Taylor v. Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement

4 Cal. App. 5th 801, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 81 Cal. Comp. Cases 1016, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 912

Opinion

Opinion

BRUINIERS, J.

The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), imposed a $179,329.60 penalty, pursuant to Labor Code section 3722, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 3722(b)), 1 against A. Taylor, LLC, 2 for failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance as required by section 3700. Taylor requested an administrative hearing and then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus under section 3725. The petition was dismissed after the trial court sustained DLSE’s demurrer without leave to amend. On appeal, Taylor renews various statutory construction and constitutional challenges to the penalty and section 3722(b). In the published portion of this opinion, we hold “calendar year,” as used in section 3722(b), means the 12-month period immediately preceding a determination that an employer has been uninsured for the requisite period. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject Taylor’s constitutional challenges. We conclude the trial court properly determined the petihon for writ of mandate failed to state a cause of action and affirm.

I. Statutory Background

The purposes of the workers’ compensation scheme are “(1) to ensure that the cost of industrial injuries will be part of the cost of goods rather than a burden on society, (2) to guarantee prompt, limited compensation for an employee’s work injuries, regardless of fault, as an inevitable cost of production, (3) to spur increased industrial safety, and (4) in return, to insulate the employer from tort liability for his employees’ injuries.” (S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 354 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399].) To accomplish those goals, “[e]very employer except the state must secure the payment of workers’ compensation either by obtaining insurance against liability from a duly authorized insurer or by securing from the Director of Industrial Relations a certificate of consent to self-insure. (§ 3700, subds. (a), (b).) . . . [¶] When an employer fails to secure workers’ compensation required by sechon 3700, the director ‘shall issue and serve on such employer a stop order prohibiting the use of employee labor by such employer unhl the employer’s compliance with the provisions of Section 3700. Such stop order shall become effective immediately upon service.’ (§ 3710.1.)” (Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872].) “An employer’s failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees can [also] result in criminal punishment, including a fine or imprisonment or both [(§ 3700.5)], administrative penalties [(§§ 3711, 3722)] and a civil suit for damages by an injured employee [(§ 3706)].” (Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 195], fns. omitted.)

“An employer may contest a penalty assessment order by filing a written request for a hearing within 15 days after service of the order. (. . . § 3725.) Upon receipt of the request, the director must set the matter for a hearing within 30 days. (Ibid.) An employer aggrieved by the decision of the director may take a writ of mandate from the findings upon the execution of a bond to the state in double the amount found due, as long as the party agrees to pay any judgment and costs rendered against the party for the assessment. (Ibid.)” (Starving Students, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1365 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 583] (Starving Students).)

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Aaron’s Automotive has been in operation since 2007. On January 22, 2015, DLSE inspected and discovered the business had employees but had never acquired workers’ compensation insurance coverage. On February 9, 2015, Taylor obtained coverage through the State Compensation Insurance Fund, which was effective as of January 29, 2015. On February 27, 2015, pursuant to section 3722(b), DFSE issued a “Penalty Assessment Order” (citation No. 008907), assessing a penalty against Taylor in the amount of $179,329.60.

Taylor filed a request for an administrative appeal hearing. On April 3, 2015, the hearing was held before a DESE hearing officer. At the hearing, Taylor argued (1) the term calendar year, as used in section 3722(b), means January 1 to December 31; (2) section 3722(b) violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the penalty violates substantive due process; and (4) the penalty is an excessive fine imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

On April 8, 2015, the hearing officer issued written findings and affirmed the penalty assessment. The hearing officer found: “[Taylor] did not have workers’ compensation insurance for the period of February 27, 2012 through January 29, 2015 and had 11 employees during that time period.” The hearing officer concluded Taylor’s constitutional arguments provided no basis for defense in an administrative hearing and also determined the term calendar year, as used in section 3722(b), means “one year back from the date that the director determines an employer has been uninsured on the date the citation is issued.” (Italics omitted.)

Thereafter, Taylor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), seeking to have the penalty set aside. In support of the petition, Taylor argued DLSE committed errors of law by rejecting its constitutional claims and its interpretation of calendar year. Taylor also filed a motion for an order waiving section 3725’s bond requirement.

DLSE demurred to the petition, asserting Taylor failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because section 3722(b) is not unconstitutional and was properly construed. In support of its demurrer, DLSE filed a request for judicial notice of section 3722’s legislative history. Taylor opposed DLSE’s demurrer and filed a request for judicial notice of additional legislative history.

