Taylor v. Doe

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Taylor v. Doe

167 A.D.2d 984, 562 N.Y.S.2d 6, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14332

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 16, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 167 A.D.2d 984 (Taylor v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Doe, 167 A.D.2d 984, 562 N.Y.S.2d 6, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14332 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

Pincite

Opinion

Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: In this personal injury action, Supreme Court granted defendants’ request for a protective order vacating item 9 of plaintiffs combined demands for discovery. That was error.

Plaintiffs request sought: "All written complaints and accident reports of those persons who claim their shoes were caught in the joint space and/or substance(s)/filler therein, whether said claim resulted in bodily injury or property damage, from the date of construction up until the date of the accident.” We conclude that this demand constituted a request for prior similar accidents and was thus proper (see, Klatz v Armor Elevator Co., 93 AD2d 633, 637-638). There is no merit to defendants’ argument that the request was overly broad (see, Sullivan v New York City Tr. Auth., 109 AD2d 879, 880; Barnes v Barnes, 96 AD2d 894; Palmieri v Kilcourse, 91 AD2d 657). Moreover, reports of property damage claims were properly demanded because such documents are material and relevant in establishing the existence of a dangerous condition and defendants’ notice thereof (see, Klatz v Armor Elevator Co., supra). Finally, plaintiff need not resort to other discovery devices before resorting to discovery pursuant to CPLR 3120 (see, Brady v Wyeth Labs., 106 AD2d 795, 796). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Nassau County, Burke, J.—discovery.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Pine and Davis, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: In this personal injury action, Supreme Court granted defendants’ request for a protective order vacating item 9 of plaintiffs combined demands for discovery. That was error.

Plaintiffs request sought: "All written complaints and accident reports of those persons who claim their shoes were caught in the joint space and/or substance(s)/filler therein, whether said claim resulted in bodily injury or property damage, from the date of construction up until the date of the accident.” We conclude that this demand constituted a request for prior similar accidents and was thus proper (see, Klatz v Armor Elevator Co., 93 AD2d 633, 637-638). There is no merit to defendants’ argument that the request was overly broad (see, Sullivan v New York City Tr. Auth., 109 AD2d 879, 880; Barnes v Barnes, 96 AD2d 894; Palmieri v Kilcourse, 91 AD2d 657). Moreover, reports of property damage claims were properly demanded because such documents are material and relevant in establishing the existence of a dangerous condition and defendants’ notice thereof (see, Klatz v Armor Elevator Co., supra). Finally, plaintiff need not resort to other discovery devices before resorting to discovery pursuant to CPLR 3120 (see, Brady v Wyeth Labs., 106 AD2d 795, 796). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Nassau County, Burke, J.—discovery.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Pine and Davis, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

167 A.D.2d 984, 562 N.Y.S.2d 6, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-doe-nyappdiv-1990.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack