Taylor v. Dunfrund

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 25, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00190
StatusUnknown

This text of Taylor v. Dunfrund (Taylor v. Dunfrund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Dunfrund, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LOUIS J. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-CV-190

WARDEN JASON WELLS, SGT. DAN FRUND, SGT. BLAESING, SGT. ARBOGHAST, BRIAN R. BANACH, RN ROSEBAUM, LEPPEY, and DR. RIBAULT,

Defendants.

ORDER SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

On February 15, 2022, plaintiff Louis J. Taylor, who is incarcerated at Racine Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.) This matter is now before the court on Taylor’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and for screening of his complaint. The court has jurisdiction to resolve Taylor’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and to screen the second amended complaint in light of Taylor’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge and the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s limited consent to the exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Taylor was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On February 15, 2022, Taylor filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 2.) On February 17, 2022, the court ordered

Taylor to pay an initial partial filing fee of $6.27 by March 21, 2022. (ECF No. 5.) Taylor paid that fee on March 3, 2022. Then on March 7, 2022, Taylor filed another motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 8.) The court will grant Taylor’s first motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. The court will deny his second motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee as moot because he already paid the initial partial filing fee.

2 SCREENING THE COMPLAINT Federal Screening Standard The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Taylor

was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. The PLRA requires courts to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the

same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

3 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color

of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). Taylor’s Allegations Taylor alleges that in October 2021, he informed defendants Unit Manager

McLaughlin, Sgt. Dan Frund, Sgt. Blaesing, and Sgt. Arbogast that there was black mold in the showers that was infecting his penis. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) He alleges that these defendants told him they could not help him with that issue. (Id.) Taylor also alleges that he wrote an inmate complaint to defendant Brian R. Banach, who instructed him to “follow the chain of command.” (Id. at 3) Taylor first went to the Health Services Unit (HSU) on September 15, 2021,

for the mold infection on his penis. (Id. at 2.) An unknown doctor, not a defendant, prescribed an anti-fungal cream. (Id.) The cream was not working, so Taylor went back to HSU on November 9, 2021. (Id.) Defendant Dr. Ribault prescribed zinc oxide ointment. When that didn’t work, Dr. Ribault prescribed Nystatin Topical Cream. (Id.) Taylor states that when that did not work either, Dr. Ribault did not address the issue further and neither did HSU staff members Rosebaum and Leppey, who

4 told him to continue on his prescribed course of treatment, despite it having no effect. (Id. at 2-3.) Taylor seeks to have the court reprimand Warden Jason Wells for allowing

the shower to have black mold. (Id. at 4.) He also seeks $5,000,000.00 in damages. (Id.) Analysis Taylor claims that defendants McLaughlin, Frund, Blaesing, Arboghast and Banach violated his constitutional rights when they failed to address the dangerous black mold in the showers of his housing unit. “The Eighth Amendment can be violated by conditions of confinement in a jail or prison when (1) there is a

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Donald F. Greeno v. George Daley
414 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Marcos Gray v. Marcus Hardy
826 F.3d 1000 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Taylor v. Dunfrund, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-dunfrund-wied-2022.