Taylor v. State

910 S.E.2d 554, 320 Ga. 555

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: December 20, 2024
• Docket: S24A1065
• Status: Published

Opinion

320 Ga. 555 FINAL COPY

S24A1065. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

In 1999, Appellant Matthew Taylor was convicted of felony

murder and related crimes in connection with the death of Terry

Hall and was sentenced to life in prison. This Court affirmed

Taylor’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal in Rittenhouse v.

State, 272 Ga. 78 (526 SE2d 342) (2000).1 More than 23 years later,

on December 7, 2023, Taylor returned to the trial court pro se and

filed an “Extraordinary Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Criminal

Trial Ending in ‘Mutually Exclusive Jury Verdict,’” raising state and

federal constitutional claims of trial court error and ineffective

assistance of counsel arising from his 1999 criminal trial. The trial

court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and Taylor now appeals. For the

reasons explained herein, we affirm the trial court’s order of

1 Taylor’s direct appeal was consolidated with the direct appeal of his co-

defendant Jerry Rittenhouse. See Rittenhouse, 272 Ga. at 78 n.1. dismissal on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court.

Taylor’s extraordinary motion maintained that the trial court

erred by accepting jury verdicts which he argued were mutually

exclusive, that the trial court erred at sentencing by imposing a

sentence based on those verdicts, and that his trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to object to a sentence predicated on those

verdicts. Taylor contends that these alleged errors, along with the

ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, deprived him of his rights to due

process, equal protection, and to a jury trial under the Georgia

Constitution, along with rights afforded to him under the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

The problem for Taylor is that constitutional claims cannot be

raised in an extraordinary motion for new trial. Instead, the

exclusive post-appeal procedure for constitutional claims — like

those raised by Taylor here — lies in habeas corpus. See Smith v.

State, 276 Ga. 14, 15 (1) (573 SE2d 64) (2002) (“Habeas corpus is the

exclusive post-appeal procedure available to a criminal defendant

2 who asserts the denial of a constitutional right.”) (citations omitted),

disapproved on other grounds by Wilkes v. Terry, 290 Ga. 54 (717

SE2d 644) (2011); Mitchum v. State, 306 Ga. 878, 884-885 (1) (c) (834

SE2d 65) (2019) (explaining post-appeal constitutional claims are

“not properly raised” in an extraordinary motion for new trial and

reaffirming that “constitutional matters that are exclusively

governed by the adequate remedy of habeas corpus cannot be

pursued through [an extraordinary motion for new trial]”) (footnote

omitted). Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the viability of

Taylor’s claims because he has used the wrong vehicle to pursue

them. And, when such claims are improperly raised in an

extraordinary motion for new trial, the only appropriate action is to

dismiss the motion. See, e.g., Chaney v. State, 317 Ga. 181 (891 SE2d

775) (2023) (affirming dismissal of extraordinary motion for new

trial where defendant raised only ineffective assistance of counsel

claims because an adequate alternative remedy existed in the form

3 of habeas corpus) (citing Mitchum, 306 Ga. at 887 (2)).2 In sum,

because Taylor’s direct appeal has concluded, see Rittenhouse, 272

Ga. at 79 (1), the constitutional claims that he seeks to raise here

are governed exclusively by habeas corpus and are not properly

presented in an extraordinary motion for new trial. See Mitchum,

306 Ga. at 884-885 (1) (c); Smith, 276 Ga. at 15 (1).

While the trial court should have dismissed on this basis, we

do not fault its attempt to construe Taylor’s unclear filing by

“look[ing] to substance over form.” Waye v. State, 239 Ga. 871, 875

(1) (238 SE2d 923) (1977). Notwithstanding any error in the trial

court’s construction of Taylor’s extraordinary motion, the correct

outcome was reached by dismissing it. We therefore affirm the trial

court’s order dismissing Taylor’s extraordinary motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

2 That Taylor may face steep procedural hurdles in a habeas proceeding

does not mean his claims can properly be raised in an extraordinary motion for new trial. 4 Decided December 20, 2024.

Murder. Floyd Superior Court. Before Judge Sparks.

Matthew A. Taylor, pro se.

Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, Elisabeth M. Giuliani,

Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm,

Matthew B. Crowder, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys

General, for appellee.