IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED JUNE 1997 SESSION July 29, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk FRANK E. TEASLEY, ) ) Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9611-CR-00441 ) ) Knox County v. ) ) Honorable Ray L. Jenkins, Judge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction) ) Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Albert J. Newman, Jr. Charles W. Burson Burwell Bldg., Suite 500 Attorney General of Tennessee 602 South Gay Street and Knoxville, TN 37902 Marvin E. Clements, Jr. Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Randall E. Nichols District Attorney General and Zane Scarlett Assistant District Attorney General City-County Building Knoxville, TN 37902
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton Judge OPINION
The petitioner, Frank E. Teasley, appeals as of right from the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Knox County. He is presently
serving an effective sentence of forty-eight years in the custody of the Department of
Correction for his 1992 convictions based upon guilty pleas for two counts of rape,
aggravated kidnapping and robbery. His sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that
the trial court was correct.
The petitioner was originally indicted in March 1992 for two counts of
aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. He was
appointed various counsel during the course of the case, but was represented by two
assistant public defenders at the time of his guilty pleas. On the morning of trial, the
parties agreed for the petitioner to plead guilty to offenses that were one lower class
than those charged in the indictment and for the trial court to set the sentences. A third
assistant public defender represented the petitioner at the sentencing hearing. The
petitioner appealed the sentences imposed, but this court affirmed the sentences.
State v. Frank E. Teasley, No.03C01-9303-CR-00099, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App.
Nov. 23, 1993).
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that he
only met with his trial attorney, Steven Garrett, on the morning that he ultimately pled
guilty. He said that Mr. Garrett told him that if he did not enter a plea, he would get forty
to fifty years, but that if he pled, he would get a sixteen to eighteen-year sentence with
everything running concurrently. He also testified that he notified his attorney before
the sentencing hearing that he wanted to withdraw his plea, but was told that he could
not do so.
2 The petitioner acknowledged that Mr. Garrett obtained a mental
evaluation for him, but he claimed that he was not properly evaluated. Also, he said
that Mr. Garrett never talked to him about any possible strategy and did not do any “on-
the-street” investigation. The petitioner testified that at the time of the offenses, he was
under the influence of drugs and alcohol to the point that he did not know what he did,
but Mr. Garrett did not pursue the claim. He acknowledged that he did not tell the
attorney of any witnesses, but he thought the attorney would investigate the case
himself.
Relative to his sentencing hearing, the petitioner testified that his
successor attorney, Scott Carpenter, again told him that he would receive sixteen to
eighteen years. He also said that Mr. Carpenter did not tell him that the victim would
appear at the sentencing hearing and did not advise him that he would be asked to
testify, as well. The petitioner also said that he had a lengthy prior record, but he did
not have a prior history of violence. Ultimately, he stated that he pled guilty because
the attorneys said he would get sixteen to eighteen years and he was afraid of more
time.
Mr. Garrett testified that the petitioner was originally represented by local
attorneys from the Tennessee Valley Authority who had been appointed at a time when
the public defender’s office was not taking cases. He said that they conducted an
extensive investigation with detailed memos of interviews with police and civilian
witnesses. He said that when he was appointed, he received a copy of their notes and
also had a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the case. He testified that he met
with the petitioner on several occasions and determined that there might be a defense
based on the defendant’s mental status. He said that he obtained a mental evaluation
that concluded that the petitioner was sane and competent to be tried and that the
petitioner never indicated that the evaluation was improper.
3 As for trial strategy, Mr. Garrett testified that he wanted to attack the
identification of the petitioner, but he was aware that the state had a matching palm
print and the witness who intervened and stopped the assault before the petitioner left
the scene. In any event, Mr. Garrett thought that the jury might convict the petitioner of
lesser included offenses. As for the petitioner’s claim of intoxication, he stated that he
did not believe intoxication would negate the mental culpability needed for rape.
Mr. Garrett testified that he had been ready for trial. He said that the state
made no offer before the morning of trial, but then the state offered to reduce the
offenses by one class. He said that he was sure that he and the petitioner discussed
the ranges of punishment and that he never promised anybody a particular sentence.
The transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflects that the trial court fully advised the
petitioner of his rights and the consequences of his waiving those rights and pleading
guilty, including sentencing.
The trial court’s findings of fact reflect that it accredited Mr. Garrett’s
testimony. It concluded that the petitioner was provided with the effective assistance of
counsel and that the petitioner had failed to prove otherwise “whether by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing proof.”
Under the Sixth Amendment, when a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is made, the burden is upon the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial in terms of
rendering a reasonable probability that the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-72, 113 S. Ct. 838,
842-44 (1993). The Strickland standard has been applied, as well, to the right to
4 counsel under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Melson, 772
S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985), the Supreme
Court applied the Strickland two-part test to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
relative to a guilty plea. It concluded that to satisfy the prejudice part of the test, “the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED JUNE 1997 SESSION July 29, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk FRANK E. TEASLEY, ) ) Appellant, ) No. 03C01-9611-CR-00441 ) ) Knox County v. ) ) Honorable Ray L. Jenkins, Judge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction) ) Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Albert J. Newman, Jr. Charles W. Burson Burwell Bldg., Suite 500 Attorney General of Tennessee 602 South Gay Street and Knoxville, TN 37902 Marvin E. Clements, Jr. Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Randall E. Nichols District Attorney General and Zane Scarlett Assistant District Attorney General City-County Building Knoxville, TN 37902
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton Judge OPINION
The petitioner, Frank E. Teasley, appeals as of right from the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Knox County. He is presently
serving an effective sentence of forty-eight years in the custody of the Department of
Correction for his 1992 convictions based upon guilty pleas for two counts of rape,
aggravated kidnapping and robbery. His sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that
the trial court was correct.
The petitioner was originally indicted in March 1992 for two counts of
aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. He was
appointed various counsel during the course of the case, but was represented by two
assistant public defenders at the time of his guilty pleas. On the morning of trial, the
parties agreed for the petitioner to plead guilty to offenses that were one lower class
than those charged in the indictment and for the trial court to set the sentences. A third
assistant public defender represented the petitioner at the sentencing hearing. The
petitioner appealed the sentences imposed, but this court affirmed the sentences.
State v. Frank E. Teasley, No.03C01-9303-CR-00099, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App.
Nov. 23, 1993).
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that he
only met with his trial attorney, Steven Garrett, on the morning that he ultimately pled
guilty. He said that Mr. Garrett told him that if he did not enter a plea, he would get forty
to fifty years, but that if he pled, he would get a sixteen to eighteen-year sentence with
everything running concurrently. He also testified that he notified his attorney before
the sentencing hearing that he wanted to withdraw his plea, but was told that he could
not do so.
2 The petitioner acknowledged that Mr. Garrett obtained a mental
evaluation for him, but he claimed that he was not properly evaluated. Also, he said
that Mr. Garrett never talked to him about any possible strategy and did not do any “on-
the-street” investigation. The petitioner testified that at the time of the offenses, he was
under the influence of drugs and alcohol to the point that he did not know what he did,
but Mr. Garrett did not pursue the claim. He acknowledged that he did not tell the
attorney of any witnesses, but he thought the attorney would investigate the case
himself.
Relative to his sentencing hearing, the petitioner testified that his
successor attorney, Scott Carpenter, again told him that he would receive sixteen to
eighteen years. He also said that Mr. Carpenter did not tell him that the victim would
appear at the sentencing hearing and did not advise him that he would be asked to
testify, as well. The petitioner also said that he had a lengthy prior record, but he did
not have a prior history of violence. Ultimately, he stated that he pled guilty because
the attorneys said he would get sixteen to eighteen years and he was afraid of more
time.
Mr. Garrett testified that the petitioner was originally represented by local
attorneys from the Tennessee Valley Authority who had been appointed at a time when
the public defender’s office was not taking cases. He said that they conducted an
extensive investigation with detailed memos of interviews with police and civilian
witnesses. He said that when he was appointed, he received a copy of their notes and
also had a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the case. He testified that he met
with the petitioner on several occasions and determined that there might be a defense
based on the defendant’s mental status. He said that he obtained a mental evaluation
that concluded that the petitioner was sane and competent to be tried and that the
petitioner never indicated that the evaluation was improper.
3 As for trial strategy, Mr. Garrett testified that he wanted to attack the
identification of the petitioner, but he was aware that the state had a matching palm
print and the witness who intervened and stopped the assault before the petitioner left
the scene. In any event, Mr. Garrett thought that the jury might convict the petitioner of
lesser included offenses. As for the petitioner’s claim of intoxication, he stated that he
did not believe intoxication would negate the mental culpability needed for rape.
Mr. Garrett testified that he had been ready for trial. He said that the state
made no offer before the morning of trial, but then the state offered to reduce the
offenses by one class. He said that he was sure that he and the petitioner discussed
the ranges of punishment and that he never promised anybody a particular sentence.
The transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflects that the trial court fully advised the
petitioner of his rights and the consequences of his waiving those rights and pleading
guilty, including sentencing.
The trial court’s findings of fact reflect that it accredited Mr. Garrett’s
testimony. It concluded that the petitioner was provided with the effective assistance of
counsel and that the petitioner had failed to prove otherwise “whether by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing proof.”
Under the Sixth Amendment, when a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is made, the burden is upon the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial in terms of
rendering a reasonable probability that the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-72, 113 S. Ct. 838,
842-44 (1993). The Strickland standard has been applied, as well, to the right to
4 counsel under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Melson, 772
S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985), the Supreme
Court applied the Strickland two-part test to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
relative to a guilty plea. It concluded that to satisfy the prejudice part of the test, “the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474
U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.
In Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our supreme court
decided that attorneys should be held to the general standard of whether the services
rendered were within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases. Further, the court stated that the range of competence was to be measured by
the duties and criteria set forth in Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1974) and United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Also,
in reviewing counsel's conduct, a "fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.
Ct. at 2065; see Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (counsel's conduct will
not be measured by "20-20 hindsight"). Thus, the fact that a particular strategy or tactic
failed or even hurt the defense does not, alone, support a claim of ineffective
assistance. Deference is made to tactical choices if they are informed ones based
upon adequate preparation. See Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d at 9; United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1201.
5 Also, we note that the approach to the issue of the ineffective assistance
of counsel does not have to start with an analysis of an attorney's conduct. If prejudice
is not shown, we need not seek to determine the validity of the allegations about
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
The original case related to an approximately sixty-year-old woman being
abducted at her car, being forcibly robbed, and being forcibly, digitally penetrated by the
petitioner while in the car. Then, the petitioner forced the victim into the trunk, which he
could not close because it landed on her head. A bystander saw the commotion and
rescued the victim. The petitioner left the scene. The petitioner has an extensive
criminal history and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner received
the effective assistance of counsel in terms of the trial attorney’s conduct. Also,
although Mr. Garrett acknowledged that he relied upon other attorneys’ work product in
trial preparation, the petitioner has in no way proven that anything of consequence was
left undone or omitted. Similarly, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that
the petitioner’s guilty pleas were entered with knowledge and understanding of his
sentencing exposure. Likewise, the petitioner has failed to show what was improper or
omitted relative to the sentencing hearing that would indicate that his sentences
probably would have been other than those he received.
Under these circumstances, the petitioner has failed to show in any
manner how the trial court erred in its findings and conclusions. The judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
_______________________________ Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
6 CONCUR:
___________________________ John H. Peay, Judge
____________________________ Curwood Witt , Judge