Taylor v. Starbucks Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 10, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-01511
StatusUnknown

This text of Taylor v. Starbucks Corporation (Taylor v. Starbucks Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Starbucks Corporation, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 SHEENA TAYLOR, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01511-RBM-MMP

9 Plaintiff, ORDER: 10 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 STARBUCKS CORPORATION, APPLICATION TO PROCEED 12 Defendant. IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES 13 OR COSTS [Doc. 2] 14 (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 15 EFFECT SERVICE 16 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 17 MOTION TO FILE 18 ELECTRONICALLY [Doc. 3]

19 (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 20 REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 21 [Doc. 4] 22 [Doc. 2–4] 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff Sheena Taylor has filed: (1) an Application to Proceed in District Court 27 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2); (2) a Motion to File 28 Electronically (Doc. 3); and (3) a Request for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4). For the 1 reasons set forth below: (1) Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion 2 to File Electronically is DENIED; and (3) Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel 3 is DENIED. 4 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 5 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, except an 6 application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, however, a litigant who, because of 8 indigency, is unable to pay the required fees or security to commence a legal action may 9 petition the court to proceed without making the payment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). “An 10 affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot 11 pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 12 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). The facts in an affidavit regarding poverty must be stated “with 13 some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. (quoting United States v. McQuade, 14 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). The determination of indigency falls within the district 15 court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d 16 on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 17 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion states that she is “unable to pay the costs of these 18 proceedings.” (Doc. 2 at 1.) She asserts that she is a student on scholarship living in 19 campus housing and has no income. (Id. at 5.) She receives $500 monthly from 20 CALWORKS for food and her phone bill. (Id.) Plaintiff does not identify any bank 21 accounts or assets. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff’s monthly expenses for food, clothing, laundry, 22 and transportation total approximately $1,000. (Id. at 4–5.) 23 24 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 27 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does 28 1 After considering Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford 2 to pay the filing fee in this case and is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED. 4 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 5 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 6 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action “(i) is 7 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 8 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting 10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is “not limited to prisoners”). 11 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain 12 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 15 allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 16 the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A claim is facially plausible when the 17 factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 18 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 19 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 20 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 21 drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations 22 omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “section 23 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 24 fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 Here, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) racial discrimination under Title VII; (2) 26 discrimination based on marital status; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (4) breach 27 of employment contract; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) 28 1 intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) defamation; and (8) invasion of privacy. 2 (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 24–42.) 3 Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendant Starbucks Corporation and 4 “experienced racial discrimination throughout her employment with [Defendant].” (Id. 5 ¶¶ 8, 14.) She also asserts Defendant’s “recruiter engaged in a pattern of discriminatory 6 behavior, including: … [i]mproperly sharing [Plaintiff’s] personal information with 7 another employee; … [m]arginalizing [Plaintiff] based on her single mother status; … 8 [s]tereotyping [Plaintiff] by pressuring her to connect with another Black manager during 9 relocation, whom [Plaintiff] had never met; [and] … [d]iscriminating against [Plaintiff] 10 due to her unmarried status.” (Id. ¶ 9.) She claims her employment offers were rescinded 11 and she was terminated when she refused to comply with the recruiter’s request that she 12 “‘group up’ with the other Black manager” and did “not conform[] to stereotypical 13 expectations.” (Id.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez
787 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2015)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Taylor v. Starbucks Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-starbucks-corporation-casd-2025.