Templet v. Cartwright

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedDecember 7, 2020
DocketCUMbcd-cv-20-06
StatusUnpublished

This text of Templet v. Cartwright (Templet v. Cartwright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Templet v. Cartwright, (Me. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. BUSINESS & CONSUMER DOCKET DKT. NO. BCD-CV-20-06

TIMOTHY L. TEMPLET, IN HIS ) CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE ) TEMPLET-HARDWOOD TRUST AND ) AS GENERAL PARTNER OF ) HARDWOOD PRODUCTS, LP, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ORDER ON BLOOMBERG L.P.’S ) MOTION TO INTERVENE AND TO ) UNSEAL RECORDS JOHN W. CARTWRIGHT, IN HIS ) CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE ) JOSEPH W. CARTWRIGHT BUSINESS ) INTEREST TRUST AND AS GENERAL ) PARTNER OF BA CARTWRIGHT LP ) AND HARDWOOD PRODUCT ) COMPANY, LP, ) ) Defendants. )

Before the Court is a Motion to Intervene and to Unseal Records brought by Bloomberg

L.P. (“Bloomberg”), the owner of Bloomberg News. Intervention is sought under Rule 24(a) of

the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was originally brought pursuant to Maine’s

Freedom of Access Act but in its Reply, Bloomberg conceded that Maine Judicial Branch records

are not subject to that Act. Instead, Bloomberg argues pursuant to the First Amendment and the

common law presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. Bloomberg is represented

by Attorney Bernard Kubetz. Plaintiffs are represented by Attorney Sigmund Schutz, who

informed the Court that his clients took no position on Bloomberg’s Motion to Intervene but

opposed Bloomberg’s request to unseal records. Defendants, who oppose both requests by

Bloomberg, are represented by Attorneys John Lambert, Maureen Sturtevant, and Anna Clark. The

Court has considered the parties’ filings and the oral arguments made on November 20, 2020, and

1 for reasons stated, grants the Motion to Intervene in part, and grants in part the Motion to Unseal

Records.

ANALYSIS

If Bloomberg were still relying upon Maine’s Freedom of Access law for its right to

intervene, both Rule 24(a) and Bangor Publishing Co. v. Town of Bucksport, 682 A.2d 227, 230-

231 (Me. 1996), would simplify the task before the Court. In Bangor Publishing, the Law Court

rejected an appeal brought by the publisher after the Superior Court found that a prior court

protective order had sealed documents parties agreed to sealing in the underlying tax dispute

between the Town of Bucksport and Champion International. The dispute had originally been

adjudicated before the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) which had declined to seal certain business

information despite the agreement to do so between the Town and Champion. The BOTA advised

the parties that it had no authority to protect documents from public disclosure and advised

Champion to seek a court order, which it did. The Superior Court in November 1994 entered such

an order finding them privileged under Maine Rule of Evidence 507.

Bangor Publishing knew about the protective order shortly after it was issued but waited

until January 1995 to file a request with the Town under Maine’s Freedom of Access law. Another

Superior Court Justice found in favor of the Town, Champion, and the BOTA finding that Bangor

Publishing actions “were improper collateral attacks on the protective order,” and the Superior

Court judgment was affirmed by the Law Court. Id. at 229. In affirming the Superior Court, the

Law Court stated: “Contrary to Bangor Publishing’s contentions, the actions are impermissible

collateral attacks on a valid protective order. Bangor Publishing could have intervened in the

protective order action to assert its interest.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Law Court therefore implicitly recognized that for purposes of a Freedom of Access

2 action, a media entity can use Rule 24(a) to assert its interest in a civil proceeding, at least until

that action has become final.

While the Law Court has not squarely addressed the First Amendment arguments made by

Bloomberg for purposes of civil proceedings, other courts have discussed the right. See, e.g.,

Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 572 U.S.

1029 (2014); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011)

(citing cases). Despite the lack of case law in Maine addressing any constitutional right of access

to court records in civil proceedings, the Law Court on August 21, 2020, adopted the Maine Rules

of Electronic Court Systems (MRECS) which the Court finds to be instructive and controlling

here. After reviewing these Rules, the Court finds that these Rules have direct applicability to the

issues before the Court, both as to whether Bloomberg can intervene to protect its legal interest,

an interest which is recognized under the Rules, and also as to how the Court must ultimately

decide what data, documents, and information Bloomberg may access.

The preamble to MRECS provides as follows:

These Rules of Electronic Court Systems are intended to facilitate public access to and use of the courts in the electronic environment, while providing maximum reasonable public access to court records and minimizing the risk of harm to individuals and entities involved in court proceedings. In developing these rules, the Maine Judicial Branch has carefully considered and weighed the importance of both public access and protection of privacy in court records in the context of an electronic case management and filing system.

M.R.E.C.S. preamble (emphasis added).

Rule 1 sets out what it describes as the principles behind the rules:

Public access to court records is restricted in certain instances by law. When public access to court records is not controlled by law, these rules will control public access, and every judge, justice, and magistrate applying these rules shall consider the principles listed below in doing so:

3 (1) Public access to records can inform and educate the public about the workings of government, support accountability, and advance public safety;

(2) Persons who use the courts have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Providing access to personal details in court records can put the parties at risk and create a disincentive to use the courts;

(3) The public can be informed of court activity without having access to all of the personal details in a court record; and

(4) When digital information or data are made accessible by the public remotely, neither the Maine Judicial Branch nor any other entity or person has the practical ability to control its dissemination or use.

M.R.E.C.S. 1(B) (emphasis added).

Rule 2 provides definitions pertinent here. A “media organization,” such as Bloomberg, is

included specifically within the definition of “Public” in Subparagraph 31(a)(i). Court records

under 17(a)(i)-(ii) of the definitions of the Rules include some of the information sought here:

“Pleadings, motions, briefs and their respective attachments, correspondence, . . . documentary

evidentiary exhibits submitted with court filings[, o]rders, judgments, opinions, and decrees . . . .”

Rule 3(A) sets out the “General Access Policy,” which provides that “[e]lectronic court

records are accessible by the public except as provided by law, including these rules, or by court

order.” (Emphasis added). Finally, Rule 4 addresses civil cases, such as this one, by establishing

in Subparagraphs (B) and (C) which civil cases are not accessible by the public. Subparagraph D

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Related

Bangor Publishing Co. v. Town of Bucksport
682 A.2d 227 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1996)

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