IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ERIC TEEL, § § Defendant Below, § No. 363, 2022 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2004004125 (N) § Appellee. §
Submitted: July 21, 2023 Decided: September 5, 2023
Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears
to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Eric Teel, filed this appeal from a Superior Court order
denying his motion for correction of an illegal sentence under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 35 and his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61. After consideration of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the
Superior Court’s denial of the motions.
(2) In August 2021, a grand jury indicted Teel for possession of a firearm
by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”) and two counts of terroristic threatening. The
charges arose from Teel threatening his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend by sending her a photograph of himself with a gun. On December 6, 2021, Teel pleaded guilty
to one count of PFBPP and one count of terroristic threatening in exchange for the
State (i) entering a nolle prosequi on the other terroristic threatening charge, and (ii)
agreeing not to pursue other acts of intimidation occurring before December 6, 2021.
The parties also stipulated that Teel had two previous violent felony convictions and
jointly agreed to recommend the following sentence: (i) for PFBPP, fifteen years of
Level V incarceration suspended after the ten-year minimum mandatory for
decreasing levels of supervision; and (ii) for terroristic threatening, one year of Level
V incarceration suspended for one year of Level III probation. That same day, the
Superior Court accepted Teel’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended sentence.
(3) On May 2, 2022, Teel filed a pro se motion for correction of illegal
sentence, and on May 12, 2022, he filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.
In both motions, Teel argued that his PFBPP sentence was illegal because one of the
two felony convictions identified in the Immediate Sentencing Form—a 2008
conviction for possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a school
zone—was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c) and he therefore did not
qualify for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2).
He also contended that his 2008 conviction for possession with intent to deliver
marijuana (“PWITD”), which was not listed on the Immediate Sentencing Form,
should not qualify as a violent felony under Section 4201(c).
2 (4) The Superior Court asked the State and Teel’s trial counsel to address
whether Teel qualified for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under Section
1448. In response, Teel’s counsel advised the court that he had contacted the State
a few days after sentencing to request resentencing because the school zone
possession conviction was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c). If Teel only
had one prior violent felony conviction, he faced a five-year minimum mandatory
sentence under Section 1448(e)(1)(b) rather than a ten-year minimum mandatory
sentence under Section 1448(e)(2)(b). Teel’s counsel also told Teel that if the State
relied upon the school zone possession conviction, he would seek resentencing to
reduce the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence to a five year minimum
mandatory sentence.
(5) Teel’s counsel further advised the court that he and the State had
discovered the Immediate Sentencing Form contained a scrivener’s error and should
have listed Teel’s 2008 PWITD conviction as the second violent felony conviction,
rather than the school zone possession conviction. Teel’s counsel also discussed this
with Teel, who reminded counsel that he had filed a motion regarding his belief that
the PWITD conviction should not qualify as a violent felony. Teel’s counsel then
reminded Teel that the Superior Court had denied that motion before accepting his
plea.1 The State agreed with Teel’s counsel’s summary of the parties’
1 See App. to Answering Br. at B35.
3 communications, took responsibility for the scrivener’s error in the Immediate
Sentencing Form, and noted that the plea form correctly listed the minimum
mandatory sentence for PFBPP as ten years.
(6) The Superior Court held an office conference with counsel on August
3, 2022. After the parties reviewed what had occurred since sentencing, the Superior
Court judge stated that he believed the error in the Immediate Sentencing Form was
minor and he would resolve the error in his order deciding the motion for correction
of illegal sentence. On September 1, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order
denying the motions for correction of illegal sentence and postconviction relief. This
appeal followed.
(7) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion for
correction of illegal sentence and a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.2 We review questions of law de novo.3 A sentence is illegal if
it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to
the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a
term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a
sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.4 To prevail on an
2 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014); Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 810 (Del. 2013). 3 Fountain, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1; Ploof, 75 A.3d at 820. 4 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
4 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Rule 61 after entering into a plea
agreement, the defendant must demonstrate that: (i) trial counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) counsel’s actions were
so prejudicial “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”5
(8) On appeal, Teel argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his
motions because his PWITD conviction is not a violent felony under Section 4201(c)
and therefore he only qualified for a five-year minimum mandatory sentence for
PFBPP under Section 1448(e)(1). At the time of the crimes Teel committed in 2020,
Section 1448(e)(1)(c) provided that a prohibited person who knowingly possessed a
firearm “shall receive a minimum sentence of . . . ten years at Level V, if the person
has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony.” Teel
does not dispute that he was convicted of stalking, a violent felony under Section
4201(c), in 2014. He also admits that he has a 2008 conviction for PWITD but
contends that PWITD is no longer a violent felony under the Ned Carpenter Act, 78
Del. Laws. Ch. 13 (2011). Teel is mistaken.
(9) The Ned Carpenter Act eliminated or reclassified certain drug offenses,
but the act did not apply retroactively to any violation that occurred before
5 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ERIC TEEL, § § Defendant Below, § No. 363, 2022 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 2004004125 (N) § Appellee. §
Submitted: July 21, 2023 Decided: September 5, 2023
Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears
to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Eric Teel, filed this appeal from a Superior Court order
denying his motion for correction of an illegal sentence under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 35 and his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61. After consideration of the parties’ arguments, we affirm the
Superior Court’s denial of the motions.
(2) In August 2021, a grand jury indicted Teel for possession of a firearm
by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”) and two counts of terroristic threatening. The
charges arose from Teel threatening his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend by sending her a photograph of himself with a gun. On December 6, 2021, Teel pleaded guilty
to one count of PFBPP and one count of terroristic threatening in exchange for the
State (i) entering a nolle prosequi on the other terroristic threatening charge, and (ii)
agreeing not to pursue other acts of intimidation occurring before December 6, 2021.
The parties also stipulated that Teel had two previous violent felony convictions and
jointly agreed to recommend the following sentence: (i) for PFBPP, fifteen years of
Level V incarceration suspended after the ten-year minimum mandatory for
decreasing levels of supervision; and (ii) for terroristic threatening, one year of Level
V incarceration suspended for one year of Level III probation. That same day, the
Superior Court accepted Teel’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended sentence.
(3) On May 2, 2022, Teel filed a pro se motion for correction of illegal
sentence, and on May 12, 2022, he filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief.
In both motions, Teel argued that his PFBPP sentence was illegal because one of the
two felony convictions identified in the Immediate Sentencing Form—a 2008
conviction for possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a school
zone—was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c) and he therefore did not
qualify for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(2).
He also contended that his 2008 conviction for possession with intent to deliver
marijuana (“PWITD”), which was not listed on the Immediate Sentencing Form,
should not qualify as a violent felony under Section 4201(c).
2 (4) The Superior Court asked the State and Teel’s trial counsel to address
whether Teel qualified for a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence under Section
1448. In response, Teel’s counsel advised the court that he had contacted the State
a few days after sentencing to request resentencing because the school zone
possession conviction was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c). If Teel only
had one prior violent felony conviction, he faced a five-year minimum mandatory
sentence under Section 1448(e)(1)(b) rather than a ten-year minimum mandatory
sentence under Section 1448(e)(2)(b). Teel’s counsel also told Teel that if the State
relied upon the school zone possession conviction, he would seek resentencing to
reduce the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence to a five year minimum
mandatory sentence.
(5) Teel’s counsel further advised the court that he and the State had
discovered the Immediate Sentencing Form contained a scrivener’s error and should
have listed Teel’s 2008 PWITD conviction as the second violent felony conviction,
rather than the school zone possession conviction. Teel’s counsel also discussed this
with Teel, who reminded counsel that he had filed a motion regarding his belief that
the PWITD conviction should not qualify as a violent felony. Teel’s counsel then
reminded Teel that the Superior Court had denied that motion before accepting his
plea.1 The State agreed with Teel’s counsel’s summary of the parties’
1 See App. to Answering Br. at B35.
3 communications, took responsibility for the scrivener’s error in the Immediate
Sentencing Form, and noted that the plea form correctly listed the minimum
mandatory sentence for PFBPP as ten years.
