TELFAIR FINANCE COMPANY v. Williams

Court of Appeals of Georgia

TELFAIR FINANCE COMPANY v. Williams

323 S.E.2d 689, 172 Ga. App. 489, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2555

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedOctober 30, 1984

Docket68700

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 323 S.E.2d 689 (TELFAIR FINANCE COMPANY v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

TELFAIR FINANCE COMPANY v. Williams, 323 S.E.2d 689, 172 Ga. App. 489, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).

Pincite

Opinion

Benham, Judge.

Appellant brought suit on a conditional sales contract executed by appellee and assigned by the payee to appellant. The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee on the ground that the statute of limitation had run. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to rule that the contract was under seal and was, therefore, controlled by the 20-year period of limitation provided for in OCGA § 9-3-23. We agree.

The promissory portion of the contract begins, “The undersigned Buyer hereby promises to pay . . .” and ends, “Signed, sealed and delivered by the Buyer . . .” “Contrary to the situation in Echols v. Phillips, 112 Ga. 700 (37 SE 977) (1900), [and in Johnson v. Intl. Agricultural Corp., 41 Ga. App. 740 (154 SE 465) (1930), where the words, “Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of,” were held to have been intended as the expression of attesting witnesses] it is clear that the maker of the note did intend to use these words as his own.” Hixon v. Woodall, 246 Ga. 758, 759 (272 SE2d 727) (1980). Following appellee’s signature on the contract appears the word “(SEAL).” Since the contract was, therefore, a sealed instrument within the meaning of OCGA § 9-3-23 (Hixon, supra), the 20-year period of limitation provided by that statute controls and the grant of summary judgment to appellee on the basis of the statute of limitation cannot stand.

Judgment reversed.

Banke, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Benham, Judge.

Appellant brought suit on a conditional sales contract executed by appellee and assigned by the payee to appellant. The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee on the ground that the statute of limitation had run. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to rule that the contract was under seal and was, therefore, controlled by the 20-year period of limitation provided for in OCGA § 9-3-23. We agree.

The promissory portion of the contract begins, “The undersigned Buyer hereby promises to pay . . .” and ends, “Signed, sealed and delivered by the Buyer . . .” “Contrary to the situation in Echols v. Phillips, 112 Ga. 700 (37 SE 977) (1900), [and in Johnson v. Intl. Agricultural Corp., 41 Ga. App. 740 (154 SE 465) (1930), where the words, “Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of,” were held to have been intended as the expression of attesting witnesses] it is clear that the maker of the note did intend to use these words as his own.” Hixon v. Woodall, 246 Ga. 758, 759 (272 SE2d 727) (1980). Following appellee’s signature on the contract appears the word “(SEAL).” Since the contract was, therefore, a sealed instrument within the meaning of OCGA § 9-3-23 (Hixon, supra), the 20-year period of limitation provided by that statute controls and the grant of summary judgment to appellee on the basis of the statute of limitation cannot stand.

Judgment reversed.

Banke, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

323 S.E.2d 689, 172 Ga. App. 489, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2555, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/telfair-finance-company-v-williams-gactapp-1984.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack