Taylor v. Wallace

31 Misc. 393, 64 N.Y.S. 271
New York Supreme Court·Decided May 15, 1900·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Gaynob, J.:

It was claimed at the trial that the words imputeuncliastity to the plaintiff. They do not necessarily do so. A woman may ask a man to stay at her house over night for more reasons than one. It is a familiar rule of pleading in actions for damages for libel or slander that where the words are not necessarily slanderous, i. e. are capable of a meaning not slanderous, the slanderous meaning which is claimed must be alleged in the complaint in order to state a cause of action. Otherwise the defendant is not put on his defense as to such meaning, and enabled to plead facts in justification or mitigation. It is not for him to attribute a slanderous meaning to his words in order to plead thereto (Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. Rep. 35).

Motion for a new trial denied.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Taylor v. Wallace, 31 Misc. 393, 64 N.Y.S. 271 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1900).

31 Misc. 393 (Taylor v. Wallace) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Zimmerman v. Kallimopoulou
56 Misc. 2d 828 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 1967)
Morris v. Stellakis
27 Misc. 2d 120 (New York Supreme Court, 1961)
Lynott v. Pearson
138 A.D. 306 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1910)
Irving v. Irving
121 A.D. 258 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1907)
Russell v. Barron
111 A.D. 382 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1906)