Tennigkeit v. Taylor

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 24-6322
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TYLER MAXWELL TENNIGKEIT, No. 24-6322 D.C. No. 1:24-cv-01057-JLT-SKO Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* TAYLOR, Warden, FCI Mendota,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 18, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Tyler Maxwell Tennigkeit appeals pro se from the district

court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see

Lane v. Swain, 910 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 2018), we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Tennigkeit contends that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is improperly

withholding application of credits he has earned under the First Step Act (“FSA”)

based on his risk of recidivism. He argues that the BOP’s denial of FSA credits to

prisoners with medium and high recidivism risk is “an abuse of administrative

agency discretion” under Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),

and that the BOP wrongly assessed his recidivism risk level. These claims are

unavailing. Loper Bright is not implicated because the FSA itself requires that

individuals must have a low risk of recidivism for the earned time credits to be

applied. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D). In addition, as the district court

concluded, Tennigkeit’s challenge to the BOP’s assessment of his recidivism risk

level is not reviewable in a § 2241 habeas petition. See Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d

1224, 1226-28 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3625. Finally, the record

belies Tennigkeit’s argument that the district court failed to fully consider his

arguments.

We do not consider Tennigkeit’s remaining arguments, which were raised

for the first time on appeal. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th

Cir. 1994) (habeas claims that are not properly raised before the district court are

not cognizable on appeal).

AFFIRMED.

2 24-6322