Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedDecember 12, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01707
StatusUnknown

This text of Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (N.D. Ohio 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER GEORGE TAYLOR, CASE NO. 1:23-CV-01707

Plaintiff, JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

v.

DR. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND Acting Commissioner of the ORDER Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Christopher George Taylor (“Plaintiff”) filed this action to contest a judgment denying him social security benefits entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in 2014. He contends that the District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) before the time to file objections expired. He asks this Court to declare that judgment to be void. For the reasons herein stated, this case is dismissed. Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2). That Application is granted. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an action in 2012 in the United States District Court of the Western District of Louisiana seeking review of a Social Security Administration decision. See Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:12 CV 1756 (WDLA May 15, 2014) (“Taylor I”). Plaintiff indicates he had been granted disability benefits, but he filed the action to contest the determination of the date of the onset of his disability. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2). Plaintiff alleges that the Magistrate Judge issued a R&R on April 28, 2014, proposing that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, and that the appeal be denied and dismissed with prejudice. (Id.). The R&R stated that objections must be filed within fourteen days from the date of service. (Id.). The Court docket indicated that the objections were due on or before May 15, 2014. Plaintiff contends that the R&R was postmarked on May 1, 2014. (Id. at PageID #3).

Plaintiff indicates that the District Court adopted the R&R dismissing the case without prejudice on May 15, 2014, even though the time for filing objections had not yet closed. (Id.). Nearly three months later, on August 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed his objections to the R&R and also filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment. (ECF No. 4, PageID #17). He argued that the District Court had prematurely adopted the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. (Id.). The District Court rejected the Motion to Vacate, stating that Plaintiff had not attempted to file objections within the fourteen- day time period. (Id.). Instead, he missed the deadline by nearly three months. (Id.). He concluded that even if the adoption of the R&R was earlier than the full fourteen days, Plaintiff was not prejudiced by that action. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed that decision to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision on June 11, 2015. (Id. at PageID #15). Now, nine years after the Western District of Louisiana dismissed his case and more than eight years after the appellate court affirmed that decision, Plaintiff filed this case in the Northern District of Ohio. (ECF No. 1). He asks this Court to review the judgment of the Western District of Louisiana and declare it to be void. (Id.). STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998). DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, this District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the decision of another District Court. See, e.g., Dana Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., Nos. 3:83CV1153, 3:85CV7491, 1997 WL 135591, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 1997) (“One district court has no such jurisdiction over another district court”) (citing Graves v. Sneed, 541 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1976)); Elliott v. Chairman of the U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., No. 2:17-CV-47, 2017 WL 6102809, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017) (dismissing on other grounds but noting “the Court’s ability to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this case — which, according to Mr. Elliott’s allegations, derives from proceedings before the Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit — is dubious”); Laues v. Roberts, No. 2:14–CV–12313, 2015 WL 1412631, at *4-5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2015) (finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to address the

Plaintiff’s challenges to the Judge’s prior rulings in another District Court case); United States v. Westine, No. 14–10, 2014 WL 7004930, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2014) (“[T]his Court has no jurisdiction to upset or review a past judgment issued by another District Court”). This Court is unaware of any jurisdictional grant by Congress or the United States Constitution that authorizes one District Court to sit in review of a judgment by another District Court. This Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct such a review and grant the relief Plaintiff requests. Even if there was not the mentioned jurisdictional bar, this action would be barred by res judicata. The term “res judicata” literally means “a matter [already] judged.” The doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative litigation based on the same event or events. Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S.

Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
439 U.S. 322 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Montana v. United States
440 U.S. 147 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Boag v. MacDougall
454 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
George Graves v. Thomas E. Sneed
541 F.2d 159 (Sixth Circuit, 1976)

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Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-ohnd-2023.