Tayron Tyree Weeks, Petitioner v. Warden, FCI Berlin, Defendant

2023 DNH 065

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 25, 2023
• Docket: 23-cv-0165-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Tayron Tyree Weeks, Petitioner

v. Case No. 23-cv-0165-SM Opinion No. 2023 DNH 065

Warden, FCI Berlin, Defendant

O R D E R

Until his recent transfer to another federal facility,

Tayron Tyree Weeks had been an inmate at the Federal

Correctional Institution in Berlin, New Hampshire. He filed

this § 2241 petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’

determination that he is ineligible to earn time credits under

the First Step Act (“FSA”) because his underlying crime of

conviction - sex trafficking of a child – disqualifies him from

doing so. Liberally construed, Weeks’ petition alleges that he

is entitled to earn and to apply FSA time credits toward early

release to supervision and he seeks an order compelling the BOP

to change his FSA status from “ineligible” to “eligible.”

The government moves for summary judgment, asserting that,

as a matter of law, Weeks is prohibited from earning FSA time credits toward an early release to supervision. The government

is correct and, for the reasons discussed, its motion is

granted.

Discussion

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief he seeks for at

least two reasons. First, he has failed to fully and properly

exhaust available prison administrative remedies relating to his

FSA status. See Affidavit of Robert Rouleau, BOP Case

Management Coordinator (document no. 6-1) at para. 15 (“I have

reviewed the SENTRY administrative remedy records pertaining to

Petitioner. SENTRY indicates Petitioner used the administrative

remedy process to grieve a number of issues, including mail

procedures and a request for compassionate release. However,

Petitioner has never filed any requests for administrative

remedy or administrative appeals regarding his FSA

eligibility.”). And, barring unusual circumstances, claims that

have not been fully and properly exhausted are subject to

dismissal. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See also

Gonzalez v. Yates, 2023 WL 2916677 (E.D. Ark. April 12, 2023)

(noting that a prisoner may be excused from exhausting

administrative remedies if his or her claims raise only legal

issues (e.g., proper interpretation of the FSA) or if the

2 prisoner is near the end of his or her term of imprisonment and

lacks sufficient time to properly exhaust).

But, even if Weeks had fully and properly exhausted his

claim (or if he were excused from doing so because his petition

raises only a legal challenge to the BOP’s interpretation of the

FSA), it is plain that he is not entitled to the relief he

seeks. Under the First Step Act, eligible federal inmates may

earn FSA time credits for the successful completion of

“evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive

activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). Time credits earned

under that program “shall be applied toward time in prerelease

custody or supervised release.” Id. at § 3632(d)(4)(C). Based

upon their underlying crimes of conviction, however, certain

inmates are not eligible to receive FSA time credits. See 18

U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). Other inmates are ineligible to apply

FSA time credits toward prerelease custody or supervised

release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i). Weeks falls into

the former category.

In December of 2014, Weeks pled guilty to one count of sex

trafficking of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a),

(b)(2), and (c). See Judgment in a Criminal Case (document no.

6-1) at 5. He was sentenced to serve a term of 132 months in

3 prison, followed by ten years of supervised release. Id. at 6-

7. As it pertains to this action, the relevant provision of the

First Step Act states that, “A prisoner is ineligible to receive

time credits under this paragraph if the prisoner is serving a

sentence for a conviction under any of the following provisions

of law: . . . any offense under chapter 77, relating to peonage,

slavery, and trafficking in persons, except for sections 1593

through 1596.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvii). Because Weeks

was convicted of a disqualifying offense under chapter 77 – that

is, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (b)(2), and (c) – he is

statutorily prohibited from earning time credits under the First

Step Act.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in

the respondent’s filings, it is plain that, as a matter of law,

Weeks is not entitled to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, the

government’s Motion for Summary Judgment (document no. 6) is

granted. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance

with this order and close the case.

4 SO ORDERED.

____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

May 25, 2023

cc: Tayron Tyree Weeks, pro se Seth R. Aframe, Esq.