1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 4 5 Teklia Ghebrendrias, et al., 6 Case No. 2:21-cv-06492-VAP-(PDx) Plaintiffs,
7 v. Order DENYING 8 Motion to Remand (Dkt. 9) FCA US LLC,
9 Defendant. 10 11 12 13 Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (“Motion”) filed by Plaintiffs 14 Teklia Ghebrendrias and Sarah Ghebrendrias (“Plaintiffs”) on September 10, 15 2021. (Dkt. 9). Defendant FCA US LLC (“Defendant”) filed its Opposition 16 on October 8, 2021 (Dkt. 10), and Plaintiffs filed their Reply on October 18, 17 2021 (Dkt. 11). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without 18 oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. After considering all papers filed 19 in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ 20 Motion. 21 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiffs filed this action in the Los Angeles Superior Court on July 7, 24 2021, asserting six claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer 25 Warranty Act (“Song Beverly Act” or “Act”) relating to their purchase of a 26 2014 Dodge Challenger (the “Vehicle”). (See Dkt. 1-2, “Complaint”). 1 Defendant removed the action to this Court on August 11, 2021 based on 2 diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1, “Notice of Removal”). Defendant contends 3 that complete diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiffs and Defendant 4 and that the amount in controversy as to Plaintiffs’ individual claims exceeds 5 $75,000. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4). Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed this Motion, challenging 6 Defendant’s allegations as to complete diversity and the amount in 7 controversy. (See Dkt. 9). 8 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a civil action may be removed from state 11 to federal court if the action is one over which the federal courts could 12 exercise their original jurisdiction. A district court has diversity jurisdiction 13 over any civil action between citizens of different states if the amount in 14 controversy exceeds $75,000, excluding interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 15 1332. “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, 16 punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, and 17 attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Fritsch v. 18 Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). 19 20 “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking 21 removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal 22 jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th 23 Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Abrego 24 Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2006). There is 25 a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, and federal jurisdiction 26 “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 1 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation 2 omitted). A defendant “always has the burden of establishing that removal 3 is proper.” Id. “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 4 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 5 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 6 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 Plaintiffs advance three grounds for remanding this lawsuit to state 9 court. First, Plaintiffs argue that the amount in controversy does not meet 10 the necessary threshold of $75,000, making diversity jurisdiction improper. 11 (Dkt. 9 at 5). Second, Plaintiffs contend Defendant failed to establish that 12 diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. (Id.) And third, Plaintiffs 13 argue that comity principles favor remand. (Id.) The Court will address 14 each of these grounds in turn. 15 16 A. Amount in Controversy 17 A defendant who removes an action to federal court bears the burden 18 of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 19 controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. 20 Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty 21 Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not 22 facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, 23 the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 24 the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt 25 regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state 26 court”) (footnotes omitted). 1 2 Here, although Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges only that “[t]he amount in 3 controversy is greater than $25,000,” (Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 4), Defendant met its 4 burden of showing that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. 5 6 1. Actual Damages 7 Actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act are the “amount equal to 8 the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,” less the reduction in value 9 “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)- 10 (C). The reduction is based on the number of miles the buyer has driven 11 prior to the first attempted repair (often called the “use offset”). Id. To 12 determine the amount directly attributable to the buyer’s use of the vehicle, 13 the manufacturer multiplies the price of the vehicle the buyer paid or will pay 14 by a fraction, the denominator of which is 120,000, and the numerator the 15 number of miles the buyer drove the car before the first relevant repair. Id. 16 This calculation provides the actual damages that Plaintiffs suffered. 17 18 The purchase agreement for the Vehicle here lists a total purchase 19 price of $37,171.00. (See Dkt. 1-2). The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ reduction 20 in value of $6,399.20. (Dkt. 9 at 6) (“$6,399.20 calculated as follows: 21 (23,998-16)/120,000 x $32,020.02 (the cash price of the vehicle)). 22 Accordingly, the Court estimates the amount of restitution available pursuant 23 to the Song-Beverly Act to be $37,171.00 minus the mileage offset of 24 $6,399.20, or $30,771.80.1 25 1 Although Defendant argues that the Court should consider the contract’s 26 entire value, without offset, (Dkt. 10 at 5), the Court need not address the merits of this argument because, for the reasons set forth below, the amount 1 2. Civil Penalty 2 If a court determines that a defendant’s failure to comply with the 3 terms of the Act is willful, a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover civil 4 penalties of up to twice the amount of the actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code 5 §§ 1794 (c). 6 7 Here, Plaintiffs allege that FCA’s failure to comply with its obligations 8 under the Song-Beverly Act was “willful, in that Defendant and its 9 representative were aware of their obligation to repair the Vehicle under the 10 express warranty, but they intentionally declined to fulfill that obligation.” 11 (Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 23); see also Park v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 20- 12 CV-00242-BAS-MSB, 2020 WL 3567275, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 4 5 Teklia Ghebrendrias, et al., 6 Case No. 2:21-cv-06492-VAP-(PDx) Plaintiffs,
7 v. Order DENYING 8 Motion to Remand (Dkt. 9) FCA US LLC,
9 Defendant. 10 11 12 13 Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (“Motion”) filed by Plaintiffs 14 Teklia Ghebrendrias and Sarah Ghebrendrias (“Plaintiffs”) on September 10, 15 2021. (Dkt. 9). Defendant FCA US LLC (“Defendant”) filed its Opposition 16 on October 8, 2021 (Dkt. 10), and Plaintiffs filed their Reply on October 18, 17 2021 (Dkt. 11). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without 18 oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. After considering all papers filed 19 in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ 20 Motion. 21 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiffs filed this action in the Los Angeles Superior Court on July 7, 24 2021, asserting six claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer 25 Warranty Act (“Song Beverly Act” or “Act”) relating to their purchase of a 26 2014 Dodge Challenger (the “Vehicle”). (See Dkt. 1-2, “Complaint”). 1 Defendant removed the action to this Court on August 11, 2021 based on 2 diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1, “Notice of Removal”). Defendant contends 3 that complete diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiffs and Defendant 4 and that the amount in controversy as to Plaintiffs’ individual claims exceeds 5 $75,000. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4). Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed this Motion, challenging 6 Defendant’s allegations as to complete diversity and the amount in 7 controversy. (See Dkt. 9). 8 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a civil action may be removed from state 11 to federal court if the action is one over which the federal courts could 12 exercise their original jurisdiction. A district court has diversity jurisdiction 13 over any civil action between citizens of different states if the amount in 14 controversy exceeds $75,000, excluding interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 15 1332. “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, 16 punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, and 17 attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Fritsch v. 18 Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). 19 20 “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking 21 removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal 22 jurisdiction.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th 23 Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Abrego 24 Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2006). There is 25 a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, and federal jurisdiction 26 “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 1 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation 2 omitted). A defendant “always has the burden of establishing that removal 3 is proper.” Id. “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 4 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 5 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 6 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 Plaintiffs advance three grounds for remanding this lawsuit to state 9 court. First, Plaintiffs argue that the amount in controversy does not meet 10 the necessary threshold of $75,000, making diversity jurisdiction improper. 11 (Dkt. 9 at 5). Second, Plaintiffs contend Defendant failed to establish that 12 diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. (Id.) And third, Plaintiffs 13 argue that comity principles favor remand. (Id.) The Court will address 14 each of these grounds in turn. 15 16 A. Amount in Controversy 17 A defendant who removes an action to federal court bears the burden 18 of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 19 controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. 20 Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty 21 Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not 22 facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, 23 the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 24 the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt 25 regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state 26 court”) (footnotes omitted). 1 2 Here, although Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges only that “[t]he amount in 3 controversy is greater than $25,000,” (Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 4), Defendant met its 4 burden of showing that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. 5 6 1. Actual Damages 7 Actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act are the “amount equal to 8 the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,” less the reduction in value 9 “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)- 10 (C). The reduction is based on the number of miles the buyer has driven 11 prior to the first attempted repair (often called the “use offset”). Id. To 12 determine the amount directly attributable to the buyer’s use of the vehicle, 13 the manufacturer multiplies the price of the vehicle the buyer paid or will pay 14 by a fraction, the denominator of which is 120,000, and the numerator the 15 number of miles the buyer drove the car before the first relevant repair. Id. 16 This calculation provides the actual damages that Plaintiffs suffered. 17 18 The purchase agreement for the Vehicle here lists a total purchase 19 price of $37,171.00. (See Dkt. 1-2). The Court adopts Plaintiffs’ reduction 20 in value of $6,399.20. (Dkt. 9 at 6) (“$6,399.20 calculated as follows: 21 (23,998-16)/120,000 x $32,020.02 (the cash price of the vehicle)). 22 Accordingly, the Court estimates the amount of restitution available pursuant 23 to the Song-Beverly Act to be $37,171.00 minus the mileage offset of 24 $6,399.20, or $30,771.80.1 25 1 Although Defendant argues that the Court should consider the contract’s 26 entire value, without offset, (Dkt. 10 at 5), the Court need not address the merits of this argument because, for the reasons set forth below, the amount 1 2. Civil Penalty 2 If a court determines that a defendant’s failure to comply with the 3 terms of the Act is willful, a successful plaintiff is entitled to recover civil 4 penalties of up to twice the amount of the actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code 5 §§ 1794 (c). 6 7 Here, Plaintiffs allege that FCA’s failure to comply with its obligations 8 under the Song-Beverly Act was “willful, in that Defendant and its 9 representative were aware of their obligation to repair the Vehicle under the 10 express warranty, but they intentionally declined to fulfill that obligation.” 11 (Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 23); see also Park v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 20- 12 CV-00242-BAS-MSB, 2020 WL 3567275, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2020) 13 (“Plaintiff’s own allegations support the conclusion that the maximum 14 amount of civil penalties is properly included in the amount in controversy 15 determination”). As the amount of actual damages available as restitution is 16 $30,771.80, the maximum available civil penalty is twice that amount, or 17 $61,543.60. Accordingly, the sum of the restitution and civil penalty 18 amounts in controversy is $92,315.40. 19 20 The Court therefore finds that the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement 21 is satisfied. 22 // 23 // 24 25 in controversy is satisfied even taking the $6,399.20 offset into considera- 26 tion. 1 B. Diversity of Citizenship 2 Plaintiffs next argue that Defendant “failed to establish that diversity of 3 citizenship is present” because it failed to show that Plaintiffs are citizens of 4 California.2 (Dkt. 9 at 9). According to Plaintiffs, Defendant relies only on 5 the purchase agreement from seven years ago and thus Defendant 6 “improperly assumes that Plaintiffs still reside at the same address.” (Id.). 7 Plaintiffs’ arguments are unavailing. 8 9 The Supreme Court held that “diversity jurisdiction does not exist 10 unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.” 11 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). 12 “Individuals are citizens of their state of domicile.” Munoz v. Small Bus. 13 Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1365 (1981); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 14 F.3d 853, 857 (2001) (“A person's domicile is her permanent home, where 15 she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return”). 16 A corporation is a “citizen” of both the state in which it was incorporated and 17 the state where it has its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 18 1332(c). Courts in this district have held that a party may rely upon an 19 address listed in a purchase agreement to meet its burden of establishing 20 citizenship. See El-Said v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 819CV02426JLSJDE, 21 2020 WL 1187171, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2020) (hereinafter “El-Said”) 22 (“The sales contract lists a San Bernardino County address for Plaintiffs, 23 showing that he is a resident of California, and thereby indicating that 24 2 Defendant asserts—and Plaintiff does not challenge—that Defendant and 25 its members are incorporated under the laws of Delaware and the Nether- lands and has its principal place of business in Auburn Hills, Michigan. (Dkt. 26 1; Dkt. 9). 1 Plaintiff is domiciled in California, and thus a citizen of California...In his 2 Motion Plaintiff does not dispute that he is a California domiciliary and 3 citizen”). 4 5 Here, Plaintiffs’ address in the purchase agreement for the Vehicle is 6 in Fresno County, California, support that Plaintiffs are residents of 7 California. See El-Said, 2020 WL 1187171, at *3; (Dkt. 1-6, Exhibit 2). 8 Defendants also point to a July 14, 2021 repair order which lists an address 9 in Pasadena, California as further support that Plaintiffs are citizens of 10 California. (Dkt. 10-1, Exhibit A). This repair order is dated only seven days 11 after Plaintiff filed his Complaint in state court, and only four weeks prior to 12 Defendant removing this matter to federal court. (Dkt. 10 at 5). Finally, 13 Plaintiffs do not deny that they are citizens of California. See El-Said, 2020 14 WL 1187171, at *3 (“Plaintiff does not dispute that he is a California 15 domiciliary and citizen”). Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden of 16 establishing that Plaintiffs are domiciled in California and thus are citizens of 17 California. 18 19 The Court therefore finds that complete diversity exists between 20 Plaintiffs and Defendants. 21 22 C. Comity Principles 23 Plaintiffs also argue that, as California state court is the appropriate 24 venue for this case, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in 25 accordance with principles of comity. (Dkt. 9 at 10). Federal courts, 26 however, have a “virtually unflagging obligation … to exercise the 1 | Jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 2 | States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). As in other similar cases, the Court 3 | rejects Plaintiffs’ comity principles argument because “the diversity statute, 4 | unlike the supplemental jurisdiction statute, does not afford district courts 5 | the discretion to decline jurisdiction over state law claims.” See BNSF Ry. 6 | Co. v. O'Dea, 572 F.3d 785, 793 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court thus follows 7 | the rationale of other courts in this district that have considered this same 8 | argument and rejected it. See Gonzalez v. FCA US LLC, No. EDCV19967- 9 | PSG-RAOx, 2020 WL 1444941, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020); Petropolous ~ 10 | v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-CV-0398-W-KSCx, 2017 WL 2889303, at *6 (S.D. 11 | Cal. July 7, 2017); Grossman v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-CV-2048-DMG-JPRx, 12 | 2017 WL 10581093, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2017). 43 IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to 16 | Remand this action to the Los Angeles Superior Court. 17 18 | ITIS SO ORDERED. 19 20) Dated: 10/28/21 mw Vigna 0, Thales 21 Virginia A. Phillips 59 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26