1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 SHEENA TAYLOR, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01511-RBM-MMP
9 Plaintiff, ORDER: 10 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 STARBUCKS CORPORATION, APPLICATION TO PROCEED 12 Defendant. IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES 13 OR COSTS [Doc. 2] 14 (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 15 EFFECT SERVICE 16 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 17 MOTION TO FILE 18 ELECTRONICALLY [Doc. 3]
19 (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 20 REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 21 [Doc. 4] 22 [Doc. 2–4] 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff Sheena Taylor has filed: (1) an Application to Proceed in District Court 27 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2); (2) a Motion to File 28 Electronically (Doc. 3); and (3) a Request for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4). For the 1 reasons set forth below: (1) Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion 2 to File Electronically is DENIED; and (3) Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel 3 is DENIED. 4 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 5 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, except an 6 application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, however, a litigant who, because of 8 indigency, is unable to pay the required fees or security to commence a legal action may 9 petition the court to proceed without making the payment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). “An 10 affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot 11 pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 12 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). The facts in an affidavit regarding poverty must be stated “with 13 some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. (quoting United States v. McQuade, 14 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). The determination of indigency falls within the district 15 court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d 16 on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 17 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion states that she is “unable to pay the costs of these 18 proceedings.” (Doc. 2 at 1.) She asserts that she is a student on scholarship living in 19 campus housing and has no income. (Id. at 5.) She receives $500 monthly from 20 CALWORKS for food and her phone bill. (Id.) Plaintiff does not identify any bank 21 accounts or assets. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff’s monthly expenses for food, clothing, laundry, 22 and transportation total approximately $1,000. (Id. at 4–5.) 23 24 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 27 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does 28 1 After considering Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford 2 to pay the filing fee in this case and is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED. 4 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 5 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 6 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action “(i) is 7 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 8 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting 10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is “not limited to prisoners”). 11 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain 12 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 15 allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 16 the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A claim is facially plausible when the 17 factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 18 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 19 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 20 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 21 drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations 22 omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “section 23 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 24 fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 Here, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) racial discrimination under Title VII; (2) 26 discrimination based on marital status; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (4) breach 27 of employment contract; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) 28 1 intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) defamation; and (8) invasion of privacy. 2 (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 24–42.) 3 Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendant Starbucks Corporation and 4 “experienced racial discrimination throughout her employment with [Defendant].” (Id. 5 ¶¶ 8, 14.) She also asserts Defendant’s “recruiter engaged in a pattern of discriminatory 6 behavior, including: … [i]mproperly sharing [Plaintiff’s] personal information with 7 another employee; … [m]arginalizing [Plaintiff] based on her single mother status; … 8 [s]tereotyping [Plaintiff] by pressuring her to connect with another Black manager during 9 relocation, whom [Plaintiff] had never met; [and] … [d]iscriminating against [Plaintiff] 10 due to her unmarried status.” (Id. ¶ 9.) She claims her employment offers were rescinded 11 and she was terminated when she refused to comply with the recruiter’s request that she 12 “‘group up’ with the other Black manager” and did “not conform[] to stereotypical 13 expectations.” (Id.
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 SHEENA TAYLOR, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01511-RBM-MMP
9 Plaintiff, ORDER: 10 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 STARBUCKS CORPORATION, APPLICATION TO PROCEED 12 Defendant. IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES 13 OR COSTS [Doc. 2] 14 (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 15 EFFECT SERVICE 16 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 17 MOTION TO FILE 18 ELECTRONICALLY [Doc. 3]
19 (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 20 REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 21 [Doc. 4] 22 [Doc. 2–4] 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff Sheena Taylor has filed: (1) an Application to Proceed in District Court 27 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2); (2) a Motion to File 28 Electronically (Doc. 3); and (3) a Request for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4). For the 1 reasons set forth below: (1) Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion 2 to File Electronically is DENIED; and (3) Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel 3 is DENIED. 4 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 5 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, except an 6 application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, however, a litigant who, because of 8 indigency, is unable to pay the required fees or security to commence a legal action may 9 petition the court to proceed without making the payment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). “An 10 affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot 11 pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 12 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). The facts in an affidavit regarding poverty must be stated “with 13 some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. (quoting United States v. McQuade, 14 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). The determination of indigency falls within the district 15 court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d 16 on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 17 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion states that she is “unable to pay the costs of these 18 proceedings.” (Doc. 2 at 1.) She asserts that she is a student on scholarship living in 19 campus housing and has no income. (Id. at 5.) She receives $500 monthly from 20 CALWORKS for food and her phone bill. (Id.) Plaintiff does not identify any bank 21 accounts or assets. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff’s monthly expenses for food, clothing, laundry, 22 and transportation total approximately $1,000. (Id. at 4–5.) 23 24 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 27 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does 28 1 After considering Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford 2 to pay the filing fee in this case and is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED. 4 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 5 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 6 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action “(i) is 7 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 8 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting 10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is “not limited to prisoners”). 11 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain 12 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 15 allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 16 the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A claim is facially plausible when the 17 factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 18 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 19 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 20 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 21 drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations 22 omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “section 23 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 24 fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 Here, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) racial discrimination under Title VII; (2) 26 discrimination based on marital status; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (4) breach 27 of employment contract; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) 28 1 intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) defamation; and (8) invasion of privacy. 2 (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 24–42.) 3 Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendant Starbucks Corporation and 4 “experienced racial discrimination throughout her employment with [Defendant].” (Id. 5 ¶¶ 8, 14.) She also asserts Defendant’s “recruiter engaged in a pattern of discriminatory 6 behavior, including: … [i]mproperly sharing [Plaintiff’s] personal information with 7 another employee; … [m]arginalizing [Plaintiff] based on her single mother status; … 8 [s]tereotyping [Plaintiff] by pressuring her to connect with another Black manager during 9 relocation, whom [Plaintiff] had never met; [and] … [d]iscriminating against [Plaintiff] 10 due to her unmarried status.” (Id. ¶ 9.) She claims her employment offers were rescinded 11 and she was terminated when she refused to comply with the recruiter’s request that she 12 “‘group up’ with the other Black manager” and did “not conform[] to stereotypical 13 expectations.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–11, 13.) She claims Defendant retaliated against her, including 14 by pursing an invalid debt related to relocation and falsely claiming she declined a job 15 offer. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 20–22.) She also alleges Defendant’s retaliation became increasingly 16 aggressive after she filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 17 Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 16.) The Complaint references emails, phone messages, 18 and text messages that Plaintiff asserts contradict Defendant’s position and support 19 Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 24–25.) Plaintiff attaches right to sue letters from the EEOC 20 and California Civil Rights Department. (Doc. 1-2 at 3–5.) 21 Considering Plaintiff’s pro se status and the Court’s obligation to liberally construe 22 a pro se complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has satisfied the minimal pleading requirements 23 to avoid dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 Accordingly, the Court orders service by 24 the U.S. Marshal as detailed below. (See Section V.) 25
