Taylor v. Morgan

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Taylor v. Morgan

1914 OK 283, 141 P. 679, 43 Okla. 142, 1914 Okla. LEXIS 469

CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

DecidedJune 16, 1914

Docket3664

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 1914 OK 283 (Taylor v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Morgan, 1914 OK 283, 141 P. 679, 43 Okla. 142, 1914 Okla. LEXIS 469 (Okla. 1914).

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Opinion

*143 KANE, C. J.

This was an action for damages commenced by the plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, against J. H. Morgan, as town marshal of the town of Quinton, for an alleged breach of his official bond by a false arrest of the plaintiff, and J. W. Ross, H. D. Garrettson, J. P. Williams, and J. A. Nation, as sureties thereon. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the court sustained a demurrer thereto, and instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants, upon which judgment was duly entered, to reverse which this proceeding in error was commenced.

The demurrer to the evidence was sustained upon the ground that the plaintiff did not show that the officer was acting under legal process, or that there was cause for arrest without warrant, but merely established a naked trespass for which no action upon the bond will lie. We have examined the record carefully, and are unable to distinguish the case at bar from Dysart et al. v. Lurty et al., 3 Okla. 601, 41 Pac. 724; Lowe et al. v. City of Guthrie, 4 Okla. 287, 44 Pac. 198; Chandler v. Rutherford, 101 Fed. 774, 43 C. C. A. 218; Jordan v. Neer, 34 Okla. 400, 125 Pac. 1117; Inman v. Sherrill, 29 Okla. 100, 116 Pac. 426.

The foregoing cases support the doctrine that where an officer, while doing an act within the limits of his official authority, exercises such authority improperly, or exceeds his official powers, or abuses an official discretion vested in him, he becomes liable on his official bond to the person injured. But where he acts without any process and without the authority of his office, in doing such act, he is not to be considered an officer, but a personal trespasser. Sureties on the official bond of a town marshal are only answerable for the acts of their principal while engaged in the performance of some duty imposed upon him by law or for an omission to perform some such duty.

Upon the authority of said cases, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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*143 KANE, C. J.

This was an action for damages commenced by the plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, against J. H. Morgan, as town marshal of the town of Quinton, for an alleged breach of his official bond by a false arrest of the plaintiff, and J. W. Ross, H. D. Garrettson, J. P. Williams, and J. A. Nation, as sureties thereon. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the court sustained a demurrer thereto, and instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants, upon which judgment was duly entered, to reverse which this proceeding in error was commenced.

The demurrer to the evidence was sustained upon the ground that the plaintiff did not show that the officer was acting under legal process, or that there was cause for arrest without warrant, but merely established a naked trespass for which no action upon the bond will lie. We have examined the record carefully, and are unable to distinguish the case at bar from Dysart et al. v. Lurty et al., 3 Okla. 601, 41 Pac. 724; Lowe et al. v. City of Guthrie, 4 Okla. 287, 44 Pac. 198; Chandler v. Rutherford, 101 Fed. 774, 43 C. C. A. 218; Jordan v. Neer, 34 Okla. 400, 125 Pac. 1117; Inman v. Sherrill, 29 Okla. 100, 116 Pac. 426.

The foregoing cases support the doctrine that where an officer, while doing an act within the limits of his official authority, exercises such authority improperly, or exceeds his official powers, or abuses an official discretion vested in him, he becomes liable on his official bond to the person injured. But where he acts without any process and without the authority of his office, in doing such act, he is not to be considered an officer, but a personal trespasser. Sureties on the official bond of a town marshal are only answerable for the acts of their principal while engaged in the performance of some duty imposed upon him by law or for an omission to perform some such duty.

Upon the authority of said cases, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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1914 OK 283, 141 P. 679, 43 Okla. 142, 1914 Okla. LEXIS 469, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-morgan-okla-1914.

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