Tenet South Florida Health Systems v. Jackson

991 So. 2d 396, 2008 WL 4224382
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedSeptember 17, 2008
Docket3D08-665
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 991 So. 2d 396 (Tenet South Florida Health Systems v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tenet South Florida Health Systems v. Jackson, 991 So. 2d 396, 2008 WL 4224382 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

991 So.2d 396 (2008)

TENET SOUTH FLORIDA HEALTH SYSTEMS d/b/a North Shore Medical Center, Petitioner,
v.
Jean B. JACKSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Cynthia Lucas, Respondent.

No. 3D08-665.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

September 17, 2008.

*397 Wicker, Smith, O'Hara, McCoy & Ford and Shelley H. Leinicke, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Paul Morris; Jon M. Herskowitz, Miami, for respondent.

Before SUAREZ, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.

SUAREZ, J.

Tenet South Florida Health Systems d/b/a North Shore Medical Center ("North Shore") petitions for a writ of certiorari to the circuit court to quash an order denying North Shore's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Chapter 766 medical negligence presuit requirements. We have jurisdiction. See Corbo v. Garcia, 949 So.2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that an appellate court has certiorari jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Chapter 766 presuit requirements); Fassy v. Crowley, 884 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). We grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the trial court's order denying North Shore's motion to dismiss on grounds that the allegations in the complaint arise out of the failure to render medical care or services and, therefore, require Chapter 766 presuit notice.

Jean Jackson, as personal representative of the estate of her mother, Cynthia *398 Lucas, brought an action against North Shore for breach of the statutory duty of care by a healthcare provider to a vulnerable person pursuant to sections 415.101-415.113, Florida Statutes (2007), the Adult Protective Services Act. Specifically, she alleges that, on February 8, 2007, Cynthia Lucas received pre-operative care at North Shore. She was admitted to North Shore on February 15, 2007, for a carotid artery procedure and remained there until February 26, 2007, when she was transferred out of the hospital. The Complaint alleges that North Shore failed to administer proper nursing care and other medical services and was negligent by failing to perform an inpatient nursing assessment; failing to implement "latex precautions"; failing to adequately assess and monitor; failing to appreciate early implications of increasing respiratory rate and sore throat in a patient with recent neck surgery and multiple allergies; and failing to provide appropriate care and treatment. North Shore moved to dismiss the Complaint on grounds that the Complaint was not an action pursuant to Chapter 415, but was a complaint for medical malpractice pursuant to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2007). North Shore claimed the Complaint had to be dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the presuit screening requirements of section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2007). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and North Shore seeks certiorari review.

North Shore contends on review that the allegations of the Complaint constitute medical negligence by hospital personnel, that, therefore, pursuant to section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2007), presuit notice is a condition precedent to maintaining the action, and that the trial court erred in not dismissing the Complaint.

Jackson contends that she has alleged simple negligence and a claim for elder abuse, not a claim for medical negligence, and that presuit notice is not required under section 415.102(15) of the Adult Protective Services Act, which prohibits the neglect of vulnerable adults, like her mother, being cared for in a facility such as North Shore.

We do not agree with Jackson that the particular allegations of this Complaint state a claim for neglect of a vulnerable person by a caregiver pursuant to the Adult Protective Services Act, see §§ 415.101-415.113, Fla. Stat. (2007).[1] Chapter 415 was enacted to protect vulnerable adults from neglect by caregivers and specifically defines the terms caregiver and neglect as used in the statute. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, North Shore neither meets the required definition of a caregiver, nor does the Complaint allege neglect by North Shore as defined by the statute.

Pursuant to the definition of neglect, the caregiver must fail to provide the necessities which a prudent person would *399 consider essential for the well-being of a vulnerable adult or act in a careless manner resulting in injury or death.[2]

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, North Shore does not meet the Chapter 415 definition of a caregiver. The allegations in the Complaint are that Ms. Lucas was admitted to North Shore, which is a hospital, for the purpose of a surgical procedure, a right carotid endarectomy. Nowhere in the complaint is there any allegation that there existed "a commitment, agreement, or understanding ... that a caregiver role exist[ed]" between North Shore and Ms. Lucas. This is not to say that a hospital such as North Shore cannot be a caregiver pursuant to the statute. See Bohannon v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 983 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that there can be scenarios in which an acute care hospital might become a "caregiver" of "vulnerable adults" under the definition of Chapter 415). We state only that, based on the allegations in this Complaint, North Shore does not meet the Chapter 415 definition of a caregiver.

Even if the Complaint were to allege sufficiently that North Shore were a caregiver pursuant to Chapter 415, the claim is still one for medical malpractice and not for elder abuse. Section 766.106(1)(a) defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." The question in determining if a claim is a medical malpractice claim is whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2007), in order to prove the case. Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d 974, 980 (Fla.2002). This Complaint arises out of the rendering or failure to render medical care or services. The Complaint alleges that Ms. Lucas was admitted to North Shore for a right carotid endarectomy, a medical procedure. Jackson alleges injuries during this hospitalization due to the failure to perform an inpatient nursing assessment; failure to implement "latex precautions"; failure to assess and monitor; failure to appreciate early implication of increasing respiratory rate and sore throat in a patient with recent neck surgery and multiple allergies; and failure to provide appropriate care and treatment. These are all medical care or services which the plaintiff claims were either negligently rendered or not rendered at all resulting in injury. All of these allegations can be proven only through evidence that the alleged negligent action or inaction of a health care provider, i.e., the nurse or other medical care providers, fell below the prevailing standard of care in the community for that health care provider resulting in injury. Because this is a medical negligence action, the plaintiff is required to comply with the presuit notice and 90-day investigatory period as set forth in sections 766.106(2) and 766.106(3), Florida Statutes (2007),[3]see Integrated *400 Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d at 974, as conditions precedent for bringing suit.[4]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
991 So. 2d 396, 2008 WL 4224382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tenet-south-florida-health-systems-v-jackson-fladistctapp-2008.