Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. v. Astoria Hotel, Inc.

98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 83 Cal. App. 4th 139
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 15, 2000
DocketA088494
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924 (Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. v. Astoria Hotel, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. v. Astoria Hotel, Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 83 Cal. App. 4th 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

Opinion

PARRILLI, J.

the San Francisco Planning Code, a property use that “lawfully existed” on the effective date of new zoning controls is deemed a permitted conditional use. Is the city’s certification of hotel rooms as tourist units enough to establish their lawful existence for this purpose, or is proof of actual tourist use required? We hold that certification is sufficient.

The Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., (Clinic) sued the Astoria Hotel, Inc. The Clinic claimed the hotel was violating San Francisco’s Planning Code (Planning Code) and the city’s Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance by renting residential units to tourists. In 1981 the city had designated 79 of the Astoria’s rooms as residential units and 13 rooms as tourist units. The Clinic sought injunctive relief and attorney fees, and damages for unfair business practice under Business and Professions Code section 17200. Trial before the court was bifurcated. After the first phase, the court resolved a number of issues. The Astoria contends the court erred by (1) refusing to refer the Clinic’s claims to the San Francisco Planning Department under the primary jurisdiction doctrine; and (2) ruling that the Astoria could only establish a permitted conditional tourist use by proving that when the relevant Planning Code provisions came into effect on April 24, 1987, the hotel actually offered its 13 tourist rooms to tourists.

For the second phase of trial, the parties stipulated that the Astoria had regularly rented rooms to tourists since 1991. They also stipulated that the zoning administrator had informed the Astoria that if it could not show the 13 tourist rooms were “actually in tourist use” when the code provisions took effect, it would be required to obtain a conditional use permit. An appeal from this determination was pending before the city’s board of appeals. After trial, the court ruled that because the Astoria presented no evidence of “lawful and permitted actual tourist use as of the effective date of the Planning Code,” it had violated the Planning Code by renting rooms to *142 tourists without conditional use authorization. The court entered judgment enjoining the Astoria from renting any rooms to tourists.

The Astoria appeals from the judgment, contending (1) because 13 of its rooms were designated tourist units, renting to tourists was a permitted conditional use under the Planning Code without a use permit; (2) the trial court erroneously placed the burden of proving a prior nonconforming use on the Astoria; and (3) the court should have stayed the case pending administrative proceedings in the planning department. The Astoria’s first contention is correct, and therefore we reverse the judgment. However, we agree with the Clinic that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to refer the Clinic’s Planning Code claims to the planning department under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

Discussion

1. The Court Properly Declined to Defer to the Planning Department

The primary jurisdiction doctrine applies to claims originally cognizable in court, but involving regulatory issues within the special competence of an administrative body. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 826 P.2d 730].) The courts have “considerable flexibility to avoid application of the doctrine in appropriate situations, as required by the interests of justice.” (Id. at p. 392; see also Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 453 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 491, 841 P.2d 1011].) Here, it appears no party had initiated any administrative proceeding when the Astoria asked the trial court to defer ruling on the Clinic’s claims. The Astoria presented its request as if the Clinic were required to first pursue its available administrative remedies, a claim it does not renew in this court, and one which has no place in primary jurisdiction doctrine. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 390-391 [distinguishing between exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction doctrines].)

The record indicates that the Astoria itself, although it raised the primary jurisdiction doctrine as a defense in its answer, never sought an administrative ruling. Instead, three days after the court ruled against the Astoria in the first phase of trial, the Astoria’s lessor, who is not a party to this action, asked the planning department to redetermine the issue of whether a conditional use permit was required for tourist rentals. We do not believe the interests of justice call for the suspension of court proceedings in such circumstances.

Furthermore, the trial court correctly observed that the matter before it involved no need for an administrative agency’s factfinding expertise, but *143 rather concerned issues of statutory interpretation appropriate for judicial resolution. (See Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 454.) We recognize that uniform application of administrative law is one of the policies underlying the primary jurisdiction doctrine. (Ibid.; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 391.) In this case, we believe that policy is best served by publication of our decision.

2. Certified Tourist Units Are Deemed a Permitted Conditional Use

The Astoria is located in the Chinatown Community Business District. In this “Mixed Use District,” tourist hotels are permitted as a conditional use subject to the provisions of the Planning Code. 1 (§§ 809, subd. (d), 810.55.) The code permits conditional uses in a Chinatown Mixed Use District “when authorized by the Planning Commission.” (§ 803.2, subd. (b)(1)(B)(i).) The Astoria concedes it lacks such authorization. However, it contends it may rent 13 of its rooms to tourists under section 803.2, subdivision (b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides: “Any use or feature which lawfully existed and was permitted as a principal or conditional use on the effective date of these controls which is not otherwise nonconforming or noncomplying as defined in Section 180 of this Code, and which use or feature is not permitted under this Article is deemed to be a permitted conditional use subject to the provisions of this Code.”

The trial court, and the zoning administrator, required the Astoria to have actually rented or offered to rent its designated tourist rooms to tourists in order to establish a lawfully existing conditional use under section 803.2, subdivision (b)(1)(B)(ii). We disagree. Under both the Hotel Ordinance and the Planning Code, the city’s certification of the Astoria’s tourist units sufficed to make tourist rental of those rooms a permitted conditional use.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 83 Cal. App. 4th 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tenderloin-housing-clinic-inc-v-astoria-hotel-inc-calctapp-2000.