guam v. Flores, 2004 Guam 25, ~7. Ifhowever, the movant can demonstrate that there are no 4 genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant cannot merely rely on allegations contained in 5 the pleading, but must produce at least some significant probative evidence to support the 6 7 pleading. Edwards v. Pacific Financial Corporation, 2000 Guam 27, ~7. Consequently, the
8 court's ''ultimate inquiry is to determine whether the' specific facts' set by the nonmoving party,
9 coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable
10 jury might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence." Edwards, 2000 Guam 27, ~7; 11 Iizuda, 1997 Guam 10, ~8; Guam Top Builders, Inc. V. Tanota Partners, 2006 Guam 3, ~8. A 12 material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence 13 might affect the outcome of the suit. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not 14 preclude a grant of summary judgment. Edwards, at ~7; Guam Top, at ~9. 15 The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after 16 adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existenCe of an element essential to that 17 party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete 18 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 19 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
20 Celotex Corp. at 322-323 (1986)(internal citations omitted).
21 Rule Against Perpetuities
22 Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to unclouded fee simple ownership in the above mentioned 23 property because the aforementioned deed of gift violates the rule against perpetuities and 21 24 GCA §§2165, 2166. On the other hand, Defendant argues that there is no rule against 25 perpetuities on Guam and that the after acquired title law defeats any application of the rule 26
Page 3 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 against perpetuities. 2 2 The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of a future interest or estatewhich by 3 possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the effective date 4 of an instrument and 21 years thereafter. Nash v. Scott, 966 S.W.2d 936 (1998). In the instant 5 case, Plaintiff argues that because there was no certainty when the federal and local governments 6 7 would return the property, the interest was not sure to vest within twenty-one years after some
8 life which was in being at the time of the creation of the interest. The court however disagrees
9 with Plaintiff's assertions.
10 First of all, Defendants have correctly pointed out that the rule against perpetuities has 11 never been codified or established under Guam law. Thus, the court is hesitant to apply the rule 12 to the deed of gift in the instant case. However, the Supreme Court of Guam has already held that 13 the subsequently acquired title doctrine applies to the 1980 deed of gift. Taitano v. Lujan, at ~ 14 51, 56. Guam's subsequently acquired title statute, 21 GCA § 4203, provides that, 'where a 15 person purports by property instrument to grant real property in fee simple, and subsequently 16 acquires any title or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation oflaw to the grantee, or 17 his successors. Id. at ~ 43. 18 19 The policy behind the doctrine is to protect an unwitting grantee who relies upon the
20 good title of the grantor when the latter does not possess legal or perfect title to the property.
21 Schwen v. Kaye, 202 Cal. Rptr. 374,375-76 (Ct. App. 1984). Furthermore, a Montana court in
22 Mitchell v. Pestell, 208 P.2d 807 (Mont. 1949), in reviewing its estoppel-by-deed statute
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FILED SUPERIOR COURT 0.F \.) (" a 11\ I, JUf\lVI 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 3 VINCENT A. TENORIO, Individually and as) the Administrator for the ESTATES OF) 4 ENRIQUE M. LUJAN, and PAZ LUJAN) TENORIO, ) 5 ) PlaintUI: ) 6 ) v. ) 7 ) DECISION AND ORDER ) re: Motion for Summary Judgment 8 ) RALPH L. LUJAN, aka RAPAEL L. LUJAN,) 9 FUn DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,) MARINE DRIVE FRONTAGE) 10 DEVELOPMENT LLC, a Guam LLC; et aI., ) ) 11 ) Defendants. ) 12 ) 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the HOnorable Judge Michael J. Bordallo on July 26, 2011. The 15 16 Plaintiffs are represented by' attorney William L. Gavras. Defendants Fuji Development
17 Corporation and Marine Drive Frontage Development LLC, a Guam LLC are represented by
18 Attorney David W. Dooley. After considering the matters presented, the court now issues the - 19 following decision and order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment 20 BACKGROUND 21 The instant matter arises out of a complaint to quiet title Lot No. 5049-2-Rl Tamuning,
22 formerly Dededo, Guam which was filed on August 15,2008. The complaint concerns title to 23 Lot No. 5049-2-Rl. At issue is a February 14, 1980 deed of gift, filed at the Department of 24 ~
Land Management, Government of Guam. The property and deed of gift were the subject of 25 26 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 litigation in the fully adjudicated case of Taitano v. Lujan, 2005 Guam 26. 1 The property and 2 deed of gift are also the subject of litigation in Alcantra v. Lujan, CV0484-05. 3 The Plaintiff's :first and only cause ofaction alleges he is entitled to unclouded fee simple 4 ownership in the above mentioned property based on three legal theories affecting the deed of 5 gift:(l) it violates the rule against perpetuities and 21 GCA §§2165, 2166; 2) violates 21 GCA 6 7 §29148 and Guam's Land Title Registration Law; 3) is invalid because it attempted transfer of
8 an expectancy (expectant interest) without consideration.
9 On March 18, 2011, Defendants Fuji Development Corporation and Marine Drive
10 Frontage Development LLC, a Guam LLC filed a motion for summary judgment.. The motion 11 requests that the court find as a matter of law that Plaintiff may not argue three legal theories 12 challenging the validity of the deed of gift under which Defendant Lujan and his successors in 13 interest claim or claimed an interest in the Lot. 14 DISCUSSION 15 Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, deposition, interrogatories and 16 admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any show the there is no genuine issue as to any 17 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater oflaw. Guam ~ Civ. 18 19 P.56(c). Jzuka Corp. V. KawashoIntemational (Guam), Inc., 1997 ~ 10, f7.
20 [A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 21 portions of''the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the 22 absence of a genuine issue of material fact 23 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 24 25 1Please see section I of the Supreme Court decision for a more extensive review of the 26 background facts of the instant case.
Page 2 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 In rendering its decision on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw 2 inferences and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bank of 3 Guam v. Flores, 2004 Guam 25, ~7. Ifhowever, the movant can demonstrate that there are no 4 genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant cannot merely rely on allegations contained in 5 the pleading, but must produce at least some significant probative evidence to support the 6 7 pleading. Edwards v. Pacific Financial Corporation, 2000 Guam 27, ~7. Consequently, the
8 court's ''ultimate inquiry is to determine whether the' specific facts' set by the nonmoving party,
9 coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable
10 jury might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence." Edwards, 2000 Guam 27, ~7; 11 Iizuda, 1997 Guam 10, ~8; Guam Top Builders, Inc. V. Tanota Partners, 2006 Guam 3, ~8. A 12 material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence 13 might affect the outcome of the suit. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not 14 preclude a grant of summary judgment. Edwards, at ~7; Guam Top, at ~9. 15 The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after 16 adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existenCe of an element essential to that 17 party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete 18 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 19 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
20 Celotex Corp. at 322-323 (1986)(internal citations omitted).
21 Rule Against Perpetuities
22 Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to unclouded fee simple ownership in the above mentioned 23 property because the aforementioned deed of gift violates the rule against perpetuities and 21 24 GCA §§2165, 2166. On the other hand, Defendant argues that there is no rule against 25 perpetuities on Guam and that the after acquired title law defeats any application of the rule 26
Page 3 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 against perpetuities. 2 2 The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of a future interest or estatewhich by 3 possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the effective date 4 of an instrument and 21 years thereafter. Nash v. Scott, 966 S.W.2d 936 (1998). In the instant 5 case, Plaintiff argues that because there was no certainty when the federal and local governments 6 7 would return the property, the interest was not sure to vest within twenty-one years after some
8 life which was in being at the time of the creation of the interest. The court however disagrees
9 with Plaintiff's assertions.
10 First of all, Defendants have correctly pointed out that the rule against perpetuities has 11 never been codified or established under Guam law. Thus, the court is hesitant to apply the rule 12 to the deed of gift in the instant case. However, the Supreme Court of Guam has already held that 13 the subsequently acquired title doctrine applies to the 1980 deed of gift. Taitano v. Lujan, at ~ 14 51, 56. Guam's subsequently acquired title statute, 21 GCA § 4203, provides that, 'where a 15 person purports by property instrument to grant real property in fee simple, and subsequently 16 acquires any title or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation oflaw to the grantee, or 17 his successors. Id. at ~ 43. 18 19 The policy behind the doctrine is to protect an unwitting grantee who relies upon the
20 good title of the grantor when the latter does not possess legal or perfect title to the property.
