Taylor v. Fire Department

1 Edw. Ch. 294
CourtNew York Court of Chancery
DecidedFebruary 15, 1832
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1 Edw. Ch. 294 (Taylor v. Fire Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Fire Department, 1 Edw. Ch. 294 (N.Y. 1832).

Opinion

The Vice-Ciiancellor.

A preliminary objection has been taken that the proper parties are not before the court so as to enable me to make a decree which shall bind the rights of all concerned; provided the complainant be found entitled to a portion of the fund. Thus,' it is said, allowing the widow had a life interest, then there are arrears of income for ten years prior to her death withheld from her, w'hich, upon her decease, being transmissible, would rightfully belong to an executor or administrator: who ought to be before the court or some excuse shown for the omission. So, with respect to Vermilyea Taylor, his right, it is argued, has not vested in his widow and children, and a personal representative ought to be a party. The same thing is urged as respects the deceased daughter Hannah. The [296]*296objection is likewise extended so as to embrace the engineers and foremen of the fire companies, because they were the persons who received the money and deposited it with the Fire Dcpartment.. T am not prepared to say that all the grounds of this objection are untenable. But, since the cause has been heard upon the merits, I shall proceed at once to the consideration of the case as if all the necessary parties were before me.

In order to determine whether the complainant has any right to a portion of the fund in question, it is necessary to look at the circumstances of the gift and' the intention of the donors. The intention and manner of the gift must determine whether the title to the thing given has vested in the donee, or, in other-words, whether the gift has been perfected.

The law is very clear on the subject of gifts. There must not only be an intention to give, but this intention is to be executed and carried into effect by an actual delivery. If it rests in fieri or is incomplete, a court of law will not sustain, nor a court of equity interfere to compel the perfecting of it.

In all cases of gifts inter vivas there is a locus penitentice until the intention and act are consummated by delivery: Fink v. Cox, 18 J. R. 145; Tuylor v. Lendey, 9 East, 49 ; Cottinett v. Missing, 1 Mad. R. 176. But the complainants contend, that all which is required by law has been done in the present instance to render it an absolute and valid gift. And it is very true the donors have parted with their money and have never sought to recall it. Every thing has been done by them to make it an actual donation. The intention to give, the act of giving and the delivery are complete. It is, therefore, not a question between the donors and donees, but between persons claiming to be donees and those holding the funds: whether the claimants or the latter are the persons to whom the subject of the gift rightfully belongs?

To ascertain this point, it is necessary to advert to the testimony in the cause. A number of witnesses have been examined on both sides; and some documentary evidence has been produced.

The facts, about which there is no dispute, may be summed up in this: that under a general impression of Jeremiah B. [297]*297Taylor’s being a fireman and of his leaving a large and destitute family, and from the sympathy of the moment, the firemen, as a body, wore publicly invited to attend (and did attend) his funeral. Upon returning from it, the engineers and foremen of the companies held a meeting and resolved to call together the several fire companies for the purpose of making collections for the relief of the widow and children of the deceased. These meetings were had. ' Among some of the companies, contributions were made by individual members; in others, a certair sum was voted and given out of the funds of the company; and, in a number of instances, the donations were made up partly of individual contributions and partly from the funds of the company. A small amount, about twenty-five dollars, was contributed by citizens who were not firemen, and was kept separate from the rest. The money, thus raised by each company, was placed in the hands of its foreman. A meeting of the engineers and foremen was then held ; and a committee of five was appointed to inquire into the situation of the family of the deceased and report as well the result as also a plan for the disposition of the moneys. At a subsequent meeting, the committee reported they had visited the family, which they found in more comfortable circumstances than had been anticipated, and recommended that, while the money collected from the citizens should be paid directly to the widow, the remainder should be invested in bank stock in the name of the Fire Department Fund, subject to the future order and control of the engineers and foremen, and the dividends be paid over, by the treasurer of the Fund, to the widow for five years, and, in case of her death or marriage during such time, to her four youngest children until the expiration of this period. The report was approved. A committee was appointed to invest the money, which was done; and the dividends were regularly paid to the widow during the five years.

The question here arises: whether the engineers and foremen had authority to limit the use of the money in this manner 1 The solution of this question depends upon another, namely, are they to be regarded as the agents of the donors or contri» butors having power to control and regulate the use of the fund [298]*298as they, in their judgment and discretion, might think proper 1 On this .subject the witnesses differ; although they all agree in saying the money was raised for the relief of the widow and children of the deceased. Seven or eight witnesses, on the part of the complainant, testify as to their contributing individually, and of their knowing no other object to which the money was to be applied. They also state their own understanding and impression to have been, that the family were to have it without restriction or limitation, as they contributed with this view and did not intend its going ultimately or at any time to the Fire Department Fund for general objects of charity; and they supposed the receivers or committee into whose hands it might be placed would hand it over or apply it to the use of the widow and children as their property absolutely. Such is their testimony; and so far as their amounts are concerned, if it were possible to distinguish what they gave from the rest, then there would perhaps be an absolute and unconditional gift. But I do not understand these witnesses to speak of the intention and views of others in respect to amounts contributed, nor as to what the companies, in their collective capacity and by the vote or expression of the majority, thought proper to declare.

(In the part of the defendants, there are, at least, double the number of witnesses; and most of them are the foremen of the companies who were instrumental in calling meetings for the express purpose of raising the money and whose business it was to ascertain the sentiments and view's of the contributors. These witnesses testify distinctly that, although the money v'as raised for the benefit of the widow and children of the unfortunate person, it wras placed in the hands of each foreman: upon a general understanding that he was to meet the engineers and the .other foremen, and the money was to be applied in such manner as they should think proper: as some of these witnesses express it, the money was placed at the disposal of their foreman ; and as others say, it was put at the disposal of the foremen and engineers when they should meet upon the subject.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Edw. Ch. 294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-fire-department-nychanct-1832.