Taylor v. Perini

431 F. Supp. 566, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16838
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 18, 1977
DocketCiv. C 69-275
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 431 F. Supp. 566 (Taylor v. Perini) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Perini, 431 F. Supp. 566, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16838 (N.D. Ohio 1977).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DON J. YOUNG, District Judge:

The defendants have filed objections to the Third Report of the Special Master, which was filed February 10, 1977.

The objections deal with two matters in the report, the grievance machinery and the pre-hire psychological testing.

From the Court’s standpoint, these two matters have always been the most important elements in effecting compliance with the order of September 12,1972. They also have significance far beyond the narrow confines of this particular case, and must be considered in their broader aspects, if for no other reason than the administrative problems of the state department of which the Marion Correctional Institution is a part. However, they will be considered separately in this memorandum.

I. The Objection with Respect to the Grievance Machinery

The first two paragraphs of the order of September 12, 1972 prohibit the defendants from engaging in acts or practices that are discriminatory in purpose or effect, and from engaging in any form of racial harassment, intimidation or insult against members of the plaintiff class.

In ruling upon the first report of the Special Master, the Court found non-compliance with the order in that there was no effective grievance procedure maintained to process complaints relating to racial discrimination, harassment, intimidation, or insult.

The need of the development of an effective and independent grievance system was again referred to in the Second Report of the Special Master. The Court found that it would not find the order of September 12, 1972 had been complied with until a more effective and independent inmate grievance system had been developed and implemented.

The reports of the Special Master detail the work that was done toward the development and implementation of a more effective and independent grievance system. At the time of the Third Report an inmate grievance system had been developed and implemented to a considerable extent. Its functioning is being observed, not only by the Special Master, but by a special committee of persons most of whom are not in the employ of the defendants or the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

The defendants object specifically to the statement in the Third Report that It is the conviction of the Special Master that some form of permanent external monitoring is an essential ingredient to an effective grievance system.

The objections, however, deal with the defendants’ construction of the word “independent” which they state they had originally construed to mean independent of the institution, and not independent of the Department.

Their contentions are that until the grievance system which has been effectuated has been observed and evaluated, it is premature to conclude that external monitoring is essential to an effective grievance system; that such a system of external monitoring would add another level to the system, but might not be needed, efficient, or independent; and finally, although they refrain from developing the argument, that an order requiring external monitoring “might be beyond the scope of an appropriate plan to remedy past acts of alleged wrongdoing.”

As to the matter of prematurity, the report clearly shows that the new system is *568 being observed and evaluated. Certainly this is proper. Experience under the new system should give some insight into how effective it may become when it is operating fully as it is designed to operate. Experience is always a useful source of knowledge in dealing with human problems. Nevertheless, experience is neither a substitute for nor better than, intelligence and reason in dealing with such problems. As Benjamin Franklin said “Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other, and scarce in that.” This Court has already had close to a decade of experience with the problems at MCI, and shares the misgivings of the Special Master. The Court hopes that the new grievance system will prove to be so effective as to eliminate any question of the need for external monitoring. The Court’s experience clouds that hope considerably.

As to the matter of necessity, efficiency, or independence, the Court would point out that the burden in this case is not upon the plaintiffs now, since they prevailed, but on the defendants. While the Court has no enthusiasm for the normal political process of creating additional layers of staff when jobs do not get done, it is up to the defendants to prove that they can comply with this Court’s order without the necessity of having some one with no axe to grind calling their deficiencies to their attention.

In simplest terms, the problem may ultimately reduce itself either to the independent monitoring group, or the necessity of the Court retaining jurisdiction indefinitely. In another case, the Court pointed out that history seemed to indicate that it took forty years to eliminate all vestiges of bad old practices. In more immediate times, in the Hartford Empire case, this Court monitored its order for more than thirty years. It can do so again if it has to.

Finally, the suggestion that future wrongs are beyond the scope of a remedy for past wrongs does not withstand analysis. In the first place, the past wrongs which gave rise to this litigation neither have been nor can be remedied. An insult once uttered cannot be recalled, nor can a person who has been insulted or harassed ever be made fully whole. Under our common law, the only remedy the law provides for such wrongs is an award of damages, which was not made and cannot now be made in this matter.

The Civil Rights laws contemplate that in addition to that common law remedy, there is also the equitable remedy of injunction. This remedy is entirely prospective. It operates only to prevent future wrongs. The law, however, is not so naive as to suppose that merely saying “Thou shalt not ...” is sufficient to eliminate future evil. The only real remedy that this Court can give in this case is to see to it that the defendants demonstrate their compliance with the order of September 12, 1972 by adopting administrative procedures that will insure, a permanent change of old bad habits.

It has already been conclusively established in this case that the defendants did not, for a long time, comply with this Court’s order. Whether or not this Court maintains continuing jurisdiction in this case, the order of September 12,1972, binds the defendants in perpetuity, and anyone who conceives himself to have been injured by a violation of the order may bring action to require the defendants to show cause why they should not be punished as for contempt for the violation. In such a context it cannot possibly be said that future wrongs are beyond the scope of this case.

The defendants’ objections to that portion of the Third Report of the Special Master dealing with the grievance machinery will be overruled.

II. The Objection with Respect to the Pre-hire Psychological Testing

Paragraph 10(d) of the order of September 12, 1972 is expressed in very clear and simple language.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Taylor v. Perini
455 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ohio, 1978)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
431 F. Supp. 566, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-perini-ohnd-1977.