Taylor v. Stanley

4 F.2d 279, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 938
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 7, 1925
DocketNo. 213
StatusPublished

This text of 4 F.2d 279 (Taylor v. Stanley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Stanley, 4 F.2d 279, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 938 (W.D. La. 1925).

Opinion

DAWKINS, District Judge.

This is a suit to have declared forfeited under its terms a certain mineral lease upon a portion of a 10-aere tract of land situated in Calcasieu parish. The claim of forfeiture is based upon the contention that the Vinton Petroleum Company, as assignee of the said lease, failed to comply with its essential stipulations for development of the property; that by express provisions thereof all rights to or in the undeveloped portions of th.e land have been lost, and the property has reverted back to plaintiffs, free from said lease.

Defendant denied the facts alleged as the basis for forfeiture, and alternatively pleaded acquiescence and estoppel upon the part of plaintiffs. The clauses of the lease to be interpreted under the facts developed on the trial are as follows:

“This lease is made for the purpose of drilling sinking of wells, mines, or other excavations for the purpose of prospecting for oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other valuable mineral deposits beneath the surface of the above-desci’ibed property, and for the purpose of producing oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other valuable mineral deposits on the above-described land. The party of the second part binds and obligates himself, his heirs, sublessees, vendees, or assigns, to erect a derrick and commence the actual drilling of a well for the purpose of prospecting, or to erect a derrick and commence the actual deepening of a well already sunk upon said promises, within 30 days from the execution of this lease, and to prosecute said operations with due diligence and continuously until he shall have developed a stratum of oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other ’ mineral deposit in paying quantities, making due allowance for unavoidable accidents or delays over which the said second party has no control, or until he has reached such a depth as to satisfy him that no such deposits exist beneath the surface of said land.
“It is further expressly agreed and understood, and is one of the considerations of this contract, that, should the party of the second part discover oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other mineral deposits beneath the surface of said land in paying quantities, that the said party of the second part shall develop same and produce said deposits therefrom continuously, as long as said deposits are found to exist (unavoidable accidents and delays over which he has no control excepted), and in the event he shall fail, neglect, or refuse to proceed to develop same with due diligence, or to continuously produce and extract such deposits therefrom, then and in that event this contract shall ipso facto become null and void and of no force or effect. * * * It is one of the considerations for this lease that, when the first well is finished by the party of the second part under the terms of this contract, either by the discovery and development of a stratum of oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other mineral deposits in paying quantities, or by boring to such depth as to satisfy him that no such deposits exist at that point, the said second party shall, within 60 days aft[280]*280er the completion or abandonment of said well, begin the sinking of a second well for prospecting purposes upon said land, and prosecute said operations .continuously and diligently until be shall have developed' a stratum of oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other mineral deposit in. paying quantities, making due allowance for accidents and unavoidable delays over which the said second party has no control, until he has reached such a depth as to satisfy him that no such deposits exist at such point, and.upon the completion or abandonment of said second well he shall, within 60 days thereafter, commence the sinking of another well, and continue the drilling of additional wells with an intermission of not to exceed 60 days between the completion or abandonment of one well and the commencement of another well, until they have sunk at least one well upon each of the above-described lots.
“ * * * In the event of failure on the part of the party of the second part, his vendees, lessees or assigns, to comply with the foregoing paragraph, such failure shall ipso facto forfeit all rights Herein granted except upon such lot or lots as there exists at the time of said forfeiture wells producing oil, gas, sulphur, salt, or other mineral in paying quantities, except that the party of the second part shall have the right of ingress and egress to and from said lots so forfeited for a period of 30 days, to remove the salvage from the abandoned wells which ' he or his vendees and sublessees or assigns may have sunk upon the lots so forfeited.”

The-facts as disclosed by the record, in substance, are that the lease in question was made with the defendant H. G. Stanley October 15, 1914, and on April 28, 1924, was assigned to the other defendant, Vinton Petroleum Company. In the intervening period of 10 years about 10 wells were drilled upon the property. However, on objection made by defendants and acquiesced in by plaintiffs at the trial, it was conceded that the lease had been complied with by the vendors of the Vinton Petroleum Com'pany prior to its acquisition on April 28, 1924, and the court has been afforded no information as to why, in view of the strict terms of the lease requiring development, only an average of one well per year was drilled during that time. After taking over the property, the Vinton Petroleum Company commenced drilling upon one of the lots, known as No. 116,. early in June, and about July 10th, struck an oil sand, which for a few hours made an estimated flow of 3,000 barrels per day. However, within a few hours it began to spout mud and water, and defendant adopted the customary means to restore it, such as locating and closing the break or opening into the pipe through which it was believed the mud and water were flowing.

As a result of these efforts, approximately on the 15th of July the well developed into a small pumper, the drilling machinery was moved off the lease, and a standard rig for pumping was placed and the well connected úp, with an initial production of about 60 barrels per day. It was then turned over to the production foreman, along with other producing wells of defendant, and a report was made to the conservation department of Louisiana that the well had been completed on July 10th. Thereafter it was pumped, the flow of oil gradually decreasing, until at the expiration of 10 or 12 days the foreman found it necessary to again bail, and this alternate bailing and pumping from time to time was continued until October 8, 1924, when the drilling rig was moved back, and efforts - commenced, as the production foreman termed it, to “work over” the well. Thus a period of 83 days from July 17th to October 8th had elapsed from the time of removing to the date of returning the drilling machinery to the premises. Hence it is seen that if, within the' meaning of the clauses of the lease above ’quoted, the well- was, at the time of such removal, completed, then the right to develop the remaining lots was lost, because more than 60 days had elapsed without defendant beginning work upon another well.

I may say here that, while extensive allegations were made of matters of conduct by plaintiff and acquiescence in the manner of developing the property, defendant failed to offer any proof to sustain them. In the early stages of presenting the defense, counsel" started to offer such proof, but, upon suggestion from the court, desisted until the direct evidence bearing upon completion of the well and. forfeiture had been submitted; but the ease was closed without any further effort to show estoppel.

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Bluebook (online)
4 F.2d 279, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 938, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-stanley-lawd-1925.