Taylor v. Nicosia

2019 NY Slip Op 9316

• Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
• Decided: December 24, 2019
• Docket: Index No. 605323/16
• Status: Published

Opinion

Taylor v Nicosia (2019 NY Slip Op 09316)

Taylor v Nicosia

2019 NY Slip Op 09316

Decided on December 24, 2019

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 24, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
RUTH C. BALKIN
SHERI S. ROMAN
BETSY BARROS, JJ.

2018-10937
2018-11671
(Index No. 605323/16)

[*1]Andrew S. Taylor, appellant,

v

Vincent J. Nicosia, respondent.

Stefano A. Filippazzo, P.C., Brooklyn, NY (Louis A. Badolato of counsel), for appellant.

Richard T. Lau, Jericho, NY (Kathleen E. Fioretti of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (James P. McCormack, J.), entered August 6, 2018, and (2) a judgment of the same court dated August 24, 2018. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The judgment is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and the order is modified accordingly.

The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1]).

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 7, 2015. Thereafter, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. By order entered August 6, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Thereafter, a judgment was entered upon the order, in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident [*2](see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219). As the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, a lack of causation (see Straussberg v Marghub, 108 AD3d 694, 695; Kearney v Garrett, 92 AD3d 725, 726), the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation or to explain any gap in treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572; Torres v Rettaliata, 171 AD3d 829, 829-830; Lambropoulos v Gomez, 166 AD3d 952).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

RIVERA, J.P., BALKIN, ROMAN and BARROS, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court