The trial court issued a tentative ruling, 3 which was adopted as the ruling of the court after hearing on the two motions. The trial court sustained DLSE’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissed Taylor’s petition for administrative mandamus, and entered judgment in favor of DLSE in the amount of $179,329.60.

The trial court’s order states: “The court . . . rejects the arguments by [Taylor] that the term ‘calendar year’ should be interpreted to mean the January 1 through December 31 time period for the year preceding the citation date, instead of the 365 days prior to issuance of the citation. [¶] . . . [¶] It is . . . consistent with analogous statutes of limitations to define ‘calendar year’ as used within . . . section 3722(b) as referring to the time period of 365 days up to issuance of the citation in question, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 340(a) [one-year statute of limitations for civil penalty actions]. [¶] Furthermore, . . . under either the DLSE’s interpretation, or [Taylor’s] urged interpretation, [Aaron’s Automotive] qualified as an employer which had gone for a time period longer than 1 week without the required workers’ compensation insurance. [Aaron’s Automotive] had in fact been without workers’ compensation insurance from its inception, in 2007, to January 29, 2015 . . . . [¶] The court has also considered, and rejects, [Taylor’s] arguments that [section] 3722 violated due process, excessive fine, and equal protection provision^] of the federal and/or state constitutions. Similar due process and excessive fine claims were rejected in Starving Students[, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at page 1361] . . . .” (Italics added.) Declaring the issue moot, the trial court did not address Taylor’s motion for an order waiving bond. Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

III. Discussion

Taylor contends the trial court erred in sustaining DLSE’s demurrer. Specifically, Taylor maintains (1) section 3725’s bond requirement is unconstitutional; (2) the trial court incorrectly construed the meaning of calendar year in section 3722(b); (3) the penalty assessed violates state and federal constitutional provisions barring excessive fines (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17); (4) section 3722(b) on its face or as applied violates equal protection and is a deprivation of due process of law as guaranteed by the federal and California Constitutions (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., arts. I, § 7, IV, § 16, subd. (a)).

“The inquiry for the issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus is whether the agency in question prejudicially abused its discretion . . . . [Citations.] A prejudicial abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law . . . .” (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 673-674 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 745].) Taylor has not shown a viable claim for mandamus can be stated under any theory. 4

A. Standard of Review

We review questions of constitutional law and statutory construction de novo. (Starving Students, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363; Crawley v. Alameda County Waste Management Authority (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 396, 403 [196 Cal.Rptr.3d 365].) Similarly, “[o]n appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] First, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. Next, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Then we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] [¶] We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439-440 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 330].) “ ‘We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58].) “[The appellant] has the burden to show either that the demurrer was sustained erroneously or that the court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.” (Pinnacle Holdings, Inc. v. Simon (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1434 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 778]; accord, Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 [167 Cal.Rptr.3d 687].)

B. Statutory Construction of Section 3722(b)

The parties frame this case as primarily a dispute regarding the meaning of calendar year in section 3722(b). Section 3722 provides, in relevant part: “(a) At the time the stop order is issued and served pursuant to Section 3710.1, the director [5] shall also issue and serve a penalty assessment order requiring the uninsured employer to pay to the director, for deposit in the State Treasury to the credit of the Uninsured Employers Fund, the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) per employee employed at the time the order is issued and served, as an additional penalty for being uninsured at that time or issue and serve a penalty assessment order pursuant to subdivision (b).

“(b) At any time that the director determines that an employer has been uninsured for a period in excess of one week during the calendar year preceding the determination, the director shall issue and serve a penalty assessment order requiring the uninsured employer to pay to the director, for deposit in the State Treasury to the credit of the Uninsured Employers Fund, the greater of (1) twice the amount the employer would have paid in workers’ compensation premiums during the period the employer was uninsured, determined according to subdivision (c), or (2) the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) per employee employed during the period the employer was uninsured. A penalty assessment issued and served by the director pursuant to this subdivision shall be in lieu of, and not in addition to, any other penalty issued and served by the director pursuant to subdivision (a).

“(c) If the employer is currently insured, or becomes insured during the period during which the penalty under subdivision (b) is being determined, the amount an employer would have paid in workers’ compensation premiums shall be calculated by prorating the current premium for the number of weeks the employer was uninsured within the three-year period immediately prior to the date the penalty assessment is issued. If the employer is uninsured at the time the penalty under subdivision (b) is being determined, the amount an employer would have paid in workers’ compensation premiums shall be the product of the employer’s payroll for all periods of time the employer was uninsured within the three-year period immediately prior to the date the penalty assessment is issued multiplied by a rate determined in accordance with regulations that may be adopted by the director or, if none has been adopted, the manual rate or rates of the State Compensation Insurance Fund for the employer’s governing classification pursuant to the standard classification system approved by the Insurance Commissioner.” (Italics added.)

It is undisputed that the date of ‘“the determination” is the date the penalty assessment citation issued—in this case, February 27, 2015. Taylor maintains the term calendar year necessarily means January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014, and that ‘“this is the required statutory interpretation of this term no matter how absurd the result of that interpretation . . . .” (Boldface & underscoring omitted.) DLSE, on the other hand, insists calendar year means ‘“the one-year period immediately before the date that the director determines that an employer is uninsured”—or, in this case, February 27, 2014, to February 27, 2015. DLSE urges us to analogize section 3722(b) to ‘“a one year statute of limitations on issuing a citation.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subds. (a), (b).) In other words, section 3722(b) allows a citation to be issued ‘“if the DLSE determines that an employer was uninsured [in excess of one week] during the past year, whether or not the employer subsequently obtains insurance.” (Italics added.)

It may appear we need not construe the meaning of calendar year in order to decide this appeal. The trial court was certainly correct that under either construction of the statute, Taylor was properly subject to a penalty under section 3722(b). Aaron’s Automotive was uninsured for over three years consecutively and consequently was uninsured for more than one week during the 12 months preceding the determination, as well as the period between January 1 and December 31, 2014. Thus, even if Taylor’s statutory interpretation is correct, the penalty assessed by DLSE in this case would not be invalidated. Nor would the amount of the penalty imposed be any less. In their equal protection arguments, Taylor and DLSE agree that, under section 3722(b) and subdivision (c) of section 3722, the calendar year that triggers the penalty is distinct from the period of time considered to calculate the penalty. As phrased by DLSE, ‘“failure to insure in the calendar year preceding the determination is only the triggering event. . . . The penalty is then assessed based on the length of the violation going back a maximum of three years. [(§ 3722, subds. (b), (c).)]” Or, as stated by Taylor, ‘“the penalty is imposed because of acts and/or omissions in the calendar year preceding the issuance and service of the penalty assessment order, while the penalty assessed, on the other hand, is calculated by looking at matters respecting the three years preceding the service and issuance of the Penalty Assessment Order.” (Italics, boldface & underscoring omitted.) We nevertheless resolve the statutory construction issue because it significantly affects our analysis in the unpublished portion of our opinion, specifically with respect to Taylor’s equal protection challenge.

“ ‘Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the underlying legislative intent. [Citation.] Intent is determined foremost by the plain meaning of the statutory language. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction. When the language is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, it is proper to examine a variety of extrinsic aids in an effort to discern the intended meaning. We may consider, for example, the statutory scheme, the apparent purposes underlying the statute and the presence (or absence) of instructive legislative history.’ ” (Starving Students, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363; accord, DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387-388 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523, 853 P.2d 978].) “ ‘ “ ‘When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 360, 939 P.2d 760].)

‘“In interpreting a statute (or a constitutional provision), we are called upon to avoid absurd results. ‘. . . ‘“Where the language of a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which will be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted. In other words, where the meaning is doubtful, any construction which would lead to absurd results should be rejected . . . since absurd results are not supposed to have been contemplated by the legislature.” ’ ” (Gilbert v. Chiang (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 537, 551 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 864].)

Workers’ compensation statutes ‘“shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.” (§ 3202.) However, “ ‘the rule of liberal construction stated in section 3202 should not be used to defeat the overall statutory framework and fundamental rules of statutory construction.’ ” (DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 398.) ‘“In the absence of compelling countervailing considerations, we must assume that the Legislature ‘knew what it was saying and meant what it said.’ ” (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764 [150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227].)