26 2 While the Court is required to liberally construe Plaintiff’s filings because she is 27 proceeding pro se, the Court notes that she is required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this District’s Civil Local Rules, and the undersigned’s Chambers Rules. 28 1 III. MOTION TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY 2 Plaintiff has filed a Motion to File Electronically. (Doc. 3.) In the Motion, Plaintiff 3 indicates that she would like to be able to file documents electronically because of the cost 4 of transportation and her school schedule. (Id.) 5 “Unless otherwise authorized by the court, all documents submitted for filing to the 6 Clerk’s Office by parties appearing without an attorney must be in legible, paper form.” 7 See Electronic Case Filing Admin. Policies and Procedures Manual (“CM/ECF Manual”) 8 § 2(b). “A pro se party seeking leave to electronically file documents must file a motion 9 and demonstrate the means to do so properly by stating their equipment and software 10 capabilities in addition to agreeing to follow all rules and policies in the [CM/ECF 11 Manual].” Id. The CM/ECF Manual refers to the Court’s official website for CM/ECF 12 technical requirements for electronic filing. Id. at § 1(i). Those requirements include a 13 “[c]omputer running Windows 7 or higher, MacOS X or higher, or Linux; [s]oftware to 14 convert documents from a word processor format to PDF, such as Adobe Acrobat; 15 [d]ocument scanner to convert paper documents to PDF files; [i]nternet access capable of 16 downloading and uploading file sizes up to 35 MB; a compatible browser, such as Firefox 17 15 or higher, Microsoft Edge, or Safari 5.1 or higher; a email account to receive 18 notifications from the Court.” U.S. District Court, S.D. Cal., Representing Yourself (Pro 19 Se), Information about Filing in Federal Court, Electronic Filing Information, 20 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Prose/Prose-FilingInfo.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2025);3 see 21 also U.S. District Court, S.D. Cal., CM/ECF, General Information, 22 https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/cmecf.aspx#undefined1 (last visited Jan. 6, 2025). 23 Plaintiff’s Motion does not indicate if she will follow all rules and policies, and does 24 not demonstrate that she has the equipment and software capabilities to electronically file. 25
26 liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.”). These rules 27 are all available on the Court’s website. 3 This same location on the Court’s website includes a form motion to seek permission to 28 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 3) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may 2 file an amended motion addressing the deficiencies identified above. 3 IV. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 4 “Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 5 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). However, “the district court may request an attorney to 6 represent any person unable to afford counsel” based on “exceptional circumstances.” 7 Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(e)(1)). “A finding of exceptional circumstances … requires at least an evaluation 9 of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s 10 ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. 11 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). Only “rarely” will 12 a federal court find a case to be so complex that it is appropriate to appoint counsel for a 13 civil litigant. See Dotson v. Doctor, No. 1:14-cv-00093-LJO-SKO, 2014 WL 2208090, at 14 *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2014) (“[c]ounsel is appointed in civil cases only rarely, if 15 exceptional circumstances exist”). 16 First, the Court notes it is difficult to determine Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on 17 the merits at the pleading stage. While her Complaint is sufficient to survive the minimal 18 pleading requirements for screening, it is harder to find at this early stage that she will 19 ultimately succeed on the merits of all her claims. Second, Plaintiff has not demonstrated 20 the complexity of legal issues involved requires appointment of counsel. Plaintiff asserts 21 claims for discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract related to her employment and 22 recruitment as well as claims related to Defendant improperly sharing her personal 23 information and providing false information about her to others. (Compl. ¶¶ 27–42.) And 24 she has identified the facts she believes support these claims. (Id. ¶¶ 8–26.) Plaintiff has 25 the ability to articulate her claims and though she may “[find] it difficult to articulate [her] 26 claims pro se … she has not shown that the complexity of the issues involved [is] sufficient 27 to require designation of counsel.” See Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. 28 1 Having considered Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and her ability to 2 articulate her claims pro se in light of the complexity of legal issue involved, the Court 3 cannot find exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel. Plaintiff’s Request 4 for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED. 5 V. CONCLUSION 6 Plaintiff’s Motion to File Electronically (Doc. 3) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Request 7 for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED. 8 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED and the Court: 9 1) DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) 10 and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285. In addition, the 11 Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, a certified copy of her 12 Complaint, and the summons so that she may serve Defendant. 13 2) Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 14 285 as completely and accurately as possible, including an address where Defendant may 15 be served, and return it to the U.S. Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides. 16 3) ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) 17 and summons upon Defendant at the address specified by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285, 18 and to file an executed waiver of personal service upon Defendant with the Clerk of Court 19 as soon as possible after its return. Should Defendant fail to return the U.S. Marshal’s 20 request for waiver of personal service within 90 days, the U.S. Marshal must instead file 21 the completed Form USM 285 Process Receipt and Return with the Clerk of Court. The 22 Return must include the date the summons, Complaint and request for waiver was mailed 23 to Defendant and indicate why service remains unexecuted. All costs of service will be 24 advanced by the United States. 25 4) ORDERS Defendant, once served, to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint within 26 the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). 27 5) ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 28 serve upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendant’s 1 ||counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 2 ||Court’s consideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b). Plaintiff must 3 |}include with every original document she seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a 4 || certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document was served 5 ||on Defendant or Defendant’s counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 6 Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk 7 || of Court or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendant or Defendant’s 8 || counsel, may be disregarded. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ||Dated: January 10, 2025 Fp ; ? L > i HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28