Tendrich v. Tendrich

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Tendrich v. Tendrich

544 So. 2d 229, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 839, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1711, 1989 WL 30813

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 4, 1989

DocketNos. 89-75, 89-80

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 544 So. 2d 229 (Tendrich v. Tendrich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Tendrich v. Tendrich, 544 So. 2d 229, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 839, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1711, 1989 WL 30813 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We have for review an order setting temporary alimony and child support, and making an interim award of attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In a lengthy evidentiary proceeding the General Master heard conflicting evidence regarding the level of the wife’s need for temporary alimony and child support, as well as the husband’s ability to pay. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order affirming the General Master’s report with respect to temporary alimony and child support. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980).¹

We reach a different conclusion with regard to the order awarding attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. “[T]he purpose of section 61.16, Florida Statutes, was to ensure that both parties [to a dissolution] will have similar ability to secure competent legal counsel.” Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So.2d 620, 621 (Fla.1988) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). At the hearing below the $95,000 amount sup[230]*230ported by the wife’s expert was not seriously challenged as to reasonableness, although the wife’s expert was cross-examined. No opposing expert testimony was offered. The husband’s objection was grounded on lack of ability to pay. The $20,000 amount awarded was less than amounts previously billed by the wife’s counsel and accountant. Although the General Master found that the husband has a temporary, serious cash flow problem, the Master also found that the husband projects a positive cash flow of $700,000 to $1,000,000 by the end of 1989. While the husband has substantial indebtedness, he also has substantial assets. In light of the admonition in Nichols that each spouse have a similar ability to secure competent legal counsel, and in light of the importance of having a reasonable opportunity to prepare for a final hearing, we conclude on this record that it was an abuse of discretion to reduce the award for attorney’s fees, suit money and costs below the level requested by the wife. That interim order is therefore reversed.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded.

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PER CURIAM.

We have for review an order setting temporary alimony and child support, and making an interim award of attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In a lengthy evidentiary proceeding the General Master heard conflicting evidence regarding the level of the wife’s need for temporary alimony and child support, as well as the husband’s ability to pay. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order affirming the General Master’s report with respect to temporary alimony and child support. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980).¹

We reach a different conclusion with regard to the order awarding attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs. “[T]he purpose of section 61.16, Florida Statutes, was to ensure that both parties [to a dissolution] will have similar ability to secure competent legal counsel.” Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So.2d 620, 621 (Fla.1988) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). At the hearing below the $95,000 amount sup[230]*230ported by the wife’s expert was not seriously challenged as to reasonableness, although the wife’s expert was cross-examined. No opposing expert testimony was offered. The husband’s objection was grounded on lack of ability to pay. The $20,000 amount awarded was less than amounts previously billed by the wife’s counsel and accountant. Although the General Master found that the husband has a temporary, serious cash flow problem, the Master also found that the husband projects a positive cash flow of $700,000 to $1,000,000 by the end of 1989. While the husband has substantial indebtedness, he also has substantial assets. In light of the admonition in Nichols that each spouse have a similar ability to secure competent legal counsel, and in light of the importance of having a reasonable opportunity to prepare for a final hearing, we conclude on this record that it was an abuse of discretion to reduce the award for attorney’s fees, suit money and costs below the level requested by the wife. That interim order is therefore reversed.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded.

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544 So. 2d 229, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 839, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1711, 1989 WL 30813, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tendrich-v-tendrich-fladistctapp-1989.

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