Temple of Inspired Living v. Department of Social Service

97 Cal. App. 3d 564, 158 Cal. Rptr. 816, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2202
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 10, 1979
DocketCiv. 56006
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 97 Cal. App. 3d 564 (Temple of Inspired Living v. Department of Social Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Temple of Inspired Living v. Department of Social Service, 97 Cal. App. 3d 564, 158 Cal. Rptr. 816, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

Opinion

ASHBY, J.

Respondent Department of Social Service of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the regulation of bingo games for charity authorized by Penal Code section 326.5. Appellant Temple of Inspired Living (TOIL), is a charitable and religious organization, whose application for a bingo license was denied by respondent. The trial court denied appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to reverse such decision.

Appellant submitted its application for a bingo license October 4, 1977. The license was denied by the manager of the Department of Social Service on February 28, 1978, on the grounds that (1) appellant intended to compensate its members for operating bingo games; (2) appellant intended to use bingo proceeds for other than charitable purposes; and (3) appellant intended to permit a minor to participate in operation of its bingo games. On March 4, 1978, appellant requested an appeal.

A hearing was held before a hearing officer on March 22, 27, 29 and 31, 1978. The hearing officer submitted a report to respondent on April 13, 1978, recommending that the license application be denied. The hearing officer found, consistent with respondent’s stated reasons for denial:

*568 1. That appellant offered compensation to Janet Williams and Selma Allen to assist in the operation of appellant’s bingo games. (Pen. Code, § 326.5, subds. (b), (h).) Ms. Williams testified that Ned North, appellant’s bishop-director, told her in late September 1977 that she would come home every night with cash in her pocket from each night’s bingo proceeds. Ms. Allen testified that she was offered a position as a bishop on October 10, 1977, by Bishop North and Prime Minister Frank Winston and was told her salary would be determined by the extent of her participation in the bingo operation.

2. That appellant intended to use bingo proceeds for noncharitable purposes. (Pen. Code, § 326.5, subds. (a), (j).) Bishop North told Ms. Williams in late September or early October 1977 that the proceeds from bingo would be used to finance his campaign for governor. In addition, Ms. Allen was told that if she made a $10,000 contribution and a $40,000 interest-free one year loan to appellant, her loan would be repaid from bingo proceeds, a diversion of bingo proceeds from charitable purposes.

3. That appellant intended to allow a minor to participate in bingo games. (Pen. Code, § 326.5, subd. (e).) Bishop North offered to hire Ms. Williams’ 10-year-old daughter to sort the bingo cards.

On April 20, 1978, the manager of the Department of Social Service notified appellant that she had received the report of the hearing officer and that appellant’s application for the license was denied.

Appellant contends that it was denied due process and a fair hearing because (1) the hearing officer followed no formal rules of procedure for the format of the hearing; (2) appellant’s representative was absent for a portion of the hearing; (3) the hearing officer abdicated judicial responsibility to the agency by sustaining respondent’s claim of privilege as to a portion of its investigative files, without examining the files himself; (4) appellant was not supplied with a copy of the hearing officer’s report and recommendations prior to the final denial of the license; (5) appellant was not given an opportunity to argue the hearing officer’s report prior to final denial; and (6) respondent failed to make adequate findings. None of these contentions has any merit.

At the hearing before a hearing officer appellant TOIL was represented by its prime minister, Frank Winston. Winston stated at the beginning of the hearing that appellant’s attorney was out of the country but that *569 Winston felt “perfectly competent” to handle the matter. The hearing lasted for 4 days, occupying 600 pages of reporter’s transcript. On the second day of the hearing, Winston inquired “under what identifiable rules this hearing is being conducted?” The hearing officer replied that it was being conducted under rule 5 of the bingo regulations of the Department of Social Service. 1

Appellant’s claim that it was denied due process by the absence of formal rules specifying a format for conduct of the hearing is utterly without merit. It is not necessary that a statute or regulation specify a particular method of proceeding, so long as there is reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard. (Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75, 80-81 [87 P.2d 848]; CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com., 43 Cal.App.3d 306, 329 [118 Cal.Rptr. 315].) The manner of proceeding is controlled by the hearing officer, but the format is usually substantially like that employed in civil trials. (Cal. Administrative Agency Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1970) §§ 3.1, 3.2, p. 142.) Respondent’s representative courteously attempted to assist Winston by providing him a copy of the procedures used by the civil service commission. Appellant makes no showing whatsoever that the procedure used was improper or unfair to appellant in any way. (See Baker v. Wadsworth, 6 Cal.App.3d 253, 264 [85 Cal.Rptr. 880]; Roth v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.3d 679, 690-691 [126 Cal.Rptr. 163].)

Appellant next contends that a portion of the hearing was conducted in appellant’s absence. Respondent had several exhibits to introduce. The hearing officer suggested it would save time if all the *570 exhibits were marked at one time by the reporter, and ordered a five-minute recess for this purpose. After the recess, Winston, who was out in the hall, was notified the witness was ready to resume the stand. He failed to return to the hearing room. A document, a memo from Ned North to Frank Winston entitled “Economic feasibility for using bingo income for funding Branch Church Expansion in California” was offered into evidence. The hearing officer stated, “Let the record reflect that Prime Minister Winston has chosen not to return to the hearing although he has been notified twice that the hearing has begun. Hearing no objection, the exhibit will be admitted.” Winston subsequently returned to the hearing room and objected to the exhibit but was informed that it already had been admitted.

So far as the record shows, Winston’s absence was informed, voluntary and wilful. Appellant was not denied an opportunity to be heard. (McGinn v. Board of Health, 113 Cal.App. 228, 231 [298 P. 118].) In any event, appellant suffered no prejudice as a result of this absence, since the hearing officer did not rely on the exhibit.

Appellant next contends the hearing officer abdicated his judicial responsibility to respondent in ruling on respondent’s claim of privilege as to certain matters in its investigative file. When respondent’s principal investigator was on the stand, Winston requested that the entire investigative file be turned over to him for examination. Respondent objected that the file contained memoranda, notes and communications which were privileged.

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Bluebook (online)
97 Cal. App. 3d 564, 158 Cal. Rptr. 816, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/temple-of-inspired-living-v-department-of-social-service-calctapp-1979.