1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUCARIA TENORIO, et al., No. 1:16-cv-00283-DAD-JLT 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 14 GABRIEL GALLARDO, et al., COSTS AGAINST THE GALLARDO DEFENDANTS 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 123) 16 17 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs against 18 defendants Gabriel Gallardo, Silvia Esther Gallardo, Manuel Gallardo, and Kern County 19 Cultivation, Inc. (Doc. No. 123-1.) On April 16, 2019, the motion came before the court for 20 hearing. Attorneys Cynthia Rice, Stanley Mallison, Marisa Lundin, and Liliana Garcia appeared 21 telephonically on behalf of plaintiffs. Defendants, who are proceeding pro se, did not appear. 22 Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, and having heard from counsel, plaintiffs’ motion will 23 be granted in part for the reasons explained below. 24 BACKGROUND 25 This multi-party lawsuit alleges that all defendants named in this action acted in concert to 26 employ plaintiffs and other farm workers to perform seasonal agricultural work in and around 27 Kern County in 2014 and 2015. Plaintiffs allege that this employment violated various federal 28 and state labor laws, including failure to pay all wages due, failure to provide timely meal 1 periods, failure to provide complete wage statements, and operating as an unlicensed farm labor 2 contractor. (Doc. No. 109-37 at 7.) 3 Defendants have filed cross-claims against each other, alleging that the others were 4 responsible for compensating workers but failed to do so. (See id. at 41.) Specifically, Pawan S. 5 Kooner, Hardeep Kaur, and Nazar Kooner (collectively the “Kooner defendants”) alleged that 6 they paid Gabriel Gallardo, Silvia Gallardo, Manuel Gallardo, and Kern County Cultivation, Inc. 7 (collectively the “Gallardo defendants”) for the labor provided, and that the Gallardo defendants 8 then failed to pay workers. (Id.) The Gallardo defendants, in turn, allege that the Kooner 9 defendants were responsible for paying workers. (Id.) 10 This action proceeds on the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which includes claims 11 for violations of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act (“AWPC”), the Fair Labor Standards 12 Act (“FLSA”), and various provisions of the California Labor Code. (Doc. No. 34 (“SAC”).) On 13 March 22, 2017, the Gallardo defendants filed their answer to the SAC. (Doc. No. 52.) 14 Subsequently, the answers of each of the Gallardo defendants were stricken, and the Clerk of the 15 Court entered default against them. (Doc. Nos. 76, 77, 97, 98.) On April 23, 2018, the court held 16 a pretrial conference, at which defendant Silvia Gallardo appeared on her own behalf. (Doc. No. 17 108.) After hearing from the parties at that conference, the undersigned vacated the trial date and 18 directed plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment as to the Gallardo defendants. (Id.) 19 Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment on May 8, 2018. (Doc. No. 109.) The motion was 20 partially granted on January 28, 2019. (Doc. No. 114.) On March 8, 2019, plaintiffs filed a 21 motion for attorneys’ fees and costs against the Gallardo defendants. (Doc. No. 123-1.) No 22 opposition has been filed to that motion. 23 LEGAL STANDARDS 24 “In federal litigation, the American Rule generally precludes an award of attorneys’ fees 25 absent statutory authorization or an enforceable contractual fees provision.” Golden Pisces, Inc. 26 v. Fred Wahl Marine Const., Inc., 495 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007); see also MRO Commc’ns, 27 Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the “American Rule” 28 in which “each party must bear its own attorneys’ fees in the absence of a rule, statute or contract 1 authorizing such an award”). However, attorneys’ fees may be awarded pursuant to the FLSA 2 and various provisions of the California Labor Code. The FLSA provides for the mandatory 3 award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action” to the 4 prevailing party. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Newhouse v. Robert’s Ilimare Tours, Inc., 708 5 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The FLSA grants prevailing plaintiffs a reasonable attorney’s 6 fee.”); Gonzalez v. Rest., No. 14-cv-03099-BLF, 2015 WL 4481978, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 7 2015) (“The FLSA provides for the mandatory award of attorney’s fees and costs of an action.”). 8 Additionally, in actions brought for the nonpayment of wages, the court must “award reasonable 9 attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party if any party to the action requests attorney’s fees 10 and costs upon the initiation of the action.” Cal. Lab. Code § 218.5. 11 “Courts in the Ninth Circuit calculate an award of attorney’s fees using the lodestar 12 method, whereby a court multiplies ‘the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably 13 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Telles v. Li, No. 5:11-CV-01470-LHK, 14 2013 WL 5199811, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 15 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted)); see also Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 16 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). “In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the 17 burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended.” 18 Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). “Where the 19 documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” 20 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A district court should also exclude from the 21 lodestar fee calculation any hours that were not “reasonably expended,” such as hours that are 22 excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. See id. at 434; see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. 23 v. Napuri, No. C 10-04171 SBA, 2013 WL 4428573, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013). 24 In assessing fee applications, the reasonable hourly rates are calculated according to the 25 prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 26 (1984); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013); Ingram v. Oroudjian, 27 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We have held that ‘[i]n determining a reasonable hourly rate, 28 the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work 1 performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’”) (quoting Chalmers, 2 796 F.2d at 1210–11); Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 3 1046 (9th Cir. 2009); Carson v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUCARIA TENORIO, et al., No. 1:16-cv-00283-DAD-JLT 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 14 GABRIEL GALLARDO, et al., COSTS AGAINST THE GALLARDO DEFENDANTS 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 123) 16 17 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs against 18 defendants Gabriel Gallardo, Silvia Esther Gallardo, Manuel Gallardo, and Kern County 19 Cultivation, Inc. (Doc. No. 123-1.) On April 16, 2019, the motion came before the court for 20 hearing. Attorneys Cynthia Rice, Stanley Mallison, Marisa Lundin, and Liliana Garcia appeared 21 telephonically on behalf of plaintiffs. Defendants, who are proceeding pro se, did not appear. 22 Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, and having heard from counsel, plaintiffs’ motion will 23 be granted in part for the reasons explained below. 24 BACKGROUND 25 This multi-party lawsuit alleges that all defendants named in this action acted in concert to 26 employ plaintiffs and other farm workers to perform seasonal agricultural work in and around 27 Kern County in 2014 and 2015. Plaintiffs allege that this employment violated various federal 28 and state labor laws, including failure to pay all wages due, failure to provide timely meal 1 periods, failure to provide complete wage statements, and operating as an unlicensed farm labor 2 contractor. (Doc. No. 109-37 at 7.) 3 Defendants have filed cross-claims against each other, alleging that the others were 4 responsible for compensating workers but failed to do so. (See id. at 41.) Specifically, Pawan S. 5 Kooner, Hardeep Kaur, and Nazar Kooner (collectively the “Kooner defendants”) alleged that 6 they paid Gabriel Gallardo, Silvia Gallardo, Manuel Gallardo, and Kern County Cultivation, Inc. 7 (collectively the “Gallardo defendants”) for the labor provided, and that the Gallardo defendants 8 then failed to pay workers. (Id.) The Gallardo defendants, in turn, allege that the Kooner 9 defendants were responsible for paying workers. (Id.) 10 This action proceeds on the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which includes claims 11 for violations of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act (“AWPC”), the Fair Labor Standards 12 Act (“FLSA”), and various provisions of the California Labor Code. (Doc. No. 34 (“SAC”).) On 13 March 22, 2017, the Gallardo defendants filed their answer to the SAC. (Doc. No. 52.) 14 Subsequently, the answers of each of the Gallardo defendants were stricken, and the Clerk of the 15 Court entered default against them. (Doc. Nos. 76, 77, 97, 98.) On April 23, 2018, the court held 16 a pretrial conference, at which defendant Silvia Gallardo appeared on her own behalf. (Doc. No. 17 108.) After hearing from the parties at that conference, the undersigned vacated the trial date and 18 directed plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment as to the Gallardo defendants. (Id.) 19 Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment on May 8, 2018. (Doc. No. 109.) The motion was 20 partially granted on January 28, 2019. (Doc. No. 114.) On March 8, 2019, plaintiffs filed a 21 motion for attorneys’ fees and costs against the Gallardo defendants. (Doc. No. 123-1.) No 22 opposition has been filed to that motion. 23 LEGAL STANDARDS 24 “In federal litigation, the American Rule generally precludes an award of attorneys’ fees 25 absent statutory authorization or an enforceable contractual fees provision.” Golden Pisces, Inc. 26 v. Fred Wahl Marine Const., Inc., 495 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007); see also MRO Commc’ns, 27 Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the “American Rule” 28 in which “each party must bear its own attorneys’ fees in the absence of a rule, statute or contract 1 authorizing such an award”). However, attorneys’ fees may be awarded pursuant to the FLSA 2 and various provisions of the California Labor Code. The FLSA provides for the mandatory 3 award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action” to the 4 prevailing party. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Newhouse v. Robert’s Ilimare Tours, Inc., 708 5 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The FLSA grants prevailing plaintiffs a reasonable attorney’s 6 fee.”); Gonzalez v. Rest., No. 14-cv-03099-BLF, 2015 WL 4481978, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 7 2015) (“The FLSA provides for the mandatory award of attorney’s fees and costs of an action.”). 8 Additionally, in actions brought for the nonpayment of wages, the court must “award reasonable 9 attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party if any party to the action requests attorney’s fees 10 and costs upon the initiation of the action.” Cal. Lab. Code § 218.5. 11 “Courts in the Ninth Circuit calculate an award of attorney’s fees using the lodestar 12 method, whereby a court multiplies ‘the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably 13 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Telles v. Li, No. 5:11-CV-01470-LHK, 14 2013 WL 5199811, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 15 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted)); see also Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 16 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). “In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the 17 burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended.” 18 Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). “Where the 19 documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” 20 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A district court should also exclude from the 21 lodestar fee calculation any hours that were not “reasonably expended,” such as hours that are 22 excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. See id. at 434; see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. 23 v. Napuri, No. C 10-04171 SBA, 2013 WL 4428573, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013). 24 In assessing fee applications, the reasonable hourly rates are calculated according to the 25 prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 26 (1984); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013); Ingram v. Oroudjian, 27 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We have held that ‘[i]n determining a reasonable hourly rate, 28 the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work 1 performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’”) (quoting Chalmers, 2 796 F.2d at 1210–11); Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 3 1046 (9th Cir. 2009); Carson v. Billings Police Dep’t, 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 Typically, the “relevant legal community” is the forum district1 and the local hourly rates for 5 similar work should normally be employed. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1205; Prison Legal News, 608 6 F.3d at 454; Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994); Deukmejian, 987 F.2d at 7 1405. 8 The fee applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence “that the requested 9 rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 10 reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. 11 “Affidavits of the plaintiff[’s] attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 12 community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the 13 plaintiff[’s] attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United 14 ///// 15
16 1 The court recognizes that judges in the Eastern District of California frequently distinguish between the Fresno and Sacramento communities in determining hourly rates. The general rule 17 for awarding attorneys’ fee rates, however, is that “the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district” are used. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). 18 The ultimate task of the court is to discern the “prevailing market rates in the relevant 19 community.” See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005)). This court has located no authority indicating that hourly rates for attorneys in 20 Sacramento may not be used to guide the court’s award of such fees in cases originating in Fresno, particularly in specialized fields of litigation. Again, the typical approach looks to the 21 district in which the court sits. See id. at 1206 (noting the appropriate rate was “the market rate prevailing in the Central District of California”); Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 22 446, 455 (9th Cir. 2010) (using the “Northern District of California” as the relevant legal 23 community); Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (same); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991) (using the Western District of Washington as the relevant local community), 24 overruled on other grounds as recognized in Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Vega v. Eatherford U.S. LP, No. 1:14-cv-01790-JLT, 2016 25 WL 7116731, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016) (concluding that within the Eastern District of California, the appropriate forum for determining the lodestar rate is the division of the district in 26 which the case is filed) (quoting Jadwin v. County of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 27 2011)). Finally, the undersigned would note that according to the Local Rules of this court, this is not a district court with separate divisions, as many are, but rather is a single district sitting in 28 designated locations for venue purposes. See Eastern District of California Local Rule 120. 1 Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Napuri, 2 2013 WL 4428573, at *2. 3 DISCUSSION 4 A. Attorneys’ Fees 5 Here, plaintiffs request a total of $189,630.25 in attorneys’ fees for counsel from 6 California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. (“CRLA”) and $90,811.00 in attorneys’ fees for counsel 7 from Mallison & Martinez. (Doc. No. 123-1 at 13.) The attorneys and their respective bar 8 admission dates, hourly rates, hours expended, and total fees requested are detailed below. 9 Hourly Hours 10 CRLA Attorney Bar Admission Total Requested Rate Expended 11 Cynthia Rice November 1979 $425 244.68 $103,989.00 12 Marisa Lundin February 2012 $275 176.95 $48,661.25 $25,590.00 13 Maureen Keffer December 2011 $300 85.3 14 Sahar Durali December 2013 $250 23 $5,750.00 $5,640.00 15 Rebecca Buckley-Stein June 2016 $200 28.2
16 CRLA Total 558.13 $189,630.25 17
18 Mallison & Martinez Hourly Hours 19 Bar Admission Total Requested Attorney Rate Expended 20 Stan S. Mallison December 1996 $650 3.3 $2,145.00 21 $81,477.00 Marco Palau June 2006 $495 164.6 22 $987.50 Joseph D. Sutton June 2010 $395 2.5 23 $1,382.50 24 Eric S. Trabucco January 2014 $395 3.5 25 Hilary P. Hammel November 2013 $395 12.2 $4,819.00
26 Mallison & Martinez $90,811.00 186.1 Total 27 28 1 In support of their fee request, plaintiffs have submitted the declarations of attorneys 2 Marisa Lundin and Stan Mallison. (See Doc. No. 123-2, Declaration of Marisa Lundin (“Lundin 3 Decl.”) and Doc. No. 123-4, Declaration of Stan Mallison (“Mallison Decl.”).) Based on these 4 declarations, the attorneys of CRLA and Mallison & Martinez request different hourly rates, 5 which the court will address separately. 6 1. Requested Hourly Rates 7 The CRLA attorneys request hourly rates that range from $200 per hour for an attorney 8 with approximately three years of experience, to $425 per hour for an attorney with 9 approximately thirty years of experience. (Doc. No. 123-1 at 6–8.) Counsel argues that these 10 rates are reasonable “because they were calculated according to the forum in which this Court 11 sits, the Fresno Division of the Eastern District.” (Id. at 3.) Further, counsel from CRLA state 12 that they seek “compensation at this rate given that they have an office and local counsel in the 13 [Fresno] area.” (Id. at 5.) 14 Meanwhile, the attorneys from Mallison & Martinez request higher hourly rates than those 15 requested by the CRLA attorneys. (Id. at 8–11.) They request hourly rates ranging from $395 16 per hour for an attorney with approximately six years of experience, to $650 per hour for an 17 attorney with approximately twenty-five years of experience. (Id.) Counsel from Mallison & 18 Martinez argue that these hourly rates are appropriate because, due to a lack of local resources, 19 they had to recruit private counsel from Oakland, California for assistance in litigating this case. 20 (Id. at 5.) In this regard, counsel appears to argue that out-of-district rates are appropriately 21 awarded here because the relevant community lacked attorneys with the proper expertise or 22 specialization required to litigate this case. (Id.) Alternatively, counsel from Mallison & 23 Martinez urges the court to consider awarding them attorneys’ fees based on “higher rates they 24 have been awarded in the Eastern District.” (Id. at 6.) Specifically, the Mallison & Martinez 25 attorneys point to attorneys’ fees that were awarded them in Velasco v. Mis Amigos Meat Mkt., 26 Inc., No. 2:08-CV-0520-TLN, 2013 WL 5755054, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013), a wage and 27 hour class action in which the court granted default judgment and summarily approved the 28 following rates: attorney Stan Mallison at $650.00 per hour; attorney Hector Martinez at $650.00 1 per hour; attorney Marco Palau at $495.00 per hour; attorney Joe Sutton at $395.00 per hour. 2 (See Doc. No. 123-1 at 6.) 3 Based on prior awards of attorneys’ fees in this District, the court finds that the rates 4 requested by CRLA are clearly within the prevailing rates for this community. See, e.g., In re 5 Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions, 222 F. Supp. 3d 813, 839 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (concluding that 6 appropriate rates in this community are $350 to $400 per hour for attorneys with twenty or more 7 years of experience, $250 to $350 per hour for attorneys with less than fifteen years of 8 experience, and $125 to $200 per hour for attorneys with less than two years of experience); 9 Sanchez v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00797 AWI, 2015 WL 4662636, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10 5, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-797-AWI-MJS, 2015 WL 5138101 11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2015) (awarding rates of $275 to $350 for attorneys with between fourteen 12 and twenty years of experience). Therefore, the court will award attorneys’ fees to the CRLA 13 attorneys at the requested hourly rates. 14 However, the undersigned notes that judges in this district have found that significantly 15 higher prevailing rates are appropriate in the Eastern District of California, especially in areas of 16 complex civil litigation including labor and employment class action cases. See Early v. 17 Keystone Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00740-JAM-DB, 2019 WL 918211, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18 25, 2019) (finding that an “hourly rate of $530 per hour to be well within the acceptable range for 19 an attorney with [thirty years of experience in labor and employment law]”); Z.F. by & through 20 M.A.F. J.F. v. Ripon Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:10-cv-00523-TLN-CKD, 2017 WL 1064679, at *3 21 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (“Prevailing hourly rates in the Eastern District of California are in the 22 $350–$550/hour range for experienced attorneys with over 15 years of experience in civil rights 23 and class action litigation.”). Though the court acknowledges that in one Eastern District case 24 counsel at Mallison & Martinez have been awarded rates of up to $650 an hour, it also notes that 25 the rates in that case were summarily approved without explanation as to their reasonableness. 26 See Velasco, 2013 WL 5755054, at *12. Based on the authorities cited above, the court finds that 27 a downward adjustment to the rates requested by Mallison & Martinez is appropriate to reflect the 28 prevailing rates in the Eastern District of California, despite the complex nature of this litigation. 1 Therefore, the court will award the following hourly rates. 2 Mallison & Martinez Bar Requested Adjusted Hours Adjusted Total Attorney Admission Rate Rate Award 3 Stan S. Mallison December $650 $525 3.3 $1,732.50 4 1996 Marco Palau June 2006 $495 $375 164.6 $61,725.00 5 Joseph D. Sutton June 2010 $395 $300 2.5 $750.00 6
7 Eric S. Trabucco January 2014 $395 $250 3.5 $875.00
8 Hilary P. Hammel November $395 $250 12.2 $3,050.00 2013 9 Total: 186.1 $68,132.50 10 11 12 2. Hours Reasonably Expended 13 “In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears the burden of submitting detailed time 14 records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended.” Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. The 15 CRLA attorneys have submitted detailed billing records that include the date, amount of time 16 spent, attorney name, and description of the activity being billed. (See Doc. No. 123-3.) In her 17 declaration in support of the fee application, attorney Lundin stated that the hours spent on this 18 case were derived from “contemporaneous and accurate records of their time spent on the case in 19 CRLA’s electronic time keeping system . . ..” (Doc. No. 123-2 at 4.) Attorney Lundin also stated 20 that billing between attorneys for CRLA and Mallison & Martinez was not duplicative, because 21 “Mallison & Martinez also represented individuals not represented by CRLA. Therefore, their 22 presence at depositions, client meetings, hearings and in all other matters was not duplicative.” 23 (Id.) Finally, attorney Lundin stated that travel costs and all hours expended following filing the 24 motion for default judgment, including the hours spent preparing this apparent, were excluded. 25 (Id.) The court has reviewed the hourly billing records provided by CRLA and finds them to be 26 reasonable. 27 However, the court cannot overlook that counsel from Mallison & Martinez did not 28 submit detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended in litigating this 1 case. At the hearing on the pending motion, attorney Mallison stated that it was his 2 understanding that the hours reflected in the motion were based on contemporaneous billing 3 records. However, attorney Mallison also candidly acknowledged that attorney Marco Palau, the 4 main litigator in the firm responsible for this case, left Mallison & Martinez last year, and that the 5 firm’s ability to improve upon the information provided with respect to attorney time spent 6 litigating this matter was limited as a result of his departure. Finally, attorney Mallison stated that 7 the time records were based on attorney Palau’s declaration, as submitted in support of plaintiffs’ 8 motion for default judgment. (See Doc. No. 109-38.) Attorney Palau’s declaration provided the 9 following short summary of his work on this case, as it pertains to this motion: 10 I have spent 147.3 hours working on this case that can be applied to claims against Gabriel Gallardo, Silvia Gallardo, Manuel Gallardo 11 and Kern County Cultivation, Inc. I spent approximately 33 hours in the initial work-up of the case. This included meetings with 14 12 plaintiffs in the Arvin area, conducting legal research and investigating the claims and bases of liability for the various 13 defendants, and drafting and filing of the complaint. I then spent approximately 102 hours litigating the case, including written 14 discovery, depositions, motions to compel, a motion for sanctions and other litigation. Finally, I have spent approximately 12 hours 15 working on the prove-up and preparing for trial. 16 (Id. at 3, ¶ 2.) In his declaration Attorney Palau also stated the hours that other Mallison & 17 Martinez attorneys worked on this case but did not attach detailed billing records or describe what 18 each attorney worked on during the hours billed. (Id. at 3.) At the hearing on the pending 19 motion, the court expressed dissatisfaction with the deficiencies of these billing records, but 20 counsel from Mallison & Martinez did not indicate that they were able to provide any more 21 detailed billing records. 22 Courts in this circuit “have expressed a ‘preference’ for contemporaneous records, [but] 23 we have never held that they are absolutely necessary.” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 24 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. 12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1521 (9th Cir. 25 1991)). “[F]ee requests can be based on ‘reconstructed records developed by reference to 26 litigation files.’” Id. (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1473 27 (9th Cir. 1983)). Therefore, an attorney is “not required to record in great detail how each minute 28 of his time was expended . . . [and] can meet his burden—although just barely—by simply listing 1 his hours and identifying the general subject matter of his time expenditures.” Id. (finding that a 2 fee application met this “basic requirement” when it “provided a summary of the time spent on a 3 broad category of tasks such as pleadings and pretrial motions (16.5 hours), settlement (4.2 4 hours), and court appearances (1.5 hours).”). However, “parties are subject to a reduction in the 5 hours awarded when they fail to provide adequate documentation, notably contemporaneous time 6 records.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C 11-1846 LHK PSG, 2012 WL 5451411, at *3 7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012); see also, e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 438 n.13 (noting with approval the 8 district court’s 30% reduction in an attorneys’ fee award in part due to counsel’s failure to keep 9 contemporaneous time records); Frank Music Corp. v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 10 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The lack of contemporaneous records does not justify an automatic 11 reduction in the hours claimed, but such hours should be credited only if reasonable under the 12 circumstances and supported by other evidence such as testimony or secondary documentation.”); 13 Ackerman v. W. Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 836, 865 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d, 860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 14 1988) (“The percentage reduction method used by defendant to determine the number of hours 15 reasonably expended has been employed by a number of courts, especially when 16 contemporaneous records are seriously deficient or nonexistent.”). 17 Here, the court concludes that the billing records provided by Mallison & Martinez are not 18 sufficiently specific to allow a determination of whether the time expended on the stated tasks 19 was reasonable. Based on this minimal showing, the court is skeptical that counsel maintained 20 contemporaneous time records. Attorney Palau’s declaration vaguely describes his own work 21 (e.g., “102 hours litigating the case, including written discovery, depositions, motions to compel, 22 a motion for sanctions and other litigation”) and provides no description of the work done by his 23 colleagues on this action. Because these records are not specific enough to allow the court to 24 determine if the time attorney time spent was reasonable, the attorney time sought to be 25 compensated will be subject to a reduction. See Young v. Wolfe, CV 07-03190 RSWL-AJWx, 26 2017 WL 3184167, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2017) (A 30% reduction in the number of attorney 27 hours reasonably expended found to be appropriate in light of insufficient billing records); Lehr v. 28 City of Sacramento, No. 2:07-CV-01565-MCE, 2013 WL 1326546, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1 2013) (finding that a twenty percent reduction in the number of hours would be reasonable, given 2 insufficient detail in billing documentation). 3 Accordingly, the court concludes that counsel from Mallison & Martinez should be 4 awarded $60,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and that the CRLA attorneys should be awarded 5 $189,630.25 in attorneys’ fees as requested. 6 B. Costs 7 Both counsel from CRLA and Mallison & Martinez submit records of costs to be 8 recovered, attributable to this litigation against the Gallardo defendants. (See Doc. No. 123-1 at 9 13.) Counsel from CRLA submitted costs totaling $6,773.03, which includes postage and 10 mailing costs; deposition transcript preparation; interpreter services at depositions for non- 11 English speaking deponents; translation costs for translating plaintiffs’ declarations on 12 interrogatory responses; Court Call appearance fees; and production costs for Public Records Act 13 requests. (Doc. No. 123-2 at 4.) The court has reviewed these costs and finds them to be 14 appropriate for recovery. 15 Counsel from Mallison & Martinez states that the firm expended a total of $23,577.10 in 16 costs in this matter, including deposition reporting fees, filing and service fees, expert services, 17 and legal research. (See Doc. No. 123-4 at 2.) A significant portion of these fees are derived 18 from legal research conducted. While reasonable litigation expenses, such as those from 19 computer legal research, are typically recoverable, plaintiffs’ counsel may only recover fees that 20 were actually expended. See Rutti v. Lojack Corp., No. SACV 06-350 DOC JCX, 2012 WL 21 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (stating that expenses, such as from computer legal 22 research, are typically recoverable but denying plaintiffs’ request for costs when it was not 23 accompanied with any supporting documentation). At the hearing on the pending motion, 24 plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged in response to the court’s inquiry that such legal research fees 25 were not specifically incurred in the true sense and, therefore, are not typically charged to a 26 client.2 Based on the court’s review of Mallison & Martinez’s costs, the $11,862.00 of which are 27 2 This is because law firms typically have unlimited access plans with Westlaw or similar 28 providers. 1 | attributed to legal research fees, will not be awarded. The remaining costs submitted by Mallison 2 | & Martinez are reasonable and appropriate and will costs will be awarded to the firm in the 3 | amount of $11,715.00. 4 CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, 6 1. Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs against the Gallardo defendants is 7 granted in part, as discussed in the order above; 8 2. The court awards $249,630.25 in attorneys’ fees, of which $189,630.25 is 9 attributable to the CRLA attorneys and $60,000.00 is attributable to counsel from 10 Mallison & Martinez; and 11 3, The court awards $18,488.03 in costs, of which $6,773.03 is attributable to the 12 CRLA attorneys and $11,715.00 is attributable to counsel from Mallison & 13 Martinez. 14 | IT IS SO ORDERED. si □ Dated: _ August 15, 2019 J aL Al 5 7 a 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12