Taylor v. Gibbs

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Taylor v. Gibbs

150 S.E.2d 506, 268 N.C. 363, 1966 N.C. LEXIS 1206

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 19, 1966

Docket366

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 150 S.E.2d 506 (Taylor v. Gibbs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Gibbs, 150 S.E.2d 506, 268 N.C. 363, 1966 N.C. LEXIS 1206 (N.C. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The contract provides for the payment of “sure-rent” by the defendant,- — -that is, certain and unconditional payment. It provides only one event that might relieve him: the reduction of the tobacco acreage. The defendant admits that this did not occur, but contends that putting acreage-poundage control into effect has the same result and that he should be absolved. However, in his Answer the defendant says that it was not anticipated by the parties and in his brief says “it was totally unanticipated by the parties at the time the contract was made.” In substance he asks *365 that the plaintiff be affected by an event that was totally unanticipated by him and by the defendant. If the parties had anticipated a development or government action similar to the acreage-poundage control, it should have been inserted as a part of the agreement. Since they did not, the law cannot bind the plaintiff to an unforeseen and unexpected eventuality not within the contemplation of either party.

The case of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 127 S.E. 2d 539, refers to several decisions in which the position of the lower court is upheld. From it we quote: “When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to its terms, and the court, under the guise of construction, cannot reject what the parties inserted or insert what the parties elected to emit. Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E. 2d 198. It is the province of the courts to construe and not to make contracts for the parties. Williamson v. Miller, 231 N.C. 722, 727, 58 S.E. 2d 743; Green v. Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 321, 327, 64 S.E. 2d 162. The terms of an unambiguous contract are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Bailey v. Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 716, 722, 24 S.E. 2d 614.”

Judge Bone’s ruling is

Affirmed.

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Per Curiam.

The contract provides for the payment of “sure-rent” by the defendant,- — -that is, certain and unconditional payment. It provides only one event that might relieve him: the reduction of the tobacco acreage. The defendant admits that this did not occur, but contends that putting acreage-poundage control into effect has the same result and that he should be absolved. However, in his Answer the defendant says that it was not anticipated by the parties and in his brief says “it was totally unanticipated by the parties at the time the contract was made.” In substance he asks *365 that the plaintiff be affected by an event that was totally unanticipated by him and by the defendant. If the parties had anticipated a development or government action similar to the acreage-poundage control, it should have been inserted as a part of the agreement. Since they did not, the law cannot bind the plaintiff to an unforeseen and unexpected eventuality not within the contemplation of either party.

The case of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 127 S.E. 2d 539, refers to several decisions in which the position of the lower court is upheld. From it we quote: “When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to its terms, and the court, under the guise of construction, cannot reject what the parties inserted or insert what the parties elected to emit. Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E. 2d 198. It is the province of the courts to construe and not to make contracts for the parties. Williamson v. Miller, 231 N.C. 722, 727, 58 S.E. 2d 743; Green v. Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 321, 327, 64 S.E. 2d 162. The terms of an unambiguous contract are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Bailey v. Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 716, 722, 24 S.E. 2d 614.”

Judge Bone’s ruling is

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

150 S.E.2d 506, 268 N.C. 363, 1966 N.C. LEXIS 1206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-gibbs-nc-1966.

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