(6) The Superior Court held an office conference with counsel on August
3, 2022. After the parties reviewed what had occurred since sentencing, the Superior
Court judge stated that he believed the error in the Immediate Sentencing Form was
minor and he would resolve the error in his order deciding the motion for correction
of illegal sentence. On September 1, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order
denying the motions for correction of illegal sentence and postconviction relief. This
appeal followed.
(7) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion for
correction of illegal sentence and a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.2 We review questions of law de novo.3 A sentence is illegal if
it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to
the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a
term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a
sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.4 To prevail on an
2 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014); Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 810 (Del. 2013). 3 Fountain, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1; Ploof, 75 A.3d at 820. 4 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
4 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Rule 61 after entering into a plea
agreement, the defendant must demonstrate that: (i) trial counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) counsel’s actions were
so prejudicial “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”5
(8) On appeal, Teel argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his
motions because his PWITD conviction is not a violent felony under Section 4201(c)
and therefore he only qualified for a five-year minimum mandatory sentence for
PFBPP under Section 1448(e)(1). At the time of the crimes Teel committed in 2020,
Section 1448(e)(1)(c) provided that a prohibited person who knowingly possessed a
firearm “shall receive a minimum sentence of . . . ten years at Level V, if the person
has been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of any violent felony.” Teel
does not dispute that he was convicted of stalking, a violent felony under Section
4201(c), in 2014. He also admits that he has a 2008 conviction for PWITD but
contends that PWITD is no longer a violent felony under the Ned Carpenter Act, 78
Del. Laws. Ch. 13 (2011). Teel is mistaken.
(9) The Ned Carpenter Act eliminated or reclassified certain drug offenses,
but the act did not apply retroactively to any violation that occurred before
5 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988).
5 September 1, 2011.6 At the time Teel committed the crime of PFBPP in 2020,
Section 4201(c) designated (and still designates) Former
Manufacture/Delivery/Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled or Counterfeit
Controlled Substance under 16 Del. C. § 4752, the crime Teel was convicted of in
2008, a violent felony.7 Because Teel had two convictions designated violent
felonies under Section 4201(c) at the time he committed PFBPP in 2020,8 he was
subject to a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.9 The Superior Court
therefore did not err in denying Teel’s motion for correction of illegal sentence.
(10) As to the Rule 61 motion, the record does not support Teel’s claim that
he pleaded guilty because he believed he would not have to serve a ten-year
minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP. Although the Immediate Sentencing
Form incorrectly listed possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a
school zone, instead of PWITD, as one of Teel’s prior violent felony convictions,
the plea colloquy reflects that Teel was aware he had a previous conviction for
PWITD. The signed plea agreement correctly disclosed that Teel faced a ten-to-
fifteen year Level V sentence for PFBPP. The parties agreed in the plea agreement
6 Ayala v. State, 204 A.3d 829, 838-39 (Del. 2019). 7 Section 4201(c) also designates the current version of 16 Del. C. § 4752, drug dealing, a violent felony. 8 Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 543 (Del. 2017) (holding “that the definition of ‘violent felony’ as the term is used in Section 1448(e) is controlled by the version of Section 4201(c) in effect” at the time the defendant committed the Section 1448 offense). 9 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1).
6 to recommend a PFBPP sentence of fifteen years of Level V incarceration suspended
after the ten-year minimum mandatory. During the plea colloquy, Teel expressed
his understanding that he faced a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP.
The Superior Court imposed the sentence recommended by the parties.
(11) If Teel had not pleaded guilty and had insisted on going to trial, he
would have faced the same minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP— ten years of
Level V incarceration—plus the possibility of an additional five years of
unsuspended Level V time for PFBPP and two years of unsuspended Level V time
for the terroristic threatening charges, along with additional Level V time for the act
of intimidation charges that the State agreed not to pursue in exchange for Teel’s
plea. Teel has not shown that there is a reasonable probability he would have
rejected the plea offer and insisted on proceeding to trial had he known he would
have to serve the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for PFBPP. Accordingly,
the Superior Court did not err in denying Teel’s motion for postconviction relief
under Rule 61.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice