T.C. and D.C. v. S.F. and R.F.

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0282-25

T.C. and D.C.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

S.F. and R.F.,

Defendants-Respondents. __________________________

Submitted June 1, 2026 – Decided June 24, 2026

Before Judges Natali and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FD-04-0325-25.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief).

Joseph Basso, attorney for respondents.

PER CURIAM Plaintiffs T.C.1 and D.C. appeal from a Family Part order granting a

directed verdict to defendants S.F. and R.F. and dismissing their complaint for

grandparent visitation with their grandchild, A.R.F. ("Anissa"). After our

review of the record and application of the relevant legal principles, we affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs are the maternal grandparents of Anissa, born in 2018.

Defendants are her paternal grandparents. Following the death of the child's

biological father and the termination of the biological mother's parental rights,

defendants legally adopted Anissa in April 2022. The adoption was undertaken

with the consent of the biological mother, who is not a party to this litigation.

The record exhibits that after the child's birth, both of her parents

struggled with addiction, leading to the grandparents being involved in the

child's care. Anissa initially lived with plaintiffs from January 2018, until the

end of April 2018, at which time she began to reside with defendants.

Defendants provided for the primary care of Anissa and plaintiffs maintained a

role as visiting grandparents. Defendants maintained because of the termination

of parental rights of the child's biological mother, the parties had a mutual

1 To protect the privacy interests of the child, we use initials and pseudonyms for her and the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(13). A-0282-25 2 understanding that Anissa was to have no contact with her, and she was not to

be discussed in Anissa's presence.

From April 2018 through July 2024, plaintiffs had regular contact with

the child, including biweekly weekend visits, weekly video calls, and extended

visits during summers and school breaks. The plaintiffs also maintained a

dedicated bedroom for the child in their home. The visitation arrangement was

based on mutual agreement and the parties' schedules. No court order was

entered related to this parenting arrangement.

In July 2024, during their visitation, plaintiffs allegedly permitted Anissa

to have contact with her biological mother. As a result of this incident,

defendants proposed written conditions to plaintiffs' visitation with the child;

specifically prohibiting any contact with or discussion concerning the child's

biological mother during their visitation. Plaintiffs declined to sign the

agreement and offered a counterproposal that was unacceptable to defendants.

After the failure to reach an agreement, defendants terminated plaintiffs'

visitation with the child. As a result, plaintiffs initiated a complaint in the

Family Part, seeking grandparent visitation. In their complaint, plaintiffs

requested the prior visitation schedule be restored, including biweekly visits,

weekly video calls, and extended holiday and summer visits. Defendants

A-0282-25 3 opposed the application, asserting as the child's legal parents, they had the right

to determine with whom the child associates and that plaintiffs had not

demonstrated the legal requirements to override their parental autonomy.

Hearings were held before the trial court on May 8 and July 23, 2025. At

those proceedings, plaintiffs testified on their own behalf and presented the

testimony of a family member. They outlined the history of their relationship

with the child, the nature and frequency of their contact and their belief that the

child would be harmed by the abrupt cessation of the relationship.

At the close of plaintiffs' case-in-chief, defendants moved for judgment at

trial pursuant to Rule 4:40-1.2 The trial court granted the motion, finding that

plaintiffs had not met their burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that denial of visitation would result in "identifiable harm" to the child.

The trial court noted that when specifically asked to identify specific harm,

plaintiffs could only "discuss[] memories, [including] multiple references to a

trip to Niagara Falls, and indicated it would be an emotional harm if grandparent

visitation were not allowed." Additionally, the court referenced the lack of

expert testimony regarding identifiable harm to the child. The court concluded

2 A Rule 4:40-1 motion is commonly referred to as a motion for a "directed verdict." The record shows that defendants erroneously phrased their motion as a motion for summary judgment. A-0282-25 4 that, absent a showing of specific, identifiable harm, plaintiffs failed to carry

their burden to support their application for visitation and dismissed the

complaint.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend the court improperly dismissed their

complaint by way of directed verdict because they had established identifiable

harm to the child through evidence adduced at the hearing and, in addition, that

the trial court erroneously determined expert testimony was required to prove

such harm.

II.

In reviewing a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b) or

a motion for judgment under Rule 4:40-1, we apply the same standard that

governs the trial courts. ADS Assocs. Grp. v. Oritani Sav. Bank, 219 N.J. 496,

511 (2014). The foregoing standard requires "'[i]f, accepting as true all the

evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion

and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and

legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motio n

must be denied[.]'" Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Estate

of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000)).

A-0282-25 5 The motion should only "be granted where no rational [factfinder] could

conclude that the plaintiff marshaled sufficient evidence to satisfy each prima

facie element of a cause of action." Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary,

196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008). We review de novo a trial court's decision on these

motions, applying the same standard as the trial court. Ibid.

Applications for grandparent visitation are governed by N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1,

which requires that grandparents seeking visitation over the objection of a fit

parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that visitation is

necessary to avoid harm to the child." Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117

(2003). Only "[i]f the court agrees that . . . the potential for harm has been

shown[] [can] the presumption in favor of parental decision making []. . . be

deemed overcome." Slawinski v. Nicholas, 448 N.J. Super. 25, 33 (App. Div.

2016) (quoting Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 117). "Substantively, it is a 'heavy

burden.'" Id. at 34 (quoting Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1, 18 (2016)). Thus, a

grandparent must make "a clear and specific allegation of concrete harm to the

[child]." Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2005).

Additionally, the alleged harm must be "significant" enough to "justify[]

State intervention in the parent-child relationship." Id. at 293. "Mere general

and conclusory allegations of harm . . . are insufficient." Id. at 294. The purpose

A-0282-25 6 behind this heightened pleading requirement is "to avoid imposing an

unnecessary and unconstitutional burden on fit parents who are exercising their

judgment concerning the raising of their children[.]" Ibid. Otherwise, "any

grandparent could impose the economic and emotional burden of litigation on

fit parents, and on the children themselves, merely by alleging an ordinary

grandparent-child relationship and its unwanted termination." Id. at 293.

In Slawinski, we described the level of harm that a grandparent must

demonstrate, stating:

[P]roof of harm involves a greater showing than simply the best interests of the child. Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 116 (stating that a dispute between a "fit custodial parent and the child's grandparent is not a contest between equals[,]" consequently "the best interests standard, which is the tiebreaker between fit parents, is inapplicable"). . . . The harm to the grandchild must be "a particular identifiable harm, specific to the child." Mizrahi v. Cannon, 375 N.J. Super. 221, 234 (App. Div. 2005). It "generally rests on the existence of an unusually close relationship between the grandparent and the child, or on traumatic circumstances such as a parent's death." Daniels, 381 N.J. Super. at 294. By contrast, missed opportunities for creating "happy memories" do not suffice. Mizrahi, 375 N.J. Super. at 234. Only after the grandparent vaults the proof-of- harm threshold will the court apply a best-interests analysis to resolve disputes over visitation details. Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 117.

[Slawinski, 448 N.J. Super. at 34 (second alteration in original) (citations reformatted).]

A-0282-25 7 A "trial court should not hesitate to dismiss an action without conducting a full

trial if the grandparents cannot sustain their burden to make the required

showing of harm." Major, 224 N.J. at 25.

At trial, plaintiffs presented their own testimony, and that of another

relative witness, asserting that Anissa would suffer harm if they were not

permitted to exercise visitation. The testimony and evidence presented by

plaintiffs substantially focused on the positive relationship between them and

Anissa. D.C. testified to several activities they did together and that he believed

Anissa would miss them if visitation ceased. T.C. similarly testified to the

informal visitation arrangement, the activities, and traditions she shared with

Anissa and the close emotional bond between them. Additionally, she noted that

Anissa was always reluctant to leave their home after her visits. She also

testified to the incident that led to the cessation of visits, which she described as

an unplanned, brief encounter between Anissa and her biological mother.

On cross examination, T.C. admitted that the harm to Anissa by not having

contact with them was based entirely on her own opinion and experience, not on

expert opinion or any documented evidence. She conceded that the emotional

harm she feared was the loss of a loving relationship with the child, but she

A-0282-25 8 could not identify any specific, measurable harm to Anissa should visitation be

denied.

The non-party witness called by plaintiffs testified to observing Anissa's

positive and loving interactions with plaintiffs during her visits. However, she

conceded she had no professional expertise and could not offer an opinion on

identifiable harm if visitation ceased.

Plaintiffs maintain the abrupt severance of their relationship with Anissa

without consideration of her emotional needs will harm her. Plaintiffs also posit

several arguments that visitation with them would be in Anissa's "best interests."

Based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude plaintiffs' trial

evidence, even when providing them all favorable inferences, failed to set forth

a prima facie case of specific, identifiable harm to Anissa if they were not

granted visitation. While we are understanding of the difficult circumstances

regarding the death of the child's biological father and the drug-related issues

with the biological mother resulting in the termination of her parental rights and

the resultant adoption of Anissa by defendants, the record evidence from

plaintiffs' fails to demonstrate sufficient and specific identifiable harm to

Anissa.

A-0282-25 9 Specifically addressing plaintiffs' argument that terminating visitation

would harm Anissa because it would not be in her best interests, our Supreme

Court in Moriarty held a "best interests of the child" analysis concerning

visitation is only required once "harm has been shown" to overcome "the

presumption in favor of parental decision making." 177 N.J. at 117 (citations

omitted). This extra hurdle was intended to be a heavy burden not met simply

by alleging the child's best interests are not met based on theoretical emotional

harm. Here, plaintiffs' allegations of emotional harm did not satisfy their burden

to show particular identifiable harm that is specific to the child as required in

order for the court to reach a best interests analysis.

We now turn to plaintiffs' contention that the trial court erred by finding

expert testimony was required to show specific harm to Anissa. Based on our

review of the record, we conclude plaintiffs' argument is misplaced. The record

shows that the court found "[t]here was no expert testimony concerning any

identifiable harm and the harm alleged by [p]laintiffs was limited to the types of

generic harm specifically identified by the court in Mizrahi." We conclude the

court did not specifically find that expert testimony was required to prove harm

to the child as asserted by plaintiffs. The court referenced the undisputed fact

that plaintiffs did not offer expert testimony to support their claims that the child

A-0282-25 10 would be harmed if they were not permitted to exercise visitation, and dismissed

their complaint after consideration of their proofs, not because of their failure

to provide expert testimony.

To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiffs' remaining

arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0282-25 11