Taylor v. Pulvers, Pulver, Thompson & Kuttner

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Taylor v. Pulvers, Pulver, Thompson & Kuttner

1 A.D.3d 128, 766 N.Y.S.2d 430, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11618

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 6, 2003

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 1 A.D.3d 128 (Taylor v. Pulvers, Pulver, Thompson & Kuttner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Pulvers, Pulver, Thompson & Kuttner, 1 A.D.3d 128, 766 N.Y.S.2d 430, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11618 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marilyn Shafer, J.), entered on or about August 5, 2002, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The affidavits submitted on the motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 were properly considered inasmuch as they conclusively established that plaintiff had no cause of action (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976]; Fields v Leeponis, 95 AD2d 822 [1983]) for legal malpractice for defendant law firm’s failure to seek a default judgment against a nonanswering defendant in the underlying medical malpractice action. The affidavits establish that defendant approached two doctors familiar with plaintiffs condition but that neither was willing to testify that plaintiff had been a victim of medical malpractice, and that defendant was consequently unable to file a certificate of merit in good faith. It is also clear that plaintiff has no cause of action against defendant for not more expeditiously deposing the medical malpractice defendants since plaintiffs allegations afford no nonspeculative basis to infer that she sustained damages attributable to the complained-of delay.

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Sullivan, Rosenberger and Lerner, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marilyn Shafer, J.), entered on or about August 5, 2002, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The affidavits submitted on the motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 were properly considered inasmuch as they conclusively established that plaintiff had no cause of action (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976]; Fields v Leeponis, 95 AD2d 822 [1983]) for legal malpractice for defendant law firm’s failure to seek a default judgment against a nonanswering defendant in the underlying medical malpractice action. The affidavits establish that defendant approached two doctors familiar with plaintiffs condition but that neither was willing to testify that plaintiff had been a victim of medical malpractice, and that defendant was consequently unable to file a certificate of merit in good faith. It is also clear that plaintiff has no cause of action against defendant for not more expeditiously deposing the medical malpractice defendants since plaintiffs allegations afford no nonspeculative basis to infer that she sustained damages attributable to the complained-of delay.

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Sullivan, Rosenberger and Lerner, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

1 A.D.3d 128, 766 N.Y.S.2d 430, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11618, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-pulvers-pulver-thompson-kuttner-nyappdiv-2003.

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