The interpretation of section 3722(b) is a question of first impression. Accordingly, Taylor relies on Earl Ranch, Ltd. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 767 [53 P.2d 154] (Earl Ranch), in which our Supreme Court construed the term calendar year in an unrelated workers’ compensation statute. In Earl Ranch, a farm laborer’s workers’ compensation award was annulled on the ground the agricultural employer was not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Earl Ranch, at p. 768.) At the time, the act automatically excluded agricultural employers, without any requirement to opt out, “ ‘ “where the payroll of such employer for the preceding calendar year has not exceeded five hundred dollars.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) The employee maintained “calendar year” should be construed to mean the 12 months preceding his injury on June 17, 1932. The distinction mattered because the employer acquired the ranch only two months before the injury and had no payroll whatsoever before April 1, 1932. In the two months after acquisition, the employer’s payroll exceeded the threshold sum. (Ibid.)

The Earl Ranch court rejected the employee’s interpretation, stating “ ‘[t]he words “calendar year” mean from January 1 to December 31 next, inclusive.’ ” (Earl Ranch, supra, 4 Cal.2d at pp. 768-769.) The court also emphasized it could not construe the statute in the employee’s favor to avoid “an absurd result”—effectively granting a one-year period of automatic exemption to farm owners who have only recently commenced business— because to do so “would be to ignore the statute and not to construe it.” (Id. at p. 769.) “In other words, the readily understandable term ‘calendar year’ is what the legislature used, and it must, under the circumstances, be taken as the expression of the legislative intent, even though the legislature may have used it without the fullest understanding of the possible consequences. [Citations.] It is both futile and dangerous for a court to tamper with unmistakable language of a statute in order to achieve some imagined and undisclosed legislative purpose.” (Ibid.)

In relying heavily on Earl Ranch, Taylor ignores a cardinal rule of statutory construction—that we construe words, not in isolation, but in context. We agree with DLSE that Earl Ranch is distinguishable because the term calendar year was used in a different statutory context in that case. In Earl Ranch, the term calendar year was used without reference to any specific date merely to identify a period of time in which to measure payroll. (Earl Ranch, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 768; accord, Annot., What 12-month Period Constitutes “Year” or “Calendar Year” as Used in Public Enactment, Contract, or Other Written Instrument (1966) 5 A.L.R.3d 584, 588 (hereafter Annotation).) In contrast, in section 3722(b), calendar year is used to measure a period of time preceding a specific reference date.

We simply cannot agree with the proposition Taylor attributes to Earl Ranch—that the meaning of calendar year is always free from ambiguity. In fact, the dictionary gives two meanings for the term: “1: a period of a year beginning and ending with the dates that are conventionally accepted as marking the beginning and end of a numbered year [¶] 2: a period of time equal in length to that of the year in the calendar conventionally in use.” (Merriam-Webster Diet. Online (2016) <http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/calendar%20year> [as of Oct. 26, 2016], italics added.) Recognizing the latter meaning, other courts have considered “calendar year” and “year” to be synonymous. (See U.S. v. Tawab (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1533, 1534; Board of Education v. Raubinger (1963) 78 N.J. Super. 90 [187 A.2d 614, 617-620] [construing a statute providing for tenure after an employment period of “three consecuhve calendar years” to mean employment for 36 months]; accord, Annot., supra, 5 A.L.R.3d at p. 588.)

We cannot construe the term calendar year without considering the broader statutory context in which it is used. (See Phelps v. Stostad, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 32; Hops v. Poe (1914) 25 Cal.App. 451, 453-454 [143 P. 1072] [meaning of “year” is “ ‘dependent upon the subject matter and the connection in which it is used’ ”].) Because the term calendar year is directly linked to “preceding the determination”—and the determination date could obviously occur in any month of the year—the statutory language is most reasonably construed to mean the 12-month period preceding the determination.

Nor is our construction absurd or inconsistent with the apparent purpose of section 3722(b). As previously mentioned, section 3700 requires employers to “secure the payment of compensation” to employees by obtaining workers’ compensation insurance. “The securing of the payment of compensation in a way provided in this division is essential to the funchoning of the expressly declared social public policy of this state in the matter of workers’ compensation.” (§ 3712, subd. (a).) An employer who fails to have workers’ compensation coverage in effect on a particular date of inspection may be subject to penalhes under sechon 3722, subdivision (a). Subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 3722, quite clearly were enacted to provide harsher penalties for those employers who have more egregiously failed or refused to obtain workers’ compensation insurance. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 749 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats. 2002, Summary Dig., p. 9 [“bill would authorize the director to assess a higher amount upon a determination that an employer has been uninsured for a period in excess of one week during the calendar year preceding the determination”]; Sen. Com. on Labor & Industrial Relations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 313 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 27, 2009, p. 4 [“author and supporters of SB313 believe the bill will create a more effective penalty structure for employers that fail to maintain workers’ compensation coverage . . . [, arguing] that under the current scheme employers may face a penalty that is less than what their workers’ compensation costs would have [been], thus creating a disincentive to have coverage”]; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 313 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 2, 2009, p. 4.)

“An important function of penalty assessment under the challenged statutory scheme is to help finance the California Uninsured Employers Fund, a source of funds for injured workers whose employers have failed or refused either to obtain workers’ compensation insurance coverage, or to qualify as self-insurers for the employers’ liability.” (Bradshaw v. Park, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1275-1276, citing DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 388-389.) While Taylor is subject to section 3722(b) penalties regardless of how we construe the term, it would not further this finance function to exempt another employer from section 3722(b) penalties if they were determined on February 27, 2015, to be uninsured in excess of one week within January 2015. (See Sen. Com. on Fabor & Industrial Relations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 313 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 27, 2009, p. 4 [“SB313 will reduce the amount law-abiding employers have to pay to the [Uninsured Employers Benefit Trust Fund]”].)

Taylor maintains the 2009 amendment to section 3722 makes clear the Fegislature knew how to differentiate between a calendar year and a “one-year period” when it used the term “three-year period” in subdivision (c) to delineate the “look back” period for penalties imposed under subdivision (b). (See Stats. 2009, ch. 640, § 1; Fab. Code, § 3722, subd. (c) [“amount an employer would have paid in workers’ compensation premiums shall be calculated by prorating the current premium for the number of weeks the employer was uninsured within the three-year period immediately prior to the date the penalty assessment is issued” (italics added)].) We do not view this amendment as Taylor does, and, in fact, believe subdivision (c) bolsters our resolution of the ambiguity in subdivision (b). It is unlikely that the Fegisla-ture intended that, using this case as an example, subdivision (b) would only be triggered by Taylor’s period of uninsurance between January 1 and December 31, 2014, but also intend penalties should be collected for the period Taylor was uninsured in January 2015.

For all of these reasons, we conclude calendar year, as used in section 3722(b), means the 12-month period immediately preceding the determination. In this case, a triggering event of uninsurance did occur between February 27, 2014, and February 27, 2015. Therefore, our construction of the statute does not in any way invalidate the penalty imposed.

C., D. *

IV. Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. DLSE is entitled to its costs on appeal.

Simons, Acting P. J., and Needham, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied November 21, 2016, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 15, 2017, S238763.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. Section 3722(b) provides, in relevant part: “At any time that the director determines that an employer has been uninsured for a period in excess of one week during the calendar year preceding the determination, the director shall issue and serve a penalty assessment order requiring the uninsured employer to pay to the director, for deposit in the State Treasury to the credit of the Uninsured Employers Fund, the greater of (1) twice the amount the employer would have paid in workers’ compensation premiums during the period the employer was uninsured, determined according to subdivision (c), or (2) the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) per employee employed during the period the employer was uninsured.” (Italics added.)

2 A. Taylor, LLC, does business as Aaron’s Automotive, and its sole member is Aaron Taylor. We refer to appellants collectively as Taylor.

3 On February 1, 2016, Taylor filed a request for judicial notice of a printout of the “Splash Page” from the DLSE website, the trial court’s tentative ruling on DLSE’s demurrer, the trial court clerk’s notice of filing appeal, and a file-stamped copy of the proof of service of the notice of appeal. We deferred ruling on the unopposed motion and now grant the request for judicial notice of the latter three documents. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) We deny the request for judicial notice of the printout from the DLSE website, as Taylor has not demonstrated its relevance to the issues on appeal. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 169 P.3d 559].)

4 Because the petition for administrative mandamus fails to state a cause of action, we need not reach Taylor’s argument regarding section 3725’s bond requirement. We also do not address any of the arguments Taylor raises only in passing. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481] [if no legal argument with citation to authority “ ‘is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration’ ”].)

[5] 5 “ ‘[D]irector’ means the Director of Industrial Relations or the director’s designated agents.” (§ 3710, subd. (c).)

* See footnote, ante, page 801.