Taylor v. Daniels

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Taylor v. Daniels

244 A.D.2d 176, 664 N.Y.S.2d 6, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11052

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 6, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 244 A.D.2d 176 (Taylor v. Daniels) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Daniels, 244 A.D.2d 176, 664 N.Y.S.2d 6, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11052 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J., and a jury), entered on or about September 30, 1996, awarding plaintiff damages in an action for personal injuries sustained in a car accident, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The proof showed that plaintiff was traveling in the left-hand lane of a three-lane highway when her car suddenly malfunctioned and coasted to a stop in the left lane; that defendant was driving in the center lane, following closely behind a van that was proceeding too slowly for his liking; that in passing the van, defendant increased his speed and entered the left lane; and that defendant struck plaintiff’s vehicle from behind. Under no view of this evidence could the jury have concluded that defendant was faced with an emergency that was not of his own making (see, Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327-328; Francis v New York City Tr. Auth., 237 AD2d 107). Accordingly, defendant’s request for an emergency doctrine charge was properly denied. Nor is there merit to defendant’s claim that the court improperly allowed plaintiff medical witness to testify about possible future surgery without defendant ever having been advised of that possibility prior to trial, in violation of 22 NYCRR 202.17 (h). That rule does not preclude a medical witness from “detail [ing] the functional consequences of previously reported injuries or conditions” (Shehata v Sushiden Am., 190 AD2d 620). Here, the witness clearly was not advancing any new injury or condition, but instead merely relating a conclusion that could have been reasonably anticipated from the injuries that were fully disclosed to defendant. Significantly, plaintiffs bill of particulars expressly stated that she might have to undergo future surgery. We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Wallach, J. P., Nardelli, Tom, Mazzarelli and Colabella, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J., and a jury), entered on or about September 30, 1996, awarding plaintiff damages in an action for personal injuries sustained in a car accident, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The proof showed that plaintiff was traveling in the left-hand lane of a three-lane highway when her car suddenly malfunctioned and coasted to a stop in the left lane; that defendant was driving in the center lane, following closely behind a van that was proceeding too slowly for his liking; that in passing the van, defendant increased his speed and entered the left lane; and that defendant struck plaintiff’s vehicle from behind. Under no view of this evidence could the jury have concluded that defendant was faced with an emergency that was not of his own making (see, Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327-328; Francis v New York City Tr. Auth., 237 AD2d 107). Accordingly, defendant’s request for an emergency doctrine charge was properly denied. Nor is there merit to defendant’s claim that the court improperly allowed plaintiff medical witness to testify about possible future surgery without defendant ever having been advised of that possibility prior to trial, in violation of 22 NYCRR 202.17 (h). That rule does not preclude a medical witness from “detail [ing] the functional consequences of previously reported injuries or conditions” (Shehata v Sushiden Am., 190 AD2d 620). Here, the witness clearly was not advancing any new injury or condition, but instead merely relating a conclusion that could have been reasonably anticipated from the injuries that were fully disclosed to defendant. Significantly, plaintiffs bill of particulars expressly stated that she might have to undergo future surgery. We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Wallach, J. P., Nardelli, Tom, Mazzarelli and Colabella, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

244 A.D.2d 176, 664 N.Y.S.2d 6, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11052, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-daniels-nyappdiv-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack