Teasley v. State

458 A.2d 93, 54 Md. App. 454, 1983 Md. App. LEXIS 267
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedApril 15, 1983
Docket1113, September Term, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 458 A.2d 93 (Teasley v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Teasley v. State, 458 A.2d 93, 54 Md. App. 454, 1983 Md. App. LEXIS 267 (Md. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

Moylan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This seemingly trivial appeal takes on significance only because its single and insubstantial contention is showing recent signs of becoming dangerously epidemic.

The appellant, Tyrone Teasley, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury, presided over by Judge Rosalyn B. Bell, of armed robbery and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Judge Bell sentenced the appellant to sentences of ten years for each offense, the sentences to be served consecutively. Upon this appeal, the appellant raises the single contention that Judge Bell, in sentencing, "misapplied the matrix system” of the sentencing guidelines now being tried, on an experimental basis, in Montgomery County and three other jurisdictions. Without any intention of being callous or cavalier, our response to the contention, no matter how we might dress it up verbally, has to reduce itself to a simple, "So what?”

Sentencing is a matter left almost exclusively to the broad discretion of the sentencing judge. Where the sentence falls within the statutory limits set by the Legislature, Roberts v. Warden, 242 Md. 459, 219 A.2d 254 (1966), and where there is no showing that it was "motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other improper considerations,” Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 69, 400 A.2d 419 (1979), it is beyond appellate challenge. The effort at sentencing reform represented by the so-called sentencing guidelines and being conducted on an experimental basis is a commendable one. Participation, however, by the trial judges is on a voluntary basis. Our approval of an experimental effort to reform the law does not enlarge our appellate jurisdiction. Whether, therefore, a trial judge scrupulously follows, outrageously flouts or clumsily misapplies the sentencing guidelines is simply none of our appellate business, unless, of course, such flouting or *456 misapplying should coincidentally trigger one of our more limited and traditional reasons for reviewing a sentence.

Judgments affirmed; costs to be paid 'by appellant.

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Bluebook (online)
458 A.2d 93, 54 Md. App. 454, 1983 Md. App. LEXIS 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/teasley-v-state-mdctspecapp-1983.