In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-24-00355-CR
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TED DARWIN MOORE, Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 22-10-13402-CR
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Ted Darwin Moore appeals his conviction for the second-degree felony offense of possession of a controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d). In a single issue, Moore argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Moore for the second-degree felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of more than 4 grams but less than 200 grams. See id. The State filed a Notice of Extraneous Offenses and Prior Convictions, stating it intended to offer evidence of Moore’s two prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance. The State also filed a Notice of Enhancement, which included two enhancement paragraphs and stated that the State intended to enhance Moore’s punishment range by introducing evidence of Moore’s two prior felony convictions.
The trial court conducted a jury trial. Deputy Troy Mungia (“Mungia”) of Montgomery County Precinct 4 Constable’s Office testified that his dash camera was operating when he stopped the vehicle Moore was driving for not having a front or rear license plate. The jury viewed the video recording from Mungia’s dash camera. Moore reported that he and his wife had just purchased the vehicle and that he was on his way to get insurance. Mungia did not think Moore’s story made sense because Moore was not driving in the direction where his insurance company was located. Mungia explained that it was policy to tow and inventory a vehicle without a license plate.
Mungia described Moore as cordial and cooperative and stated Moore consented to a search of the vehicle. Mungia stated that in his training and
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experience, people with narcotics on their person do consent to being searched. Mungia testified that Deputy Trevor Young (“Young”) found a glass pipe containing burnt residue in Moore’s left front shirt pocket, and Mungia explained the pipe was typically used to smoke methamphetamine. Moore also had a couple of torch lighters which are typically used to burn the pipe, and Moore did not have any cigarettes or cigars.
Mungia detained Moore for further investigation of narcotics. Mungia found a “black nylon eye glass case[]” that contained paraphernalia–a pick and small straws–and a pair of socks containing four clear plastic bags with a white crystal substance which he believed to be methamphetamine. Mungia also found a marijuana bong and one additional pipe, which was in the center console of the vehicle and contained residue. Mungia arrested Moore for possession.
On cross-examination, Mungia explained that the VIN number on the vehicle did not come back to Moore or as stolen. Mungia stated it could have been someone who recently purchased the vehicle. Mungia explained he field tested the contents of the packages to determine that the substance was methamphetamine.
Young, of the Montgomery County Precinct 4 Constable’s Office, testified that he was working with Mungia when they pulled Moore over. Young testified that he got Moore’s consent to search both his person and the vehicle. Young explained that in his experience, it was common for people with narcotics to consent to a search
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of their person and vehicle. Young searched Moore and found a few torch lighters and a pink clear glass pipe with residue in Moore’s front right shirt pocket. Young explained that the residue shows the pipe had been used to smoke illegal narcotics and that the torch lighters are commonly used to smoke narcotics. In the driver’s side door pocket, Young found the black nylon case containing drug paraphernalia–the pick and straws–and plastic bags containing a white crystal-like substance. Young also found a clear glass pipe in the center console and a pink bong used to smoke marijuana.
Young inventoried the vehicle and had it towed. Young testified that it looked as though somebody was moving because there were a lot of items in the vehicle, including totes with clothes and a few bags. Young explained that Moore had stomach pains, and EMS took Moore to the hospital, which cleared Moore to be taken to jail.
Briana Ricks, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory, analyzed some of the controlled substance found in Moore’s case and determined that it was 6.15 grams of methamphetamine. Ricks explained that the 6.15 grams of methamphetamine she tested was above 4 grams and between the range of the 4 to 200 grams Moore was charged with possessing.
At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for a directed verdict due to the State’s alleged failure to prove Moore had any intent or knowledge and
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because the vehicle did not belong to Moore. The trial court denied Moore’s motion for directed verdict.
Moore testified in his defense and explained that he “turned to drugs[]” after his divorce and the death of his parents and son. Moore explained he had been in trouble a couple of times for “[s]mall possession charges[]” that he thought were felonies, and he had spent time in prison and on parole. After completing parole, Moore got in trouble for drugs again, was incarcerated, and still on parole. Moore explained that his drug of choice was methamphetamine, and that he claimed to have quit. Moore had been in a relationship with Sharon McGeehen, who also used drugs. Moore tried to help McGeehen by letting her live with him and helping her to take care of herself.
Moore testified that when he was arrested for the current offense, he had sold his house, and he and McGeehen were going their separate ways. Moore explained that he was driving McGeehen’s vehicle that McGeehen had purchased the night before, because she had asked him to take her to pick up the vehicle, which already contained everything McGeehen owned. Moore testified that he had never seen the vehicle which had no license plates, and when he arrived at the location, McGeehen left him there with the vehicle with no plates. Moore explained that the owner of the location made him remove the vehicle, and he was pulled over five minutes after he
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left. Moore claimed he asked McGeehen if there was “anything in your car, and she said, no.”
Moore testified that the drugs found in McGeehen’s vehicle were not his, and he had no idea McGeehen had put them in the vehicle. Moore explained that he had never seen the vehicle before and had no intention of driving the vehicle because his plan was to drop McGeehen off so she could get the vehicle. Moore testified that he pleaded not guilty to the current offense and that he had pleaded guilty to his prior drug offenses.
On cross-examination, Moore explained that he helped McGeehen purchase the vehicle he was driving. Moore agreed that he had three convictions for possession of a controlled substance. Moore remained in a relationship with McGeehen despite knowing that McGeehen had used methamphetamine. A couple of weeks after his arrest for the current offense, Moore called McGeehen from jail, and Moore denied telling McGeehen the drugs were hers during that recorded call. During one jail call, Moore told McGeehen, who said she was his common law wife, that “this was not mine, it was yours,” and McGeehen responded, “it’s not mine what do you mean?” McGeehen stated, “so it is all on me, ok.” When Moore told McGeehen that he “did not know,” McGeehen stated that “she didn’t know it was in there either.”
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Concerning the pipe the police found in his front pocket, Moore stated that it was under the gas pedal, and when he hit the brake, he stuck it in his pocket after it rolled under the seat. Moore explained he was going to try to throw the pipe out because he did not know where it came from. Moore claimed ownership of the torch lighters. Despite testifying that he left his billfold in his truck before McGeehen left him with her vehicle, Moore had his identification during the stop.
McGeehen testified that it was not Moore’s “stuff that was – he was charged with. And I was terrified.” McGeehen stated that “[i]t was mine. It was my vehicle.” McGeehen explained that she bought the vehicle the night before and it contained her “stuff” and that she did not believe that Moore knew the “stuff” was in her vehicle. McGeehen stated that she had medical conditions that caused her to easily forget things. McGeehen was scared she would go to jail.
On cross-examination, McGeehen explained that she and Moore used drugs during their dating relationship and that she still loves him. McGeehen stated she was doing the right thing. McGeehen had a couple of phone calls with Moore while he was in jail, and she claimed that she “was denying what was going on because I was in denial. I did not want to go to jail.” When the State played one of the jail calls for the jury and asked whether McGeehen sounded surprised that Moore was blaming the drugs on her, McGeehen stated she “was scared. I was really terrified. And, yes, they were mine.” The jury also heard another jail call during which Moore
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discussed writing McGeehen letters, and McGeehen claimed Moore was trying to convince her to tell the truth. McGeehen explained that the drugs were found in a “bag or something like that[,]” but she did not “remember correctly[]” and just knew “they were in there.” McGeehen also did not remember the quantity of the methamphetamine that was found, how it was packaged, or whether she had a pipe.
McGeehen agreed that she filed an affidavit in one of Moore’s prior cases claiming possession of the drugs Moore was charged with because they were hers. McGeehen explained the drugs in that case were found in a car Moore was driving and that she was not present when he was stopped. McGeehen stated that the drugs in that prior case were found in her shower bag, but drugs were also found in the air intake of the vehicle, and McGeehen did not remember whether she claimed ownership of those drugs. McGeehen testified that she “had no idea[]” about the drugs found in the air intake. McGeehen was aware that her punishment range for possession of the drugs in the current case was less than Moore’s.
The jury found Moore guilty of the second-degree felony offense of possession of a controlled substance. Moore and the State reached an agreement as to Moore’s punishment–thirty years of confinement. Moore pleaded “[t]rue” to the State’s enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court found the enhancement paragraphs to be “true” and assessed Moore’s punishment as a habitual felony offender at thirty years of confinement.
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ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Moore complains that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions were violated because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed the methamphetamines beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore complains the State failed to prove he knowingly or intentionally exercised care, custody, management or control of the methamphetamines found in McGeehen’s vehicle because he lacked knowledge and exclusive control. Moore contends that McGeehen claimed ownership of the vehicle’s contents.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction in a criminal case, appellate courts consider all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and decide, after reviewing the evidence in that light, whether a rational trier of fact could have found the appellant guilty of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We apply “only one standard” to evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and that is “legal sufficiency.” Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we defer to the jury’s findings and its conclusions, as it was the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve all
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conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the basic facts to resolve whether the defendant is guilty of the criminal offense that is at issue at trial. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).
The jury, as the judge of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, may choose to believe or not believe the testimony of the witnesses, or any portion of their testimony, despite any contradictory evidence. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). “‘When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.’” Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). A jury is allowed to draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts as long as each is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360.
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A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he knowingly or intentionally possesses the controlled substance in the prescribed amount, by aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102, 481.115(d). To prove possession, the State must prove that (1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The State does not have to prove that the defendant had sole or exclusive possession of the drugs. See Cude v. State, 716 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). However, when the defendant does not have exclusive possession of the place where the contraband is found, then independent facts and circumstances must link him to the drugs. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish that the defendant’s connection with the drugs was more than fortuitous. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161. This is called the “affirmative links” rule. Id. This Court has recognized the following non-exclusive factors as tending to establish affirmative links: (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other
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contraband when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. See Cogar v. State, No. 09-19- 00342-CR, 2020 WL 5805955, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dixon v. State, 918 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, no pet.). The number of factors is not as important as the logical force they collectively create to prove that a crime has been committed. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. The State is not required to present evidence on each factor to show a link between the defendant and the controlled substance, and the absence of a factor is not evidence of innocence that must be weighed against the factors that are present. See Espino-Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d).
“Mere presence at the location where drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those drugs.” Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either
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direct or circumstantial, can be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Convenient access to the contraband is an accepted factor. See Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). “[C]onveniently accessible” means that the contraband must be within the close vicinity of the accused and easily accessible while in the vehicle so as to suggest that the accused had knowledge of the contraband and exercised control over it.” See id. (citing Deshong, 625 S.W.2d at 329; Rhyne v. State, 620 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)); see also Gregory v. State, 159 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. ref’d).
In this case, the jury could have considered the following affirmative links to conclude that Moore possessed the methamphetamine found in the vehicle: Moore was the driver and only person present when the police searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine; Moore was in close proximity to the methamphetamine and related paraphernalia found in the driver’s side door pocket; the police found a glass pipe containing burnt residue in Moore’s pocket and that pipe is typically used to smoke methamphetamine; Moore also claimed ownership of other related paraphernalia–torch lighters–that were found in the vehicle and typically used to smoke methamphetamine; and the police found an additional pipe containing residue in the center console of the vehicle. See Cogar, 2020 WL 5805955, at **3-4; Dixon, 918 S.W.2d at 681. Mungia also testified that Moore’s story that he was on his way
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to purchase insurance did not make sense, and McGeehen did not offer testimony supporting Moore’s account. Moore testified that he and McGeehen were going their separate ways and that she took off and left him with the vehicle. McGeehen stated that she was following Moore to park the vehicle at a place she could not remember and that she and Moore were supposed to be moving in together. They jury also considered McGeehen’s testimony that she had previously claimed ownership of drugs in one of Moore’s prior cases.
Despite hearing that Moore did not own the vehicle, which both Moore and McGeehen claimed she purchased the night before the stop, the jury could have disbelieved both Moore’s and McGeehen’s claim that the methamphetamine was not Moore’s and reasonably concluded that Moore knowingly or intentionally possessed the methamphetamine and had exercised control, management, or care over the substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d); Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161; Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614. Deferring to the jury as factfinder and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could have determined that the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances was sufficient to support the conviction of Moore for possession of a controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d); Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161. We overrule Moore’s sole issue.
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We note, however, that the trial court’s judgment contains a clerical error because it incorrectly states that Moore was charged and convicted of an offense under section 481.115(d) of the Texas Penal Code, whereas Moore was convicted of a violation of section 481.115(d) of the Tex. Health & Safety Code. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d). This Court has the authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Moore was convicted of violating section 481.115(d) of the Texas Health & Safety Code. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
JAY WRIGHT
Justice
Submitted on May 13, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 26, 2026 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.