Tennessee v. Whitworth

117 U.S. 129, 6 S. Ct. 645, 29 L. Ed. 830, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1820
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 1, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by111 cases

This text of 117 U.S. 129 (Tennessee v. Whitworth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129, 6 S. Ct. 645, 29 L. Ed. 830, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1820 (1886).

Opinion

' MR. Chief Justice Waite

delivered tbe opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above reported, he continued :

It is apparent from the charter that the subscribers of shares and those claiming under them were to be the holders of the stock of the corporation, and that the money paid into the treasury upon subscriptions was to be used by the corporation in building and equipping its railroad. In this way the capital of the corporation was to be converted into the railroad and-; its appurtenances. A tax upon the railroad, therefore, after its completion, is necessarily a tax upon the capital, because, practically, the capital and that into which it has been converted are the same. The railroad of the corporation may be worth more than its capital, but all its capital is in its railroad. Such being the case, the taxation of both railroad and capital would be, so far as the corporation is concerned, double taxation.

In Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, it was held that a provision in the charter of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company; precisely like that now under consideration, did not exempt the railroad of that corporation and its appurtenances from taxation after twenty years from the time of its completion, even though the capital stock of the corporation had all been invested in the railroad, because, taking the whole section together, it was apparent such was not the inten-. tion of the legislature. The property was taxable, but the capital stock was exempt.

■ . It is no doubt true that the legislature may make a difference, for the purposes of taxation, between the capital stock of a corporation in the hands of the corporation.itself, and the shares of the same capital stock in the hands of the individual stockholders. That has often been done, and the crises are [136]*136numerous where the exemption of shares from taxation has been claimed because of a charter exemption of the, capital stock. Notably this was the case with the national banks. The capital stock of such banks invested in United States securities is not taxable by the States, but shares of the stock in the hands of the individual stockholders may be taxed without deduction on account of such an investment. This has been held from the beginning. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; Bradley v. The People, 4 Wall. 459, 462; The People v. The Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 468. The capital stock in the hands of the bank is exempt because invested in securities which are not to be taxed, Rev. Stat. § 3701, but the shares in the hands of the stockholders are, by the very terms of the banking act, put, for the purposes of State taxation, on the same footing as other moneyed capital.. Rev. Stat. § 5219. This, it was said, showed the intention of Congress to exempt the bank for what was invested in government securities, but to charge the stockholder. In Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, the charter of the Union and Planters’ Bank provided that said company shall pay to the State an annual tax of one-half of one per' cent, on each share of the capital stock subscribed, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes,” and the question was, whether this exempted the shares in the hands of the stockholders from any further taxation by the State. The court, three Justices dissenting, held that it did, because, as the charter tax was laid on each share subscribed, the further exemption must necessarily have- been of the shares in the hands of the holders, although the tax as im- ' posed was payable by the corporation. In all cases of this kind the question is' as to the intent of the legislature, the presumption always .being against any surrender of the taxing power.

In corporations four elements of taxable value are.sometimes found : 1, franchises'; 2, capital stock in the hands of the corporation; 3, corporate property; and, 4, shares of the capi.tal stock in the hands of the individual stockholders. Each of these is, under some circumstances, an appropriate subject of taxation; and it is no doubt :n the power of a State, when [137]*137not restrained by. constitutional limitations, to assess taxes upon them in a way to subject the corporation or the stockholders to- double taxation. Double "taxation is, however, never to be presumed. Justice requires that the burdens of government shall as far as is practicable be laid equally on all, and, if property is taxed once in one way, it would ordinarily be wrong to tax it again in another way, when the burden of both taxes falls on the same person; Sometimes tax laws have that effect; but if they do, it is because the legislature has unmistakably so enacted. All presumptions are against such an imposition.

■ This brings us to an examination of the present charter to see what the legislature has expressed its intention of doing. “ The capital stock of said company ” is exempt from taxation. That has been expressly enacted, and the' owner or owners of the stock are necessarily relieved from all taxation- on this account. The important question is, therefore, who are the owners of the capital stock of this corporation within the meaning of the term “capital stock” as used in this - charter, because, in construing statutes which are binding on States as contracts; the words employed are, if possible, to be given the same meaning they had in the minds of the parties to the contract 'when the statute was enacted. In this respect there is no difference between a contract of a State and a contract of a natural per-' son. If the words employed are capable of more than one meaning, that meaning is to be given them which, taking the whole statute together, it is apparent the parties intended they should have.

Returning to the charter, we find that the “ capital stock ” is divided into shares. These shares are to be subscribed and paid for,'and the money raised in this way constitutes .the “capital” of the corporation spoken of in section 12, where it is said, “ the board of directors shall not exceed in their contracts the amount of the capital of the corporation,” &c., and in section 17, where it is provided “ that said company may at any time increase its capital to a sum sufficient to complete the said road.” This capital is to be used by the corporation ■ to build and equip its road, and if more capital is needed for [138]*138that purpose it may be raised “by opening books for new stock, or by selling such new stock.” The manner of' doing this may “be prescribed by the stockholders at a general meeting; and any State, or any citizen, corporation or company, . . . may subscribe for and hold stock in the said company, with all the rights and subject to all the liabilities of any other stockholder.” Sec. 17. Payments of subscriptions are to be made on each share of stock, and if default is made in a payment when demanded “ the share or shares on which default shall be so made and all payments thereon ” are forfeited, “and the sainé shall vest in and belong to the company,” but the board of directors may, if they deem proper, restore them to the “ owner or owners,” “ on payment of all arrears on such shares and the legal interest thereon.” Sec. 15. So, too, “ The Stock of said company may be transferred in such manner and form as may be directed by the by-laws of the corporation,” sec.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ex Parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc.
718 So. 2d 33 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1998)
George and Elam Campbell v. Commissioner
108 T.C. No. 5 (U.S. Tax Court, 1997)
Campbell v. Commissioner
108 T.C. No. 5 (U.S. Tax Court, 1997)
Dean v. Pinder
538 A.2d 1184 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1988)
Atlas Copco, Inc. v. United States
10 Ct. Int'l Trade 790 (Court of International Trade, 1986)
Andrews v. Lathrop
315 A.2d 860 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1974)
Village of Hodgkins v. Margarites
251 N.E.2d 774 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1969)
Leader v. Glander
77 N.E.2d 69 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1948)
Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
141 F.2d 328 (Sixth Circuit, 1944)
Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit
136 F.2d 574 (Sixth Circuit, 1943)
Miller v. McColgan
110 P.2d 419 (California Supreme Court, 1941)
Welch v. Henry
305 U.S. 134 (Supreme Court, 1938)
John H. Faunce, Phila., Inc. v. United States
25 C.C.P.A. 131 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1937)
Hoover-Bond Co. v. Denman
59 F.2d 909 (Sixth Circuit, 1932)
New York Life Ins. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Okla. Cty.
1932 OK 193 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1932)
Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank v. City of Atlanta
53 F.2d 557 (Fifth Circuit, 1931)
The People v. Deep Rock Oil Corp.
175 N.E. 572 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1931)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
117 U.S. 129, 6 S. Ct. 645, 29 L. Ed. 830, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tennessee-v-whitworth-scotus-1886.