Taylor v. Kemp

S.D. Georgia

Taylor v. Kemp

DecidedSeptember 11, 2020

Docket4:19-cv-00236

StatusUnknown

This text of Taylor v. Kemp (Taylor v. Kemp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Taylor v. Kemp, (S.D. Ga. 2020).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION JIMMY L. TAYLOR, ) Plaintiff, ) CV419-236 SGT. GREG PENNYCUFF et al, Defendants. ORDER This matter was assigned to the undersigned. See docket. Because of a previous partnership relationship with the law firm which has newly appeared to represent two defendants, and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I

recuse. Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when “a party ... makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit....” Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, “places a judge under a self- enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist.” United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams

v. Birmingham Bad. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). Courts have generally recognized that prior partnership in the law firm representing a party is not an absolute bar on a judge’s hearing a case. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (prior partnership in law firm not grounds for recusal); Apex Oil Co. v. Apex Oil, 981 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1992) (judge’s prior partnership in law firm that represented party involved in case was not required to recuse); Ford v. Bank of Am., 2000 WL 1028238, * 2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000) (unpublished) (disqualification not required because of judge’s prior employment with law firm representing defendants). Nevertheless, judges typically observe a two-year recusal period from cases involving their prior law firms. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1281 (citing Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. II, Ch. V, Compendium § 3.3-1(b) (2003). It is vital that litigants and the public see that the judicial process is fair and impartial. Accordingly, I will exercise my discretionary power to recuse in this case. The Clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to forward a copy of this order to the assigned District Judge for reassignment SO ORDERED, this 11th day of September, 2020. Nd o/ Lon 4 | Mee. Christopher L. Ray United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of Georgia

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION JIMMY L. TAYLOR, ) Plaintiff, ) CV419-236 SGT. GREG PENNYCUFF et al, Defendants. ORDER This matter was assigned to the undersigned. See docket. Because of a previous partnership relationship with the law firm which has newly appeared to represent two defendants, and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I

recuse. Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when “a party ... makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit....” Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, “places a judge under a self- enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist.” United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams

v. Birmingham Bad. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). Courts have generally recognized that prior partnership in the law firm representing a party is not an absolute bar on a judge’s hearing a case. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (prior partnership in law firm not grounds for recusal); Apex Oil Co. v. Apex Oil, 981 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1992) (judge’s prior partnership in law firm that represented party involved in case was not required to recuse); Ford v. Bank of Am., 2000 WL 1028238, * 2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000) (unpublished) (disqualification not required because of judge’s prior employment with law firm representing defendants). Nevertheless, judges typically observe a two-year recusal period from cases involving their prior law firms. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1281 (citing Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. II, Ch. V, Compendium § 3.3-1(b) (2003). It is vital that litigants and the public see that the judicial process is fair and impartial. Accordingly, I will exercise my discretionary power to recuse in this case. The Clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to forward a copy of this order to the assigned District Judge for reassignment SO ORDERED, this 11th day of September, 2020. Nd o/ Lon 4 | Mee. Christopher L. Ray United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of Georgia

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