TAYLOR v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 4, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00077
StatusUnknown

This text of TAYLOR v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (TAYLOR v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TAYLOR v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (S.D. Ga. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION ZACHARY BOUVIER TAYLOR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 121-077 ) GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF ) CORRECTIONS; A.S.M.P. MENTAL ) HEALTH DIRECTOR DONNA YOUNG; _ ) CERT TEAM OFFCER SMITH; ) CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TAYLOR, ) A.S.M.P.; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ) CUNNINGHAM, A.S.M.P.; WARDEN ) EDWARD PHILBIN; NURSE BRUCKER, _ ) Psych Nurse, A.S.M.P.; OFFICER VALERIE ) FLOURNEY, A.S.M.P; OFFICER ) BRACEWELL; and OFFICER PROPHET __) WEBB, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

After a careful, de novo review of the file, the Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), to which objections have been filed. (Doc. no. 14.) The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under the three-strike provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Further, the Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff failed to qualify for the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception to § 1915(g), as Plaintiff only presented general or conclusory allegations of threats and no factual details to demonstrate imminent danger.

In his objections, Plaintiff argues he qualifies for the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g), and therefore should be granted permission to proceed IFP. (Id. at 2-5.) Plaintiff alleges details about the inmates and correctional officers who have threatened him, the nature of those threats, and the inadequate procedure he received before his involuntary medication. (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide this information anywhere in his complaint and therefore it was not before the Magistrate Judge. While courts have the discretion to consider novel evidence, factual claims, and legal argument raised for the first time in an objection to an R&R, they are under no obligation to do so. Frone v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 695 F. App’x 468, 472 (11th Cir. 2017) (concluding district judge has broad discretion in considering argument not presented to magistrate judge); Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (same). The Court chooses not to consider Plaintiff's new factual claims because Plaintiff had more than enough time to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the Cour. OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections, ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as its opinion, DENIES Plaintiff's request to proceed IFP, (doc. no. 8), DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (doc. no. 4-1), DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. no. 4-2), and DISMISSES this action without prejudice. SO ORDERED this hay of June, 2021, at Augusta, Georgia.

a 4 74 se ~ { Yt) ? (J. RANDAL HAVL, CHIEF JUDGE \ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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Related

Williams v. McNeil
557 F.3d 1287 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Vadis J. Frone v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
695 F. App'x 468 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
TAYLOR v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-georgia-department-of-corrections-gasd-2021.