TD Banknorth v. Hawkins

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedDecember 11, 2012
DocketCUMcv-07-08
StatusUnpublished

This text of TD Banknorth v. Hawkins (TD Banknorth v. Hawkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TD Banknorth v. Hawkins, (Me. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS & CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. Location: Portland Docket No. BCD-CV -OJ-0~ 0CtJ- Cufr\- fd.j11/~~or2.

TD BANKNORTH, N.A.,

Plaintiff

V. DECISION AND ORDER (Motion for Summary Judgment)

BENJAMIN HAWKINS,

Defendant

This matter is before the Court on Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff TD

Banknorth. Through its motion, Plaintiff contends that the remaining issues either have

been previously resolved, or are issues for which a material dispute of fact does not exist.

I. Standard of Review

M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) instructs that summary judgment is warranted if "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." For purposes of summary

judgment, a "material fact is one having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit."

Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84,' 6, 750 A.2d 573. "A genuine issue of material fact

exists when there is sufficient evidence to require a fact-finder to choose between

competing versions of the truth at trial." Lever v. Acadia Hosp. Corp., 2004 ME 35,' 2,

845 A.2d 1178. II. Discussion

Plaintiff principally contends that summary judgment is warranted because the

Court has previously decided the central issues in the parties' dispute. In other words,

Plaintiff argues that the Court should enter summary judgment based on the doctrine of

res judicata. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that the Court's entry of judgment against

Defendant in his fraud claim against Lawrence Wold/ a bank officer employed by

Plaintiff, precludes Defendant from raising certain defenses to Plaintiff's allegations in

this matter. Defendant maintains that resolution of his fraud claim against Mr. Wold does

not resolve all of the affirmative defenses in this case, including the defense of equitable

estoppel.

Res judicata "prevents the relitigation of matters already decided." Portland

Water Dist. v. Town of Standish, 2008 ME 23,' 7, 940 A.2d 1097, 1099. The doctrine of

res judicata is comprised of two distinct, though related, components: claim preclusion

and issue preclusion. See id. "Claim preclusion prevents relitigation if: (1) the same

parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered

in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action were,

or might have been litigated in the first action." !d.' 8, 940 A.2d at 1099 (quotation

marks omitted). "Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, prevents the

relitigation of factual issues already decided if the identical issue was determined by a

prior final judgment, and ... the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to

litigate the issue in a prior proceeding." Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME

121,' 22, 834 A.2d 131, 138-39 (quotations marks and citations omitted).

1 Benjamin Hawkins, et al,. v. Lawrence Wold (BCD-CV-08-16). Defendant argues that contrary to Plaintiff's contention, he Court has not

previously considered the merit of the defense of equitable estoppel. Accordingly,

Defendant contends that the Court must deny Plaintiff's motion.

In Blue Star Corporation v. CKF Properties, LLC, et al., 2009 ME 101,' 27,980

A.2d 1270, 1277, the Law Court wrote, "[e]quitable estoppel "precludes a party from

asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed ... against another person

who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his

position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right." (citing

Dep 't of Health & Human Servs. V. Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ' 17, 964 A .2d 630, 635.

Equitable estoppel requires a misrepresentation that 'may arise through a combination of

misleading statements, conduct, or silence."' (quoting Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v.

Pelletier, 2009 ME 11,' 18,964 A.2d 630, 636).

In this case, whether Mr. Wold made fraudulent misrepresentations, upon which

Defendant Hawkins relied, is an issue that was, as Plaintiff asserts, previously resolved.

To the extent that Defendant Hawkins equitable estoppel argument is based upon Mr.

Wold's alleged intentional misrepresentations, Defendant Hawkins cannot prevail on his

equitable estoppel defense.

Nevertheless, because Defendant Hawkins need not establish that Mr. Wold

intended to mislead Defendant Hawkins (Gorham Savings Bank v. MacDonald, 710 A.2d

916, 919 (Me. 1998)), and because the misrepresentation can be based upon a party's

conduct or the party's silence (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. V. Pelletier, 2009 ME

11, '18, 964 A.2d 630, 636)), the Court cannot conclude that the resolution of the fraud

claims in favor of Mr. Wold preclude recovery in this matter. The elements of proof are

not identical, and Defendant Hawkins could conceivably prove equitable estoppel on facts that would not give rise to fraud. Plaintiff is not, therefore, entitled to summary

judgment on the basis of res judicata.

Plaintiff's alternative arguments in support of summary judgment (i.e., the fact

that the loan was in default upon commencement of litigation, or the fact that the Court's

allowance of Plaintiff's supplemental complaint moots any argument as to whether the

loan was in dispute at the commencement of this action) all require the resolution of

factual issues that are in dispute (e.g., the circumstances giving rise to the alleged default,

and whether Plaintiff provided proper notice of the alleged default). Accordingly,

Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and

Order into the docket by reference.

Dated: 1J.jtt /J;._

Entered on the Docket: /:I· / Z,l ~ ~oples sent vi<:~ Mail _ Electronically./ BCD-CV-07-08 TD Banknorth v. Benjamin Hawkins Edward MacColl, Esq. Russell Pierce, Esq. Thompson Bull Norman Hanson Detroy PO Box447 PO Box 4600 Portland ME 04112 Portland ME 04112

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Related

Department of Health & Human Services v. Pelletier
2009 ME 11 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2009)
Lever v. Acadia Hospital Corp.
2004 ME 35 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2004)
Burdzel v. Sobus
2000 ME 84 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Portland Water District v. Town of Standish
2008 ME 23 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2008)
MacOmber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie
2003 ME 121 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
Blue Star Corp. v. CKF PROPERTIES, LLC
2009 ME 101 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2009)
Gorham Savings Bank v. MacDonald
1998 ME 97 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)

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