Taylor v. Metropolitan Development Council

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 MAUREEN TAYLOR, CASE NO. C22-5509-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. COUNCIL, 13 Defendant. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s objections (Dkt. No. 61) to the report 16 and recommendation (“R&R”) of the Honorable S. Kate Vaughan, United States Magistrate 17 Judge. (Dkt. No. 60.) Having thoroughly considered the party’s briefing and the relevant record, 18 the Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections, and GRANTS 19 summary judgment to Defendant for the reasons explained below. 20 Plaintiff Maureen Taylor is a licensed practical nurse formerly employed by Defendant 21 Metropolitan Development Council (“MDC”). (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.) In May 2022, she filed this 22 lawsuit alleging claims for breach of the employment contract, retaliation, and wrongful 23 termination. (Id. at 5–7.)1 Defendant moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 24 25 1 The details of the case are discussed in the R&R (Dkt. No. 60), and the Court will not repeat 26 them here. 1 (Dkt. No. 50.) Judge Vaughan’s resulting R&R recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s 2 motion. (Dkt. No. 60 at 33.) Plaintiff objects. (See generally Dkt. No. 61.) 3 A district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of a magistrate judge’s 4 R&R to which a party properly objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party 5 properly objects when they file “specific written objections” to the R&R as required under Federal 6 Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2). In contrast, general objections or summaries of arguments 7 previously presented have the same effect as no objection at all, since they do not focus the Court’s 8 attention on any specific issues for review. Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 9 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); Eggum v. Holbrook, 467 F. Supp. 3d 968, 975 (W.D. Wash. 2020). 10 To the extent the Court can discern Plaintiff’s objections, she argues Judge Vaughan: 11 (1) misapprehended the McDonnell Douglas standard for reviewing employment discrimination 12 claims; (2) improperly gave weight to an employee’s testimony regarding an alleged incident of 13 unprofessional conduct by Plaintiff;2 (3) failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s declaration and 14 supporting exhibits;3 (4) did not consider that the six Weingarten meetings with Plaintiff took place 15 when there was no manager of the unit (which, according to Plaintiff, means she had no 16 opportunity to refute allegations against her);4 and (5) failed to infer pretext and retaliation from 17 2 Plaintiff asserts this was improper because the employee allegedly allowed for deletion of video 18 of the incident. (See Dkt. No. 61 at 7–8.) The Court notes, however, the existence of multiple 19 pieces of corroborating evidence, including a patience grievance and a report from another employee present during the incident. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 75–94.) And to the extent Plaintiff 20 suggests the video footage would be “exculpatory,” this is irrelevant in light of separate, undisputed evidence of unprofessional conduct by Plaintiff, as described later in this order. 21 3 In raising this objection, Plaintiff points to Judge Vaughan’s observation that “Plaintiff relies 22 almost entirely on her declaration to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” (Dkt. No. 61 at 8) (citing Dkt. No. 60 at 15). Notwithstanding this observation, though, Judge Vaughan went on to 23 consider Plaintiff’s declaration in great detail. 24 4 Plaintiff appears to raise this argument for the first time at the objection stage. “[A]n unsuccessful party is not entitled as of right to de novo review by the judge of an argument never 25 seasonably raised before the magistrate.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Even if this Court were to consider this argument, however, Plaintiff’s 26 claims fail for the reasons described below. 1 the fact that Defendant’s notes of Weingarten meetings with Plaintiff were suspiciously missing.5 2 (See Dkt. No. 61 at 3–15.) 3 Fundamentally, Plaintiff’s objections lack merit for the same reason: they fail to raise 4 genuine disputes of material fact. Indeed, in moving for summary judgment, Defendant presented 5 overwhelming evidence of patient grievances and staff complaints regarding Plaintiff’s 6 disrespectful and unprofessional conduct—much of which Plaintiff either concedes or fails to 7 dispute.6 Thus, even assuming Plaintiff has established genuine disputes as to some evidence, those 8 disputes are irrelevant in light of the remaining, undisputed evidence showing a pattern of 9 actionable conduct. As to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, Judge Vaughan correctly concluded that 10 Plaintiff made a prima facie case, but failed to adequately dispute Defendant’s legitimate, 11 nondiscriminatory reasoning with specific and substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 60 at 22–30.) And 12 in doing so, she applied the correct legal standard for reviewing employment disputes at the 13 summary judgment stage. 14

15 5 The Weingarten meetings were conducted with Plaintiff, MDC’s labor dispute specialist, Allen Jacobson, and Plaintiff’s union representative, Leslie Liddle. (Dkt. No. 60 at 4.) But according to 16 Defendant and Mr. Jacobson’s testimony, notes of those meetings could not be produced due to Mr. Jacobson’s laptop being stolen. (Dkt. No. 66 at 8.) In objecting to the R&R, Plaintiff submits 17 a police report showing the laptop was reported stolen earlier than Mr. Jacobson suggested, and 18 before the Weingarten meetings occurred. (See Dkt. No. 61-1). This, according to Plaintiff, raises an inference that the notes are still available, contrary to Mr. Jacobson’s testimony. (Dkt. No. 61 19 at 15.) Notably, though, Plaintiff submits this police report for the first time at the objection stage. Therefore, the Court need not consider it. See Howell, 231 F.3d at 621 (“[A] district court 20 has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a party’s 21 objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation.”). 6 For example, Plaintiff concedes that she purposely left urine in a utility for a co-worker to clean 22 up and directed another employee to leave a medication error in a patient’s chart. (Dkt. No. 57-1 at 26–27). And as Judge Vaughan aptly noted, it is “indisputable that a large number of patients 23 and staff, including two managerial employees, reported Plaintiff’s disrespectful behavior and 24 unprofessional conduct.” (Dkt. No. 60 at 17) (quoting reports of Plaintiff’s “unprofessional, demeaning, and triggering behavior” towards patients and the “unprecedented” number of 25 “consistently themed/grievances against a healthcare staff member”). This includes a patient complaint alleging Plaintiff had been disrespectful, stating: “I felt belittled [and] she talked to me 26 like an animal [and] not a person.” (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 197.) 1 For the foregoing reasons: 2 (1) The Court APPROVES and ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 60). 3 (2) Plaintiff’s objections (Dkt. No. 61) are OVERRULED; 4 (3) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 50) is GRANTED; 5 (4) Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; and, 6 (5) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send copies of this Order to the parties and to Judge 7 Vaughan. 8 DATED this 7th day of March 2024. 9 A 10 11 12 John C. Coughenour 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26