21 Schwen v. Kaye, 202 Cal. Rptr. 374,375-76 (Ct. App. 1984). Furthermore, a Montana court in
22 Mitchell v. Pestell, 208 P.2d 807 (Mont. 1949), in reviewing its estoppel-by-deed statute
23 describes its operation: 24 25 2The Defendant also argues that the deed of gift did not create a future interest; that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to an ancestral lands future interest or future 26 interests created by the United States government.
. Page 4 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 The salutary principle that if a vendor conveys land or an interest in land to which 2 he has not title, and to which he afterward acquires title, the title thus acquired shall inure to the benefit of his vendee, and he is thereby estopped to assert the 3 same as against his grantee, cannot be defeated in equity by any circuitous method of attempting to dishonor or disclaim his covenants. 4 Id. at 811. The doctrine of subsequently-acquired title thus puts grantors on notice that a 5 conveyance will be honored by the law even if the grantor changes his mind after he actually 6 7 receives the title he expected. Taitano v. Lujan, at ~ 46. It is designed, not so much to protect the
8 prior grantee, as to prevent inconsistent grants or unjust enrichment by the grantor. Id. If the first
9 grant would otherwise be valid if the grantor did own the land, then the initial grant counts if the
10 grantor afterward acquires ownership, regardless ofwhether the grantor owns it or not at the time
11 of the initial grant. Id. 12 In applying the above doctrine and the Guam Supreme Court's analyses in Taitano to 13 the exact same deed of gift, the court finds that rule against perpetuities is inapplicable to void 14 the 1980 deed of gift from Enrique, Isabel and paz to Rafael from which the defendants claim 15 title in this case because the subsequently acquired title law applies. The law is applicable 16 because the deed of gift conveyed an alienable contingent future interest which was later 17 transformed into a fee simple interest. The contingency was the return of the property from the 18 United States to the government of Guam, who would then return the land to the original 19 20 landowners. Thus, at the time the deed of gift was made the grantors did not have fee simple
21 interest in the property.
22 However, the return of property to the original landowners did in fact occur, which in
23 effect made the interest in the property freely transferable by deed of gift and not just a ''mere 24 possibility". The subsequently acquired title law applies because Enrique, Isabel and paz 25 purported by property instrument (the 19080 deed of gift) to grant real property in fee simple, 26
Page 5 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 and subsequently acquired fee simple title when the land was returned. The fee simple interest 2 therefore passed by operation oflaw to Defendant Rafael Lujan pursuant to Guam's subsequently 3 acquired title law. See 21 GCA § 4203. Therefore, the court finds that there is no genuine issue 4 of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a mater of law as to this claim. 5 Guam's Land Title Registration Law 6 7 As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims he is entitled to unclouded fee simple ownership
8 in said property based on the notion that Guam's Land Title Registration Law was violated. In
9 the Defendants' motion however, they argue that Plaintiff cannot prevail under Guam Land
10 Registration Law because the property was never registered under that law. In his opposition,
11 the Plaintiff withdraws his assertions under this claim. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate 12 as to this claim. 13 Attempted transfer of an expectancy (expectant interest) without consideration 14 Plaintiff also argues that the February 14, 1980 deed of gift is invalid because it attempted 15 transfer of an expectancy (expectant interest) without consideration. However, the Supreme 16 Court of Guam found that the deed of gift conveyed an alienable contingent future interest, not 17 an expectancy. Taitano v. Lujan, 2005 Guam ~ 41. Plaintiff argues that the rationale and holding 18 in Taitano are incorrect This court declines to overrule Guam's Supreme Court in a case 19 20 involving the very same deed of gift and property. Therefore, Defendants Fuji Development
21 Corporation and Marine Drive Frontage Development LLC, a Guam LLC are entitled to
22 summary judgment on this legal theory.
23 CONCLUSION 24 Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendants Fuji Development Corporation's 25 and Marine Drive Frontage Development LLC, a Guam LLC's motion for summary judgment 26
Page 6 of 7 DECISION AND ORDER Civil Case no. CV 0930-08 1 because there are no issues of material fact regarding the Plaintiff s legal theories challenging 2 the validity of the deed of gift. 3 4 SO ORDERED, this 11- day of !IN , 2011.
5 6
7 ORABLE MICHAEL J. BORDALLO 8 J age, Superior Court of Guam
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