Taylor v. United States

372 A.2d 1009, 1977 D.C. App. LEXIS 467
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 1977
DocketNo. 10836
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 372 A.2d 1009 (Taylor v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. United States, 372 A.2d 1009, 1977 D.C. App. LEXIS 467 (D.C. 1977).

Opinion

KELLY, Associate Judge:

In this appeal from convictions of felony murder,1 second-degree burglary,2 and attempted robbery while armed,3 we are asked to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing to seat in the jury box the first twelve j'urors who had passed challenge for cause, allegedly depriving appellant of the opportunity to visually inspect the j'urors before exercising his peremptory strikes and impairing his unrestricted right to a meaningful exercise of those challenges.

When the prospective jurors were sworn, the trial judge directed each member of the panel to stand briefly as his or her name was called “so that counsel and the Court may associate your name and face.” Appellant and his attorney were invited to turn their chairs, if they wished, to facilitate a viewing of the panel. After the roll had been called, appellant, both counsel, and the prospective witnesses were introduced to the jurors. The court conducted the voir dire examination and several prospective jurors were excused for cause.4 Counsel then came to the bench, as required by Super.Ct.Cr.R. 24(b), where the following ensued:5

THE COURT: All right. I would ask counsel then, to proceed with their pre-emptory [sic] challenges.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Number one, list one.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I guess I am confused about the procedure. You are not going to seat twelve and then strike them?
THE COURT: No. You may assume that the first twelve persons will be in the box.

[Each counsel then struck five members of the jury panel.]

THE COURT: If you wish to have any person stand to be reviewed, I will—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I am somewhat surprised and disturbed by this procedure, because I had assured my client that he would have an opportunity to view the people who would be seated, so that—
THE COURT: That is why I asked him to turn his chair around, so he could look at them.
[1011]*1011[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I assumed that we would place twelve in the box and strike them out as we saw them.
THE COURT: Is there any one you wish to have stand?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, may I consult with my client?
THE COURT: You may.
[Pause.]
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it is extremely difficult for my client to recall who is who, and to associate the names with a face. I have had five strikes thus far; is that correct, Your Honor?

[Whereupon the process of striking prospective jurors continued].

Defense counsel formally objected to the jury selection process after the jury and two alternates had been seated and sworn.6

It was held in Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37, 44 (9th Cir. 1967), that a similar method of jury selection was eminently fair to both sides, the court stating:

Defense counsel argued that twelve jurors should have been seated in the jury box and challenges exercised alternately against the panel with replacements when any one was excused until twelve jurors were seated who had passed all challenges. The manner of qualifying a jury is largely discretionary with the trial judge. No specific method is prescribed. As the judge said: “* * * so at all times counsel knows who their ultimate jury is going to be, and it is not exercising a challenge and not knowing who you might draw subsequently.” We think the “Arizona System” as used in selecting the jury was eminently fair to both sides and the trial judge did not err in this respect. A similar system of qualifying a jury was approved in Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208.

And the court in United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1971), also sustained a requirement that peremptory challenges be made from the entire jury panel. We also conclude that the method of jury selection in this case was one fair to both sides. The trial judge provided appellant with ample opportunity to inspect the panel before exercising his strikes by asking the prospective jurors to stand as their names were called, by giving the appellant and defense counsel the opportunity to turn their chairs to better view the panel, and by offering to have any panel member stand again to aid the defense in connecting faces with names.

Affirmed.

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Related

Rosser v. United States
381 A.2d 598 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1977)
Butler v. United States
377 A.2d 54 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1977)

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Bluebook (online)
372 A.2d 1009, 1977 D.C. App. LEXIS 467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-united-states-dc-1977.