Taylor v. Doe

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 29, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-03398·Unknown

Opinion

Dirldall L. VFOSSMall | ALLOTTIEY hj kK . H One Liberty Plaza S Ip Tr EV IC! AW 165 Broadway, Suite 2300 New York, NY 10006 p. 212-252-3003 f. 888-568-5815 www.shipkevich.com

October 23, 2020 VIA ECF Hon. Mary Kay Vyskocil Daniel Patrick Moynihan USDC SDNY United States Courthouse DOCUMENT 500 Pearl St. ELECTRONICALLY FILED New York, NY 10007-1312 DOC #: DATE FILED:_10/29/2020 Re: = Taylor et al. v. Doe, 1:20-cv-03398 Dear Judge Vyskocil, I represent Plaintiffs Deborah Taylor a/k/a Holly T, Matthew Kramer a/k/a Disco Killerz, and Reem Taoz a/k/a GATTUSO (together the “Plaintiffs”) in the above-captioned action. I write pursuant to (1) the Court’s Order of October 13, 2020, directing Plaintiffs to show cause in writing why service of the summons and complaint have not been served on the Doe Defendant and (2)pursuant to Local Civil Rule 37.2 to seek a pre-motion conference for Plaintiffs’ anticipated motion to seek leave to issue five additional third-party subpoenas in advance of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(f) conference.' Previous efforts to identify the Doe Defendant via information directly from the Medium site on which the defamatory postings were made have taken the Plaintiffs only so far as receiving IP addresses with no names or contact information and Plaintiffs now require information from four internet service providers (each an “ISP”) and from Google to advance efforts to identify Doe and effectuate service of the summons and complaint. Plaintiffs seeks to issue subpoenas to ISP providers Verizon, Eonix (Serverhub), M247, and Performive (formerly Total Server Solutions) and to email provider Google in advance of the Rule 26(f) conference to ascertain the true identity of Doe. All parties do not consent to this letter motion as Plaintiffs do not currently know the true identity of Defendant Jane Doe (“Doe”) and thus have been unable to request Doe’s consent but Plaintiffs have reached out to each ISP in an attempt to inform them of Plaintiffs’ request. Background As the Court is aware, Plaintiffs filed this defamation action against a “Jane Doe” defendant because Plaintiffs are unable to ascertain the true identity of Doe without discovery. Doe is known to Plaintiffs only through Doe’s accounts on Medium of @kittykat97 (a/k/a @kittykat) and

1 The Court helpfully granted Plaintiffs’ prior letter motion ordering the issuance of a third-party subpoena to Medium (Dkt. No. 7).

@Edmnation2020 (a/k/a @Edmnation).2 Upon information and belief, Medium was in possession of other information that would help identify Doe, including but likely not limited to, Doe’s email address and related IP addresses. Plaintiffs sought to issue a subpoena to Medium prior to a Rule 26(f) conference seeking the personal information of Doe, as Plaintiffs were unable to hold a Rule 26(f) conference without first ascertaining the true identity of Doe and serving Doe with the Summons and Complaint. On June 24, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ letter motion and ordered a third-party subpoena to be issued to Medium provided that (i) the information sought may be uploaded to counsel from a location within 100 miles of Medium's offices as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c) as interpreted by Mackey v. IDT Energy, Inc., 2019 WL 2004280 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019), and (ii) the information is reasonably related to the identification of the Doe defendant. That order was immediately relayed to the lawyers for Medium. Medium’s Response Despite this Court’s order and direction on June 24, 2020, and Counsel for Medium’s indication that it would accept service of a subpoena by email once Plaintiffs received authorization of early discovery—in addition to Medium’s demand that the subpoena must specify a place of compliance within 100 miles of Medium’s office in San Francisco—Counsel for Medium nonetheless considered the order inappropriate and the subpoena defective, and refused to accept service unless the subpoena still included an address within 100 miles of San Francisco. Counsel for Medium’s interpretation of the 100-mile rule in conjunction with this Court’s order cost Plaintiff nearly two weeks of back and forth simply to appease Counsel for Medium regarding the 100-mile rule (even though this Court helpfully clarified that the correct approach to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c) is as is interpreted by Mackey v. IDT Energy, Inc., just as had been pointed out in our previous correspondence). Once Plaintiffs’ acquiesced to Counsel for Medium’s insistence and included an address in the San Francisco Bay area, Plaintiffs were then informed that the subscriber had not yet even been given notice that their subscriber information had been requested, despite Plaintiffs having—by then—been writing to Medium’s Counsel since the middle of May. This required an additional 21-day delay before Medium would respond to the subpoena endorsed by this Court with actual information. Information Finally Received by Medium was Limited The information responsive to Plaintiffs’ subpoena was not provided by Medium until July 29, 2020, and that information was limited, confirming only that the two accounts were created contemporaneously with the defamatory articles being posted and only for the purpose of posting those articles. Indeed, Medium somehow did not even have copies of the original articles that were posted, despite Plaintiffs’ having initially reached out to Medium to remove the articles from public view due to their defamatory nature. However, the information from Medium also included internet provider (IP) addresses—that ISPs can use to track individual accounts if the IP address is associated with a particular ISP—and two Gmail email addresses. 2 Upon information and belief, the two Medium accounts of @kittykat97 and @Edmnation2020 are owned and operated by the same person: Doe. IPs and ISPs Investigation and Communication Further investigation of the IP addresses over the course of August and early September, along with productive follow-up communications directly with Medium Legal, suggested that the Medium website was accessed for the purposes of creating the account and posting the articles at locations in or near Miami Airport and in or near JFK Airport over the course of the early hours of Sunday, March 22, 2020, through Thursday, March 26, 2020. Plaintiffs were also able to ascertain that the ISPs corresponding to the times Doe accessed the Medium accounts were Verizon, Eonix (Serverhub), M247, and Performive (formerly Total Server Solutions). Over the course of the rest of September and in to October, Plaintiffs determined the means by which to contact these ISPs in order to request information or indeed to issue a formal subpoena if required. On September 9, 2020, emails and letters were sent to all four ISPs. Eonix (Serverhub) replied to Plaintiffs’ letter and email directing a subpoena to be sent to a specified email addresses upon receipt of which they will provide the subscriber information as requested. Verizon provided a response on September 29, 2020, asking for more specific information accompanying the IP address, such as dates, times, etc. Verizon also indicated that to provide the information requested they need a court order endorsed by a judge or magistrate. The email sent to the address provided via the M247 website bounced back as undeliverable and a letter mailed to a New York City address listed as associated with M247 was likewise returned and marked “return to sender.” M247’s main office is located in the United Kingdom but it holds itself out as having a “local team” based in New York.

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