J-S92011-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ANTHONY TEAGUE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
TAMMY S. FERGUSON,
Appellee No. 346 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order February 8, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at No(s): 254-2004
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 20, 2017
Appellant, Anthony Teague, appeals pro se from an order entered on
February 8, 2016, denying Appellant’s purported petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Because we conclude that Appellant’s filing was an untimely, serial
Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) petition, we affirm the order denying
relief, albeit on different grounds.
The record reveals that on January 12, 2004, Appellant shot and killed
the mother of his three children, and then shot himself in the chest.
Appellant survived his wounds, and on September 10, 2014, he entered a
negotiated guilty plea to murder in the third degree. On November 2, 2004,
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S92011-16
the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of twenty to forty years of
incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
On March 8, 2005, Appellant filed an untimely post-sentence motion.
The trial court properly treated the motion as a PCRA petition and appointed
counsel. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (reiterating that, generally, a petition filed after the judgment
of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition). On May 27,
2005, Appellant’s counsel filed a PCRA petition, and the PCRA court held a
hearing on July 7, 2005. On July 13, 2005, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition, and Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. After
review, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s
petition. Commonwealth v. Teague, 1403 WDA 2005, 903 A.2d 54 (Pa.
Super. filed May 15, 2006) (unpublished memorandum).
More than a decade later, on February 5, 2016, Appellant filed the
underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant attached a civil
cover sheet to his petition and listed Tammy Ferguson as the defendant. 2
Despite attaching the civil cover sheet and averring the petition was a civil
habeas corpus filing, Appellant’s petition was filed in the criminal division of
the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas and docketed at Appellant’s
murder conviction docket number, 254-2004. On February 9, 2016, the trial
2 Tammy Ferguson is the Superintendent at SCI Benner Township where Appellant is serving his sentence.
-2- J-S92011-16
court denied Appellant’s petition, and Appellant filed a timely appeal to this
Court. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In his pro se brief on appeal, which is predominantly a prolix
statement of alleged trial court errors and inapposite legal authority,
Appellant appears to argue that his petition should have been filed in civil
court, that the criminal court lacked jurisdiction in this matter, and that his
sentence is illegal. Appellant’s Brief at 4; Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. However, before we may
reach the merits of these issues, we must address a jurisdictional matter.
It appears that the trial court, in an abundance of caution, addressed
the merits of Appellant’s challenges and found the issues meritless. Trial
Court Opinion, 4/22/16, at 4-9. However, for the reasons that follow, we
affirm the order denying relief, but we base that decision on our conclusion
that Appellant’s petition was merely an untimely PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that
this Court is not bound by the rationale of the trial court, and may affirm the
trial court’s order on any basis).
As noted, Appellant’s claims concern the trial court’s jurisdiction and
the legality of his sentence. These claims are cognizable under the PCRA.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2); and see Commonwealth v. Butler, 566 A.2d
1209, 1210 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that PCRA relief is permitted where it
is established that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction), and Commonwealth v.
-3- J-S92011-16
Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54, 60 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that persons serving illegal
sentences may obtain collateral relief under the PCRA). Therefore,
Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should have been treated as a
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citations omitted). It is well settled that the PCRA is the sole means
of obtaining post-conviction relief. Id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Issues that are
cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and
cannot be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Taylor, 65 A.3d at
466. “Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by
titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. Thus, it is well
settled that any collateral petition raising issues with respect to remedies
offered under the PCRA will be considered to be a PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Satisfied that we are addressing an appeal from the denial of PCRA
relief, we review it under the following standards. When determining the
propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record “in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.”
Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)).
This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports
the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal
error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012).
-4- J-S92011-16
We must now address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA. A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of
the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the
petition. Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 762 (Pa. Super. 2013).
A judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). However, an untimely
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J-S92011-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ANTHONY TEAGUE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
TAMMY S. FERGUSON,
Appellee No. 346 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order February 8, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at No(s): 254-2004
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 20, 2017
Appellant, Anthony Teague, appeals pro se from an order entered on
February 8, 2016, denying Appellant’s purported petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Because we conclude that Appellant’s filing was an untimely, serial
Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) petition, we affirm the order denying
relief, albeit on different grounds.
The record reveals that on January 12, 2004, Appellant shot and killed
the mother of his three children, and then shot himself in the chest.
Appellant survived his wounds, and on September 10, 2014, he entered a
negotiated guilty plea to murder in the third degree. On November 2, 2004,
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S92011-16
the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of twenty to forty years of
incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
On March 8, 2005, Appellant filed an untimely post-sentence motion.
