Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers

993 F. Supp. 1052, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2259, 1998 WL 57494
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 5, 1998
DocketCiv.A. 95-40474
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 993 F. Supp. 1052 (Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 993 F. Supp. 1052, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2259, 1998 WL 57494 (E.D. Mich. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING JOINT OBJECTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS

GADOLA, District Judge.

On August 27, 1997, Magistrate Judge Thomas Carlson issued an order granting a motion by defendant/counter-plaintiff, Detroit Newspaper Agency (“DNA”), for leave to file a second amended counterclaim. Currently before this court are joint objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order filed by the six union plamtiffs/eounter-defendants. 1 In *1054 the alternative, the Unions ask this court to dismiss the second amended counterclaim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, this court will dismiss the Unions’ joint objections and affirm the order of the Magistrate Judge. In addition, this court will grant, in part, and deny, in part, the motion to dismiss the second amended counterclaim.

Factual Background

This case arises from the labor strike against DNA which first began an July 13, 1995. On October 2,1995, the Unions filed a complaint against DNA asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan state law. On November 15,1995, DNA filed a counterclaim alleging that the Unions violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and conspired to violate § 1962(d). In Count I, DNA alleges that the Unions engaged in extortion and physical and verbal threats of extortion directed at DNA independent contractors, employees, and vendors; robbery resulting from theft of newspapers from subscribers, vendors, distribution racks, drop spots, and independent contractors; and arson by setting fire to and/or bombing vehicles at DNA facilities, placing and/or igniting pipe bombs in news racks, and throwing incendiary and explosive devices at and onto DNA property and/or at individuals working for DNA. Count Two alleges that the Unions conspired with and aided and abetted one another to accomplish the pattern of racketeering activity described in Count One.

The Unions filed four motions to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on February 12, 1996. On April 2, 1996 Judge Friedman, to whom this case was originally assigned, denied the various motions to dismiss and ordered DNA to file a more detailed counterclaim and RICO case' statement. DNA complied with this request and filed an amended counterclaim alleging 248 predicate acts in support of its RICO claim. On August 9, 1996, the Unions filed a joint motion to dismiss the defendants’ amended RICO counterclaim. On October 24, 1996, the case was reassigned to this court. On January 21, 1997, DNA supplemented the original RICO case statement by alleging an additional 11 predicate acts bringing the total alleged predicate acts to 259.

On February 24, 1997, this court disposed of the Unions’ joint motion to dismiss. In that order, this court dismissed 192 of the alleged predicate acts with prejudice and dismissed 23 acts without prejudice. Accordingly, only forty-four of the 259 alleged predicate acts remained. 2 See Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.Mich.1997).

As a part of its discussion, this court engaged in an analysis of whether many of the alleged predicate acts were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Ultimately, this court held that “any conduct which is obviously criminal [may] constitute a RICO predicate act.” Teamsters Local, 956 F.Supp. at 762. This court noted that it would “not allow the Unions to hide behind the shield of the NLRA in an attempt to evade the effect of RICO for conduct that is criminal under any measure.” Id. (citing MHC v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, 685 F.Supp. 1370, 1380 (E.D.Ky.1988)).

This court then delineated which alleged predicate acts were not preempted because they contained allegations of “obviously criminal” conduct such as destruction of property, assault, arson and robbery. In addition, this court held:

Predicate Acts # 8, # 82, # 111, # 122, # 125, # 133, # 142, # 150, # 151, # 155, # 156, # 158, # 171, # 177, # 178, # 184, # 185, # 193, # 194, # 195, # 199, # 205, and # 206, although alleging destruction of property and assault, do so in a vague and/or conclusory manner and are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

*1055 Id., n. 4. The instant motions primarily relate to a subset of the 23 alleged predicate acts dismissed without prejudice. ..

DNA has attempted to cure the defects in thirteen (13) of the alleged predicate acts dismissed for being vague and/or conelusory. DNA filed a motion to amend its counterclaim to include revised versions of those thirteen alleged predicate acts, and to include one additional alleged predicate act, #260. The Unions oppose allowing DNA to amend the counterclaim at this stage. With respect to the 13 prior alleged predicate acts, the Unions’ primary objection is that the proposed amendments would be futile because the revised allegations are equally vague and/or conelusory. The Unions also object to the proposed amendments on the basis that the Unions will be prejudiced by an amendment at this late date, and that DNA has had more than an ample opportunity to amend at this point.

Magistrate Judge Carlson held oral argument on the motion for leave to amend on August 20, 1997. At that time, Magistrate Judge Carlson indicated to the parties on the record that he was uneasy about deciding a motion for leave to amend based upon arguments that were essentially tailored for a motion to dismiss. He recognized that “futility” is a basis for refusing to allow an amendment, but also noted that this court had carefully considered the issue of vagueness in issuing its prior order. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge opted to grant the motion for leave to amend, which would allow the Unions to pursue their arguments in a motion to dismiss in front of this court, which would be more familiar with the issues.

On September 15, 1997, the Unions filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order and, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss the second amended counterclaim. DNA filed its response on October 1,1997, and the Unions filed a reply on October 9, 1997.

Discussion

1. The Magistrate Judge’s order granting leave to amend

The Unions assert that the August 27, 1997 order of the Magistrate Judge is clearly erroneous because he failed to consider all of the issues raised by the Unions in opposition to the motion for leave to amend.

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Bluebook (online)
993 F. Supp. 1052, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2259, 1998 WL 57494, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/teamsters-local-372-v-detroit-newspapers-mied-1998.