Taylor v. Gin Cabel Trucking, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Taylor v. Gin Cabel Trucking, Inc.

7 A.D.3d 272, 776 N.Y.S.2d 249, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6578

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 6, 2004

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 7 A.D.3d 272 (Taylor v. Gin Cabel Trucking, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Gin Cabel Trucking, Inc., 7 A.D.3d 272, 776 N.Y.S.2d 249, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6578 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

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Opinion

[273]*273Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan J. Saks, J.), entered on or about April 22, 2003, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants in this personal injury action met their burden of establishing, through the submitted reports of medical experts, that plaintiff had not sustained a serious injury as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Plaintiff failed to present sufficient objective evidence to overcome these submissions by demonstrating she had sustained such an injury that prevented resumption of her normal and customary activities, especially in light of the lSVa-month gap between the last documented examination by her own physician and the one examination by her medical expert, Dr. Hausknecht (see Vaughan v Baez, 305 AD2d 101 [2003]). Concur—Buckley, PJ., Nardelli, Andrias, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.

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[273]*273Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan J. Saks, J.), entered on or about April 22, 2003, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants in this personal injury action met their burden of establishing, through the submitted reports of medical experts, that plaintiff had not sustained a serious injury as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Plaintiff failed to present sufficient objective evidence to overcome these submissions by demonstrating she had sustained such an injury that prevented resumption of her normal and customary activities, especially in light of the lSVa-month gap between the last documented examination by her own physician and the one examination by her medical expert, Dr. Hausknecht (see Vaughan v Baez, 305 AD2d 101 [2003]). Concur—Buckley, PJ., Nardelli, Andrias, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

7 A.D.3d 272, 776 N.Y.S.2d 249, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6578, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-gin-cabel-trucking-inc-nyappdiv-2004.

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