Taylor v. Commissioner

1988 T.C. Memo. 389, 55 T.C.M. 1642, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 419
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Taylor v. Commissioner. Read the opinion of the Court — 54 T.C.M. 129
United States Tax Court·Decided August 22, 1988·No. Docket No. 15059-86.·Unpublished

Opinion

QUINBY TAYLOR, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Taylor v. Commissioner
Docket No. 15059-86.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1988-389; 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 419; 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642; T.C.M. (RIA) 88389;
August 22, 1988.
*419

Held, various items of income, deductions and additions to tax determined.

Quinby Taylor, pro se.
Mary P. Hamilton, for the respondent.

NIMS

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

NIMS, Chief Judge: Respondent determined the following deficiencies in income taxes and additions to tax against petitioner for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982:

Additions to Tax:
YearDeficiencySec. 6653(a) 1Sec. 6661 2
1980$  62,443.58$ 3,122.18$    -- 
1981101,846.555,092.33-- 
1982103,566.915,178.3510,356.69

Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for additions to tax under section 6653(a)(2) for the taxable years 1981 and 1982. Such additions equal to 50 percent of the statutory interest on the underpayment are to be computed at the time any deficiencies are assessed (or, if earlier, the date they are *420 paid).

The issues for decision are:

1) Whether petitioner failed to report dividend, interest and capital gain income for 1980, 1981 and 1982;

2) Whether petitioner is entitled to certain deductions in 1980 and 1981 for a casualty loss, interest expense and other miscellaneous items;

3) Whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax under section 6653(a) for 1980, 1981 and 1982 and under section 6661 for 1982.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Pursuant to Rule 91(f), this Court entered an order deeming the matters set forth in respondent's proposed stipulation of facts as maintained for purposes of this case. Respondent's counsel, prior to trial, on May 29, 1987, sent petitioner the proposed stipulation of facts along with attached exhibits and a copy of Rule 91. By letter of June 2, 1987, petitioner requested an example of a stipulation of facts and other information and documents. Counsel for respondent in a June 9, 1987, letter advised petitioner that an example of a stipulation of facts had been enclosed in the previous May 29, 1987, letter. From then until the case was called for trial, no response or meaningful communication was made by petitioner with respondent's counsel in regard *421 to the case. Upon inquiry from the Court, petitioner acknowledged receiving the Notice Setting Case for Trial sent by the Clerk of the Court on January 22, 1987. This notice specifically advises that the parties are required to "agree in writing to all facts and all documents about which there should be no disagreement." The notice further advises that failure to cooperate may result in the dismissal of the case. Enclosed with the notice of trial was a directive concerning pretrial procedures, which specifically directed petitioner's attention to Rule 91. Petitioner's reason for failing to comply with Rule 91 was that he feared he would be stipulating away the case. This is not an adequate reason for failing to comply with the Court's directive regarding stipulation under Rule 91.

The stipulation of facts and the exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein by this reference.

At the time he filed his petition, petitioner resided in West Newton, Massachusetts.

Petitioner at the time of trial was 68 years old and had experienced some health problems. He owns two homes, one in West Newton, Massachusetts, and the other on Cape Cod in North Falmouth, Massachusetts. Petitioner *422 attended Andover Academy and Milton Academy. He attended Harvard College as an undergraduate and then Harvard Law School.

Upon graduation from law school, petitioner worked as an associate for two law firms. He is also licensed as a stockbroker and has worked for two brokerage firms. Petitioner additionally is licensed to sell mutual funds.

For the past 30 years, petitioner has not worked for anyone but has devoted himself to managing his own investment portfolio. During this period he has lived on his dividend and interest income.

Petitioner over the years and specifically in 1980, 1981 and 1982 owned many stocks. While it was not his practice to frequently sell shares which he owned, petitioner would do so on occasion. For instance, he would sometimes sell some shares to give his friend, a broker at Kidder Peabody, some business.

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Taylor v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C. Memo. 389, 55 T.C.M. 1642, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 419 (tax 1988).

1988 T.C. Memo. 389 (Taylor v. Commissioner) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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