Teleon Realty Corp. v. City of New York

88 Misc. 2d 767, 391 N.Y.S.2d 282, 1976 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2742
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 8, 1976
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 88 Misc. 2d 767 (Teleon Realty Corp. v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Teleon Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 767, 391 N.Y.S.2d 282, 1976 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2742 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1976).

Opinion

Harold Baer, J.

This is an action for a declaratory judgment. The basic facts were stipulated and the controversy submitted under CPLR 3222. The parties seek an interpretation and declaration of their respective rights under section 421 of the Real Property Tax Law.

The plaintiffs assembled a plot on Fifth Avenue between 51st and 52nd Streets. They sought and obtained zoning variances and the establishment of a special zoning district which permitted 30 floors of apartments to be built on top of 22 stories of commercial office space and stores. (Olympic Towers.)

Section 421 of the Real Property Tax Law, which applies to New York City only, grants defined exemptions from New York City real property taxes to residential dwelling units "during construction and * * * for a period [of] ten years * * * following * * * completion.” The exemption is granted "provided that taxes shall be paid during any such period at least in the amount of the taxes paid * * * during the tax year preceding the commencement of such construction” (the [769]*769"mini-tax”). (Real Property Tax Law, § 421, subd 2.) The statute provides that construction shall be deemed commenced upon beginning of excavation.

The plaintiffs have established a condominium plan composed of a single commercial unit and 231 individual residential units. The statute has been implemented by assessing each of these 232 units as separate tax lots commencing with the tax year 1976-1977.

The multiple character of the construction presents an issue never previously determined and both litigants present this and two other basic issues for declaration.

1. May the minimum tax mandated by section 421 of the Real Property Tax Law (the mini-tax) be satisfied by crediting the tax payments made during the exemption period on the commercial portion of a multipurpose development?

2. How should the mini-tax be computed? The Housing and Development Administration (HDA) regulations provide that the mini-tax should be the assessed valuation for the year prior to the commencement of construction of the new development multiplied by each year’s then current tax rate. The plaintiffs claim the mini-tax should be the amount of taxes paid in that prior year.

3. Which is the first year of exemption requiring payment of at least the mini-tax? The construction in this case began in August, 1972. The plaintiffs paid the mini-tax for that year (1972-1973) and thereafter sought and obtained, by writ of certiorari, a reduction of assessment so large as to reduce the "normal” tax for that year to an amount less than the mini-tax. They thereafter applied for and accepted a refund. They now claim in opposition to the city’s counterclaim that the first year of exemption is 1973-1974.

These are all questions of law and upon resolution, guidelines will be created so that the parties will be able to calculate and determine their monetary responsibilities.

1. The first issue presented by the plaintiffs is the claim that the taxes paid by the commercial portion of the new building satisfy the mini-tax required to be paid during the period of exemption. In the instant case for the years 1972-1973 through 1975-1976 this issue has not been presented. The condominium plan was not yet in effect and the commercial and residential portions were not separately owned. The issue thus first arises in the tax year 1976-1977, which is the year [770]*770after the statute was amended to take explicit recognition of multipurpose developments.

The city and the plaintiffs have both assumed that implementation of the statute is to be effected by separately assessing the commercial and residential portions of this single premises. Plaintiffs claim that the residential portion is required to pay no taxes so long as the taxes to be paid by the commercial portion exceed the mini-tax. It is this very procedure of separate assessments and separate tax determination without first fixing the amount of exemption which causes the difficulty in determining the treatment of the exemption and the mini-tax. There is no justification in the statute, or in the HDA regulations, for use of that procedure. Further, implementation of the amendment of 1975 (L 1975, ch 857) which does make provision for a multipurpose development requires unified treatment for assessment and exemption determination, even though, as hereinafter explained, the resultant exemption is then apportioned.

Thus, for the exemption period following July 1, 1975 (the effective date of the 1975 amendment) the entire premises should be assessed as a single unit, the normal tax thus established, the exemption "diminished” by the percentage of commercial floor area in excess of 12% of the total floor area, as provided in the statute, and the amount of the net exemption thus determined.

Where, as in this case after 1975, there are separate owners the exemption is then similarly apportioned between the commercial and residential portions of the premises. The respective amounts of exemption are then to be deducted from the taxes normally computed1 on the separate portions of the premises.

The 1975 amendment, in effect, modified (by allowing commercial space up to 12% of the total space to be included for exemption) the original statute which provided that exemp[771]*771tion was intended only to encourage and to benefit residential construction. Both parties here acknowledge that before the amendment the exemption was only for the residential portion of the development. But the procedure used unnecessarily complicates the proper determination of the amount of exemption and its apportionment between commercial and residential. It should be recognized that the statute is written (as is the amendment) in anticipation of a single ownership. Here, to reduce the exemption, the city, the plaintiffs acquiescing, separately assessed the separate ownership interests and anticipated exemption only against the residential portion by reducing the assessment. More precise and equitable is the device used in the 1975 amendment and the procedure described above for implementation.

The statute has a specific and limited purpose: to encourage residential construction. The Legislature in 1975 increased the benefits for sponsors by granting exemption to a portion of the commercial space in a multipurpose dwelling. However, nowhere is there any evidence of an intent that residential owners should get a "free ride” by permitting the taxes paid by the commercial portion to satisfy their obligation to pay at least some taxes. Accordingly, the procedure now to be followed must be to require the residential owners (in the aggregate) to pay the higher of either the normal tax as reduced by the exemption or the mini-tax.2

2. It should be noted that section 421 of the Real Property Tax Law as here applicable, has been thrice amended. (L 1971, ch 1207, as amd by L 1973, ch 408, as amd by L 1975, ch 857, [772]*772as amd by L 1976, ch 703.) Only one of these amendments, however, applies in the instant case to this issue.

The 1971 statute granted exemption "provided construction be commenced after July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one and before January first, nineteen hundred seventy-three and completed no later than December thirty-first, nineteen hundred seventy-four”. The 1975 and 1976 statutes apply to construction "commenced after January first, nineteen hundred seventy-five”.

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Teleon Realty Corp. v. City of New York
68 A.D.2d 858 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
88 Misc. 2d 767, 391 N.Y.S.2d 282, 1976 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2742, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/teleon-realty-corp-v-city-of-new-york-nysupct-1976.