Taylor v. United States

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 15, 2021
• Docket: 3:18-cv-01185
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case Nos.: 13CR2794-JLS 18CV1185-JLS 10 Plaintiff,

11 v. ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S MOTION UNDER 28 12 KEITH EDWARD TAYLOR, U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET 13 Defendant. ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE and DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 14 APPEALABILITY 15 16 On June 4, 2018, Defendant Taylor, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion under 28 17 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by Person in Federal Custody 18 (ECF No. 80). Plaintiff has not filed a response. 19 Defendant’s motion was filed more than one year after his conviction became final1 20 and is therefore untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). However, Defendant 21 contends that his motion is timely because of “recent case law and constitutional 22 errors…just recognized [in] April 2018.” ECF No. 80 at 13. Defendant does not provide 23 any citation, but considering Defendant’s claim that an enhancement to his guidelines “in 24 correlation with 922(g) and vagueness of Rule 16(b)” was unwarranted, the Court presumes 25

26 1 Defendant was sentenced on March 28, 2014 and he filed no notice of appeal. Thus, his conviction 27 became final 14 days later. See United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that statute of limitations for § 2255 motion began to run upon the expiration of the time 28 1 he refers to Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). In Dimaya, the Supreme Court 2 struck down the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 162 as unconstitutionally vague. In Dimaya, 3 an immigration judge relied upon the residual clause in determining that a prior conviction 4 constituted an aggravated felony and thus supported the respondent’s deportation. In 5 confirming the vagueness of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the Supreme Court relied upon its prior 6 decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which it struck down the 7 residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) as unconstitutionally vague. 8 In this case, Defendant’s sentence was not based upon an enhancement under the 9 ACCA, or on any enhancement based upon a determination that Defendant was an 10 aggravated felon or that he committed a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.3 11 Defendant pled guilty to Count 3 of the indictment against him, which alleged an offense 12 under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), being a felon in possession of a firearm. Plea Agreement, ECF 13 No. 63 at 2. The Court adopted the Government’s position that Defendant was not an 14 armed career criminal under the ACCA and calculated a base offense level of 24, enhanced 15 by 4 levels for possession of a firearm during other felony conduct pursuant to United Sates 16 Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The Court applied a 3-level reduction for 17 defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for a total offense of 25 which, at a criminal 18 history category of VI, resulted in a guideline range of 110 to 137 months. The Court 19 imposed the low-end of 110 months. ECF No. 67. 20 Thus, although Defendant suggests that Dimaya announced a new rule rendering his 21 § 2255 petition timely, neither Dimaya nor its predecessor case Johnson have any bearing 22

23 2 Section 16 defines the term “crime of violence” as: “(a) an offense that has as an element the use, 24 attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any 25 other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 26 3 The Presentence Report was prepared after Defendant’s initial guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment and recommended a 5-year enhancement under the ACCA for Count 2. However, Defendant 27 subsequently withdrew his guilty plea to those counts and pled guilty to Count 3. ECF No. 62. The Court did not apply the Guideline calculations recommended by the PSR, but instead adopted the calculations 28 1 || on the sentence imposed in this case. Therefore, these decisions cannot serve to extend the 2 || limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).* 3 Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s motion to be time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 4 ||§2255(f). Defendant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 5 ||Sentence by Person in Federal Custody is Hereby Dismissed. Additionally, the Court 6 ||Denies Defendant a certificate of appealability, as Defendant has not made a substantial 7 || showing that he has been denied a constitutional right. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ||Dated: January 15, 2021 . tt f Le 10 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 4 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) proscribes a one-year period of limitation from “the date on which the right 27 || asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the 3g || Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”