The trial court properly treated the motion as a PCRA petition and appointed
counsel. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (reiterating that, generally, a petition filed after the judgment
of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition). On May 27,
2005, Appellant’s counsel filed a PCRA petition, and the PCRA court held a
hearing on July 7, 2005. On July 13, 2005, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition, and Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. After
review, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s
petition. Commonwealth v. Teague, 1403 WDA 2005, 903 A.2d 54 (Pa.
Super. filed May 15, 2006) (unpublished memorandum).
More than a decade later, on February 5, 2016, Appellant filed the
underlying petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant attached a civil
cover sheet to his petition and listed Tammy Ferguson as the defendant. 2
Despite attaching the civil cover sheet and averring the petition was a civil
habeas corpus filing, Appellant’s petition was filed in the criminal division of
the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas and docketed at Appellant’s
murder conviction docket number, 254-2004. On February 9, 2016, the trial
2 Tammy Ferguson is the Superintendent at SCI Benner Township where Appellant is serving his sentence.
-2- J-S92011-16
court denied Appellant’s petition, and Appellant filed a timely appeal to this
Court. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In his pro se brief on appeal, which is predominantly a prolix
statement of alleged trial court errors and inapposite legal authority,
Appellant appears to argue that his petition should have been filed in civil
court, that the criminal court lacked jurisdiction in this matter, and that his
sentence is illegal. Appellant’s Brief at 4; Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. However, before we may
reach the merits of these issues, we must address a jurisdictional matter.
It appears that the trial court, in an abundance of caution, addressed
the merits of Appellant’s challenges and found the issues meritless. Trial
Court Opinion, 4/22/16, at 4-9. However, for the reasons that follow, we
affirm the order denying relief, but we base that decision on our conclusion
that Appellant’s petition was merely an untimely PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that
this Court is not bound by the rationale of the trial court, and may affirm the
trial court’s order on any basis).
As noted, Appellant’s claims concern the trial court’s jurisdiction and
the legality of his sentence. These claims are cognizable under the PCRA.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2); and see Commonwealth v. Butler, 566 A.2d
1209, 1210 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that PCRA relief is permitted where it
is established that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction), and Commonwealth v.
-3- J-S92011-16
Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54, 60 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that persons serving illegal
sentences may obtain collateral relief under the PCRA). Therefore,
Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should have been treated as a
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citations omitted). It is well settled that the PCRA is the sole means
of obtaining post-conviction relief. Id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Issues that are
cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and
cannot be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Taylor, 65 A.3d at
466. “Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by
titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. Thus, it is well
settled that any collateral petition raising issues with respect to remedies
offered under the PCRA will be considered to be a PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Satisfied that we are addressing an appeal from the denial of PCRA
relief, we review it under the following standards. When determining the
propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record “in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.”
Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)).
This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports
the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal
error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012).
-4- J-S92011-16
We must now address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA. A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of
the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional
in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the
petition. Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 762 (Pa. Super. 2013).
A judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). However, an untimely
petition may be received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner
proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to the time for filing the
petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met. 3 A
3 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5- J-S92011-16
petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty days of
the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-
year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that
demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time frame” under
section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa.
Super. 2001).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant was sentenced on
November 2, 2004, and Appellant did not pursue a direct appeal.
Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final thirty days later
on December 2, 2004. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
Therefore, Appellant had until December 2, 2005, in which to file a timely
PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Herein, Appellant’s petition was
filed on February 5, 2016. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently
untimely.
As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA
petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three
limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
-6- J-S92011-16
§ 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file
his petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be
asserted. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Our review of the record reflects that
Appellant has not alleged, nor has he proven, that any of the three
exceptions to the timeliness requirement of the PCRA is satisfied. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1).
After review, we conclude that despite the title of Appellant’s filing and
civil cover sheet, Appellant’s petition was a collateral attack on his judgment
of sentence, and it was properly filed and docketed in the criminal division.
Moreover, because the issues Appellant raised were cognizable under the
PCRA, Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was in fact a PCRA
petition requiring Appellant to satisfy the PCRA’s filing requirements.
Taylor, 65 A.3d at 465-466. As Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely and
no exceptions apply, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims
Appellant presented. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398
(Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear
untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the merits of
any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v.
Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to
a court’s right or competency to adjudicate a controversy.”).
Order affirmed.
-7- J-S92011-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 1/20/2017
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