Technical Sales of Jacksonville, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville

35 Fla. Supp. 145
CourtCircuit Court of the 4th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Duval County
DecidedApril 9, 1971
DocketNo. 71-1008
StatusPublished

This text of 35 Fla. Supp. 145 (Technical Sales of Jacksonville, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 4th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Duval County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Technical Sales of Jacksonville, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 35 Fla. Supp. 145 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1971).

Opinion

HENRY F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Memorandum opinion and order, April 9, 1971: The plaintiff was an unsuccessful bidder in connection with the purchase of certain water system equipment of a highly technical nature by the defendant, City of Jacksonville, hereinafter referred to as “the city”. Defendant Badger Meter Manufacturing Co., hereinafter referred to as “Badger”, was the low bidder to whom the contract has now been awarded.

Plaintiff contends that a portion of Badger’s bid was completely at variance with the city’s specifications and should have been rejected. Plaintiff further contends that instead of rejecting the bid as required, the city induced or permitted Badger to modify its bid after the formal opening thereof to conform to such specifications. If this is true, plaintiff’s contention that the resulting contract is invalid and that any and all payments thereunder should be enjoined is correct.

Defendants contend that the proposal in question is merely an “alternate” proposal and does not constitute an “exception” to the specifications.

Factual background

The city determined the need for certain highly technical equipment relating to the municipal water system. The services of an [147]*147outside consulting engineer were secured to prepared the specifications and related technical data for use in connection with competitive bidding and to thereafter evaluate the bids received.

All prospective bidders received a booklet entitled “Specifications and Contract Documents” which included all pertinent data relating to this project including the “Instructions to Bidders”. A complete copy of this document is filed in evidence in this cause as “City of Jax, exhibit 1” and various portions thereof will be referred to by the court at appropriate times.

The various bids were publicly opened on January 5, 1971 and plaintiff immediately objected to Badger’s apparent low bid on the ground that it contained a material variance from the specifications. This objection was set forth in detail in a letter from plaintiff to the city dated January 6, 1971. (Plaintiff’s exhibit 5).

The city and its consulting engineers, acting as an evaluation committee, thereafter conducted a series of meetings on January 14, 21, 25 and 28, 1971 concerning Badger’s bid. The city finally reached the conclusion that Badger’s variant proposal was an “alternate” to its base bid instead of an “exception”. The contract was thereafter awarded after this litigation was commenced.

Profferred trial exhibits

At the trial of this cause, plaintiff offered into evidence certain “minutes” of the various meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph, together with a letter of transmittal which accompanied the actual contract when the same was sent to Badger for execution. The city contends that these documents are inadmissible upon the grounds that a city speaks only through its official records and that the “minutes” in question are only unofficial memoranda, Beck v. Littlefield, 68 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1953). The plaintiff contends that they constitute “business records” and are admissible as such.

The court agrees that these various profferred exhibits are admissible to reflect generally what occurred at the meetings; however, these documents do not purport to be verbatim transcriptions of such meetings and contain opinions, conclusions and characterizations by the scrivener and others in attendance which are not binding upon the parties or the court. The court must make an independent determination of the true nature of the proposal in question.

Decision of court

It is clear that a determination of the true nature of the proposal in question depends upon the construction of the Badger bid and the meaning thereof gathered from such tokens thereof as may be [148]*148found in the bid proposal inself1, which in this case includes all the material contained in the booklet entitled “Specifications and Contract Documents” referred to above.

The court must first determine the basic purpose of the detailed annex which accompanied Badger’s base bid since in such base bid it agreed to do all the work in strict accordance with the specifications without exception. This determination will enable the court to decide what portions of said annex are the alternates referred to on the face of the said base bid.

The Instructions to Bidders require that bidders submit their proposal on the form supplied by the city’s engineer2 and that any exceptions to the specifications be clearly noted in said proposal.3 In this case Badger submitted its proposal on the prescribed form and offered to do the work in strict accordance with the “Contract Documents”, which include the specifications, without taking any exception thereto. Badger did specify on the face of its proposal that it was suggesting certain “alternates” in the detailed annex which accompanied its bid.4

[149]*149The “Special Conditions”, which are also a part of the “Contract Documents”, require that a bidder submit with his proposal all pertinent information necessary to describe the specific equipment the bidder proposes to use in meeting the specifications.5 This requirement is certainly to be expected since the specifications relating to the equipment consist largely, if not entirely, of performance or functional requirements and capabilities rather than specific equipment.

In compliance with the above requirement, Badger did submit such a detailed list of equipment in the annex to its base proposal.6 In the body of such descriptive list, certain alternate equipment was proposed for other equipment already described therein and these alternates were grouped together and referred to again at the end thereof for apparent ease of reference.7 Referring to equipment alternates in the manner described certainly does not preclude the existence of other alternates within the annex.

The next logical step is for the court to determine whether or not the service proposal contained in the annex could properly and reasonably be considered one of the alternates referred tp on the face of Badger’s base bid proposal.

The description of the “service” arrangement contained in the annex to Badger’s proposal is clearly at variance with the arrangement set forth in the specifications. However, unlike the specifications relating to performance capabilities of the equipment, the specifications did contain a detailed description of the required service arrangement.8 Thus, the two arrangements could be com[150]*150pared by the city’s evaluation committee. In addition, the language of the proposal itself leads the court to the conclusion that it was one of the alternates referred to on the face of the base bid. Whether or not such alternate could have been accepted under any circumstances by the city need not be decided since no attempt was made to do so.

The court is unable to conclude from the evidence before it that the method adopted by the city in investigating and dealing with plaintiff’s protest is sufficient to invalidate Badger’s bid and the resulting contract.

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Related

Beck v. Littlefield
68 So. 2d 889 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1953)
Coller v. City of St. Paul
26 N.W.2d 835 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1947)

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Bluebook (online)
35 Fla. Supp. 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/technical-sales-of-jacksonville-inc-v-city-of-jacksonville-flacirct4duv-1971.